












BRAZIL IN AFRICA: A HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
 
Történelemtudományi Doktori Iskola 
A Doktori Iskola vezetője: 
Dr. Erdődy Gábor DSc, az MTA doktora, egyetemi tanár 
 
Új- és jelenkori egyetemes történelem Doktori Program 
A Doktori Program vezetője: 
Dr. Szilágyi Ágnes Judit PhD, habil. egyetemi docens 
 
A bizottság tagjai és tudományos fokozatuk: 
Elnök: Dr. Székely Gábor DSc, professor emeritus 
Belső bíráló: Dr. Búr Gábor PhD, habil. egyetemi docens 
Külső bíráló: Dr. Lehoczki Bernadett PhD, egyetemi adjunktus 
Titkár: Dr. Pál István PhD, egyetemi adjunktus 
Tag: Dr. Soltész Béla PhD, egyetemi adjunktus 
Póttagok: Dr. Lugosi Győző PhD, egyetemi docens 
Dr. Rákóczi István PhD, habil. egyetemi docens 
 
Témavezető és tudományos fokozata: 





“Once, aid flowed in one 
direction from the richest 
industrialized nations to the 
developing world—a strict ‘North 
to South’ aid stream. Things are 
now more complex, with aid 
moving across the South, and 
old definitions of developed and 







“Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.”2 
                                                          
1 Lídia Cabral and Julia Weinstock, “Brazil: an emerging aid player”, Briefing Paper 64, Overseas 
Development Institute, 2010, p.1.  
2 Title of an article on Brazil’s foreign-aid policy: “Brazil’s foreign-aid programme: Speak softly and carry a 
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On September 6th, 2011, Kenya Airways made public the contract between one of Africa’s 
most dynamically growing airlines and Embraer for the delivery of ten aircraft. Titus 
Naikuni, CEO of the Kenyan airline, stated that the decision to order from the Brazilian 
company was taken after comparing the fuel consumption and maintenance costs of the three 
main airplane producers, Boeing, Airbus and Embraer. 
 
This success of a Brazilian company over American and European rivals is the latest example 
of the dynamic changes that transmute the global economy and diversify global commerce. 
South-South cooperation has been the ‘chic’ word of the beginning of the 21st century. 
Nations that have never traded before – through not existing as independent nations or for 
being dominated by more powerful nations – have suddenly started noticing each other. 
Brazil is just one of various emerging nations that have started investing heavily in upgrading 
their South-South relations at the turn of the millennium. Financial crisis, market saturation 
in the North, globalization and economic growth in the South all have influenced the 
direction of trade flows in the world economy. In addition, the non-fulfillment of what the 
North-South Cooperation (NSC) had promised to its beneficiaries worldwide (lower 
disparity in living standards, more democratic institutions in the South), has created 
disillusion in the less developed world, who are now seeking to find their own ways to 
achieving social and economic development instead of copying the Western model to the 
letter.  
 
The main players in this ‘poor-to-poor’ exchange have been China and India, but most 
recently Brazil, Turkey, Russia and Mexico, among others, have all raised their South-South 
relations to higher levels in all areas: economy, politics, diplomacy, health care, culture, 
education, and security. The traditional North to South model is being questioned by the 
emerging countries, and Africa has become the main playing field in South-South 
Development Cooperation (SSDC), with China making most of the headlines, with a handful 
of other countries actively working in its shadow.  
 
A. Thesis and structure of the dissertation 
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Brazil and Africa share a colonial history; the pernicious effects of the slave trade on 
economic development; grinding rural poverty; overburdened cities whose burgeoning 
growth is unguided by proper planning or oversight; common climatic conditions and 
dependence on natural resources, and challenges in areas such as infrastructure, land 
reforms, justice, and wealth distribution. These similarities make the task of analyzing their 
interaction especially exciting from an academic point of view.  
 
The hypotheses of the dissertation intend to prove the following: 
(1) the uniqueness of Brazilian-African cooperation is inherently related to the 
long-standing historical ties between the two parties;  
(2) nevertheless, there exists an overemphasis on the relevance of these ties with 
respect to modern-day business relations between the two sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean; and 
(3) behind the façade of the Brazilian government’s rhetoric about ‘brotherhood, 
solidarity and non-conditionality’ lies a hidden economic agenda that drives 
Brazil’s South-South partnership to at least the same extent as its 
philanthropism.  
 
The geographic focus of the paper will be the Portuguese-speaking African countries 
(commonly known as PALOP counties − Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde 
and São Tomé and Príncipe), as these states are the main partners to Brazil’s SSDC 
engagement on the continent.3 
 
The dissertation consists of an introduction, five main sections and an evaluation and 
conclusion. Section I gives a theoretical background to the North-South paradigm and 
world systems theories, as well as introducing the history of development cooperation to the 
reader. Section II familiarizes the reader with the historical context relating to Brazilian-
African relations from the time of Cabral’s discovery up to today. Section III offers an 
overview of the ideological motivations behind Brazil’s newly developed SSDC strategy, 
while Section IV introduces the reader to the institutional dimensions shaping the country’s 
                                                          
3 60% of Brazilian development cooperation was destined to Africa in 2010, of which 80% was implemented 
in the PALOP countries: Sergio Schlesinger, “Brazilian Cooperation and Investment in Africa: the case of 
ProSavana in Mozambique”, TEMTI Series of Economic Perspectives on Global Sustainability, TEMTI Series 
EP 1/2014, CEESP/IUCN, p. 3.  
 12 
SSDC policies. Section V highlights the role of the non-institutional players − especially 
that of the private sector actors − through Case Studies in formulating SSDC agenda 
priorities. The paper will conclude with a general evaluation of the evidence presented and 




The first methodological challenge is constituted by the dilemma of what constitutes a 
Middle or Rising Power. What variables, or factors should determine if a country is part of 
the ‘club’ or not? Professor Dr. Carlos R. S. Milani of the University of the State of Rio de 
Janeiro (UERJ) selected six variables to define the concept of Middle or Rising Powers: 
(1) they are all both recipients and donors of development cooperation, 
(2) they give greater importance to the diplomacy of South-South cooperation (in their 
official discourses, through the setting up of institutions and development of 
projects),  
(3) they are strategically important in their respective regions and in terms of global 
geopolitics, 
(4) they share a historical legacy in terms of participation, between the years 1950 and 
1970, in discussions about the center-periphery relations, non-alignment, Third 
World and the new international economic order,  
(5) they are all middle-income countries, and  
(6) they show similarities and differences for a comparative approach. 4 
 
Professor Milani identifies the following countries as members of this select group: South 
Africa, China, India, Mexico, Brazil and Turkey. The selection criteria are not uniform, and 
scholars dispute the suggestion that revisionist states such as China and India should be 
considered in the same group as South Africa and Brazil. Others would prefer to see Russia, 
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia included in the list as well. Notwithstanding this, the 
fact that scholarly discussions are taking place on the subject is already a sign that there is a 
necessity to differentiate a new group of actors on the international political and economic 
stage. The mushrooming of associations and organizations initiated by these rising states 
                                                          
4 Carlos R.S. Milani, Prof. South-South Cooperation and Foreign Policy Agendas: a comparative framework. 
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, IESP. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. p.14. 
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(IBSA, BRICS, G-77, just to name a few) underscores the need for the creation of a new 
category of economically and politically significant regional powers.  
 
There are various ways of comparing the behavior of such regional players in an attempt to 
better define the concept of Middle Powers. Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy mention 
five possible strategies in the development of comparative research:  
(1) case study 
(2) binary comparison 
(3) comparison among similar countries 
(4) comparison among contrasting countries, and  
(5) conceptual homogenization in a heterogeneous group of countries.5 
 
I am especially grateful to the advice of  Amb. Professor András Balogh of the ELTE 
University of Budapest, Hungary, who recommended that I base my analysis on certain fix 
and independent variables, along the lines of the South-South policies of each nation. After 
thorough research, I stumbled across the Milani-matrix of qualitative analytical research, 
which will be used – with minor modifications – to compare the SSDC strategies of nations 
based on the following four dimensions (see Annex A. for a full description of the matrix): 
(1) Historical dimensions: the legacy of North-South relations, struggle for 
decolonization, fight for new international economic order; 
(2) Ideological dimensions: geopolitical motivations, relationship with international and 
collective security, links with regional integration processes; 
(3) Institutional dimensions: what are the hard and soft institutions established in the 
field of SSDC in each country (aid agency, role of the ministry of external relations, 
subnational entities); 
(4) Non-institutional dimensions: what are the main actors and agendas of the current 
SSDC policies (social legitimation, non-institutional actors, public opinion)6 
 
                                                          
5 Matteï Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, Sociologie politique comparative: problèmes et perspectives, Paris: 
Economica, 1981. p. 1236. 
6 Milani, South-South Cooperation, p. 16. 
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Using the above criteria of Dogan and Pelassy, the present doctoral research paper can be 
classified as a Case Study focusing on Brazil’s South-South cooperation policy, with 
emphasis on the evolution of the country’s SSDC agenda based on Milani’s four dimensions. 
 
Literature includes the following secondary sources in Hungarian, English, Portuguese, 
Spanish, German and French languages: scholarly articles, publications in the field of SSDC, 
press releases and archives of international and governmental organizations, news outlets 
and corporations involved in Brazilian-African trade, research papers and essays of topic-
related institutes, think tanks. The literature is complemented by primary sources in the form 
of personal interviews with the academic staff at the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in 
Hungary, the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) of the University of Pretoria in 
South Africa, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
and with diplomats of the Brazilian Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In each location the author 
spent time researching the topic between 2012 and 2017. In addition, a questionnaire was 
sent out to six of the major enterprises involved in Brazilian-African commerce, of which 
three were returned and evaluated as part of this paper (for a full list of the questionnaires 




The basis of this doctoral thesis is the analysis of a wide range of publications in Hungarian, 
English, Portuguese, Spanish and French on the subject of Brazilian-African relations. The 
printed sources used are sociological, economic journals, scholarly essays, research papers, 
books, lexicons, statistical data, resolutions, memos of international organizations and 
archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil. In addition, 
a survey was conducted among the major Brazilian companies present in Angola and 
Mozambique, as well as interviews with diplomats of the Embassy of Brazil in Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
 
As far as Hungarian literature is concerned, the publication that most closely touches the 
subject of South-South cooperation from a Brazilian perspective is the doctoral dissertation 
and essays of Bernadett Lehoczki. Her works on Brazilian-Chinese relations have been 
instrumental in the Hungarian academic study of the newly shifting world economic order. 
Dávid Vogel writes about Brazilian security policy, Béla Soltész about integration initiatives 
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in Latin America, while István Rákóczi offers historical insight into Portuguese expansion 
along the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. I also made good use of István Tarrósy’s research on 
the non-aligned movements of the second half of the 20th century. The oeuvre of professor 
Ágnes Judit Szilágyi of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History of the ELTE 
University in Budapest has been of great influence when writing this thesis, just like Zsuzsa 
Dömény’s Latin-Amerika: Balra át? The cumulative works of Gábor Búr, Tibor Wittman 
and Ádám Anderle have been instrumental to the understanding of Brazilian history from the 
pre-Columbian times up until the modern days. 
 
I studied the most influential development theoreticians of the 20th century, from Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Raúl Prebisch to Fernand Braudel, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The 
findings of Brazilian social geographer Milton Santos, American economist Joseph Stiglitz 
and German political theorists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have also been included in 
this paper.     
 
South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) has been the topic of academic research 
starting only in the second half of the 20th century. Before the 1970s, the term ‘South-South’ 
did not even exist as most countries that we today consider the Global South were occupied 
by countries of the North. Relations among them were channeled through the respective 
Metropoles, which had exclusivity on every aspect of commercial, political and societal 
interaction between the overseas territories of different nations. Since the 70s a wide range 
of essays and scholarly articles have been published on the topic, the first such erudite 
discussions focused on China’s increasingly active role in Africa. Sino-African research has 
encompassed all layers of human interaction, from economic exchanges to areas of cultural 
expansionism and geopolitical-security considerations. Indian-African relations are being 
analyzed mainly from a historical perspective, focusing on diaspora study and the effects of 
the colonial measures taken by the British administration. Turkey’s resurgence in Africa is 
seen as part of wider political-cultural campaign to reassert its Ottoman imperial past on 
particularly the North Africa and the Horn of Africa regions.  
 
The study of Brazilian-African relations was triggered by President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da 
Silva’s staunch South-South rhetoric and Africanist policies in the early 2000s. A flurry of 
scholarly research activity followed, mainly by South American academicians trying to 
decipher the content, objectives and consequences of the measures implemented by the Lula 
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and succeeding administrations. A smaller, but equally noteworthy intellectual discussion 
on this new phenomenon of periphery-to-periphery dialogue ensued in Africa, Europe and 
Asia. 
 
In the field of Africa-South trade and commercial relations, Professor Dr. Lyal White of the 
Centre for Dynamic Markets (CDM) at the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS), 
University of Pretoria, has published extensively in academic journals and books. He is the 
co-editor of the Academy of International Business (AIB) Sub-Saharan Africa Book series 
with “The Changing Dynamics of International Business in Africa” and “Africa-to-Africa 
Internationalization: Key Issues and Outcomes”. I had the privilege of interviewing him in 
person in Johannesburg in 2012 and have used his works as reference in my dissertation. 
 
Sérgio Chichava, a senior Mozambican researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic 
Studies (IESE) in Maputo, studied Brazil’s role in the field of development cooperation and 
South-South relations with respect to agricultural projects in Mozambique. His publications 
about the ProSAVANA and ProAlimentos initiatives have been of great benefit to my 
doctoral research. From Angola, the writings of political analyst Nelson Pestana have added 
value to my work. 
 
A reference point in Brazilian-African relations is Paulo Fagundes Visentini, director of the 
Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) at the Federal University of Rio 
Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Brazil. His oeuvre includes, amongst many others, “A relação 
Brasil-África: prestígio, cooperação ou negócios?” (Brazil-Africa relations: prestige, 
cooperation or business?) and “A África na Política Internacional – O sistema interafricano 
e sua inserção mundial” (Africa in International Politics – the inter-African system and its 
world insertion), two monumental books on the history of Brazilian-African relations. The 
multitude of scholarly publications of Professor Visentini on the subject elaborate a synthesis 
of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic with an emphasis on Brazilian 
perspectives, going back to the period when Brazil was still a Portuguese colony and that, 
throughout time – in spite of a hundred-year rupture from the middle of the 20th century – 
how these relations were restored after the independencies and became denser until they 
reached a peak during the government of ex-president Lula (2003-2010). 
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Two other Brazilian researchers whose works contributed profoundly to my thesis are Amb. 
José Flávio Sombra Saraiva and Pio Penna Filho of the Institute of International Relations 
of the University of Brasilia. Professor Saraiva was one of the task team leaders of the 
massive study entitled “Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South 
Partnering for Growth”, composed at the request of the World Bank (WB) and the Brazilian 
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) in 2015. Bridging the Atlantic is a study 
that involved over 500 academicians, businessmen, civil society leaders, sociologists, 
historians, government officials and policy-makers, and aims to give a comprehensive 
picture of the past, present and future of Brazilian-African relations. The research focuses 
mainly on economic and political interactions and analyzes the policies of the World Bank 
with respect to funding development and trade between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
 
The digital archives of the following research centers and institutes were of significant 
benefit to my work: AHU Hungarian Africa-Knowledge Database (Afrika Tudástár), 
Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Brazilian Centre for African Studies 
(CEBRAFRICA) and Center for Strategy and International Relations at Rio Grande Sul 
Federal University (NERINT/UFRGS), Study Group on Africa (GEÁFRICA) of the Federal 
University of Pampa (UNIPAMPA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil (Itamaraty), the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the Alexandre de 
Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the Lula Institute, 
the Research Center for South-South Cooperation (Articulação Sul), World Bank (WB) and 
the United Nations (UN). In addition, a wide range of topic-related journals (Conjuntura 
Austral, Diálogos Africanos, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Economist, 
ESZMÉLET), news outlets (Reuters, O Globo, BBC, The Guardian) and primary sources 
(interviews, questionnaires) were used as part of the research methodology. The publication 
of the IPEA, called Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI), 
provided statistical data to support the arguments in this doctoral research paper. 
 
This dissertation is a novelty in the way that it is the first publication in the field of 
contemporary Brazilian-African relations from a Hungarian researcher. The fact that I am 
neither Brazilian nor African, nor do I come from any of the former colonizer nations lend 
me the neutral, unbiased perspective of an outsider when studying the topic. At the same 
time, having lived in all three locations (Brazil, Africa and former colonial powers Belgium 
and Spain), have acquainted me with hands-on experience of the colonial legacy. In addition 
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to the historical, ideological and geopolitical aspects, I also look at the institutional and 
domestic factors that shape Brazilian cooperation with the African countries and dedicate a 
section to the analysis of private-sector interests that are at play in the background. The study 
of South-South cooperation from Milani’s dimensional perspective is not new, but it is rare 
to find works of third-country researchers on the subject.  
 
D. South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) – definitions and interpretations 
 
This relatively new, albeit extremely trendy expression South-South Cooperation (or, as 
more commonly referred to, South-South Development Cooperation, SSDC) originates from 
the geographically dichotomized view of the world that the North (i.e. Europe, North 
America, Japan, South Korea and – as geographic exceptions – Australia and New Zealand) 
represents the economically and politically developed part of the globe. At the same time, 
the South (i.e. Central- and South-America, Africa, Asia except for Japan and the tiger 
economies) comprises the least developed countries in terms of economic, political and 
social development. Since early times, philosophers, sociologists, economists and political 
theorists attempted to categorize the world of human coexistence. We will focus only on the 
ones which are relevant for our purposes, that is, the ones that define world systems with 
respect to economic behavior. 
 
i. Categorizing the World: from the Ancient Greeks to Wallerstein 
 
The early attempts at grouping the world according to behavioral patterns already appeared 
during the time of the Greek city-states. Ancient Greeks used the term barbarian for all non-
Greek-speaking peoples, while for the Romans, anyone living beyond the boundaries (limes) 
of the Empire was considered a barbarian.  
 
From the persecutions of Christians all the way to the emergence of Islam and the 
excommunication of Martin Luther attempts were made to classify people based on moral-
religious lines of right and wrong. The tripartite social hierarchy of the Middle Ages was 
the so-called estates of the realm, comprising of Oratores: “those who pray”, Bellatores: 
“those who fight”, and Laboratores: “those who work”. Different systems for dividing 
society members into estates developed and evolved over time. The best known system is 
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the French Ancien Régime (Old Regime), a three-estate system used until the French 
Revolution: clergy (the First Estate), nobles (the Second Estate), and peasants and 
bourgeoisie (the Third Estate).7 
 
The discovery of the New World gave a more profound meaning to power: those who 
possess land and those who do not. In 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and 
Portugal divided the newly discovered territories between the two Iberian powers. Not much 
later on, the Treaty of Saragossa (1529) outlined the spheres of influence of the two nations 
in Asia. Multitudes of treaties, agreements, and territorial exchanges followed over the 
centuries that altered the face of the Earth and divided it into colonized and free land. At 
around the same time, the concept of mercantilism evolved, an economic policy designed to 
maximize the accumulation of gold and silver in order to achieve self-sufficiency by 
European states. Mercantilism was an ultra-protectionist theory aimed at creating economic 
independence and amassing large trade surplus in the event of war. In reality, mercantilism 
triggered a race between European powers to plunder the resources of the newly discovered 
continents of North and South America from the early 16th century to the end of the 18th 
century.  
 
Jumping a couple of hundred years ahead, German sociologist Max Weber published his 
monumental work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1905, in which he 
argued that “Protestant work ethic was an important force behind the unplanned and 
uncoordinated emergence of modern capitalism.”8 The earthly accumulation of wealth in 
Northern Europe contributed to the widening divide of economic development between 
Protestant and non-Protestant countries, that eventually lead to the widening array of 
classifications of nations based on economic growth and maturity. 
 
The first and probably most important attempt at economic categorization of states in the 
early post-War years was that of modernization theory. Modernization theory originated 
from the ideas of Max Weber, on which Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons built his model. 
It argued that the ‘developed’ world was not structurally different from the ‘underdeveloped’ 
                                                          
7 ’Ancien Regime’, Jonathan Dewald, Europe 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World, Vol.1, 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004, p. 61. 
8 Andrew M. McKinnon, “Elective affinities of the Protestant ethic: Weber and the chemistry of capitalism.” 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 108–126. 
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world, but simply temporally ahead of it. It was just a question of time before the less 
developed countries caught up with the more developed ones. Of course, less developed 
countries can be brought to development only with the assistance of the advanced 
economies.9 
 
Another significant global trade theory is termed Prebisch–Singer hypothesis, built on the 
tenets elaborated by the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch and his German counterpart, 
Hans Singer. Prebisch argued that trade between developed nations (center) and less 
developed ones (periphery) will ultimately result in the accumulation of technology and 
wealth by the center. The reason for that is that poor countries exported primary commodities 
to the rich countries who then manufactured products out of those commodities and sold 
them back to the poorer countries. The “Value Added” by manufacturing a finished product 
always cost more than the primary products used to create those products. Therefore, poorer 
countries would never be earning enough from their export earnings to pay for their imports. 
Also, Prebisch and Singer discovered that the price of primary commodities declines relative 
to the price of manufactured goods over the long term, which causes the terms of trade of 
primary-product-based economies to deteriorate even further. The Prebisch–Singer 
hypothesis was a forerunner of the dependency theory, which motivated several developing 
countries to turn inward and adopt import substitution industrialization (ISI).10 
 
Prebisch is also the ‘Father’ of dependency theory, a concept that rejects the purely temporal 
view of the modernization theory, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely 
primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their 
own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market 
economy. Originally a sociologist, former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
wrote extensively on dependency theory, arguing that it was an approach to studying the 
economic disparities between the center and periphery. Dependency theory basis its 
assumptions on the dominant/dependent, center/periphery or metropolitan/satellite 
dichotomy. It also assumes that external forces are of singular importance to the economic 
                                                          
9 Wolfgang Knöbl, “Theories That Won’t Pass Away: The Never-ending Story”, in: Gerard Delanty, Engin F. 
Isin (eds), Handbook of Historical Sociology, London: SAGE, 2003, p. 96–107. 
10 Raúl Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. New York: United 
Nations, 1950, p. 24-51. 
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activities within the dependent states. These external forces include multinational 
corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, and any other means by 
which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad. 
The relations between dominant and dependent states are normally deeply rooted and 
reinforce a vicious circle of unequal interactions between them.11 
 
Dependency theory is an offshoot of the concept of neo-colonialism, elaborated by former 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah in 1963. Neo-colonialism refers to the social 
economic and political dominance of European states over their former colonies even after 
the independence of the latter. Control can be achieved through various means: military 
presence, economic and financial aid and control of the monetary system, logistical and 
administrative ‘assistance’. Nkrumah, in his book titled Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of 
Imperialism, refers to neo-colonialism as… 
 
…the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power 
without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation 
without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power 
had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the 
colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its 
protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism 
neither is the case.12 
 
The representative example of European neo-colonialism is Françafrique, the “French 
Africa” constituted by the continued close relationships between France and its former 
African colonies. In addition to the strong linguistic, cultural and commercial ties, there is a 
significant West African diaspora living in France with intensive links to the motherland. 
The Central African Franc (CFA) has been anchored to the French Franc since the Second 
World War, holding the economies of several West African states hostage to the French 
treasury. Former heads of state of Ivory Coast, Niger, Gabon and Chad were rumored to own 
                                                          
11 Vincent Ferraro, “Dependency Theory: An Introduction”, in: Giorgio Secondi (ed.), The Development 
Economics Reader, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 58-64. 
12 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd, 
1965, p. 5. 
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luxurious villas and assets in France, which they had received in exchange for services 
rendered for French multinationals in their home countries. 
 
In the 1960s, Fernand Braudel and his colleagues (collectively referred to as the Annales 
School) argued that historical time and the longue durée (long term perspective) is what 
mattered and that sudden ruptures and discontinuities did not have a major impact on history 
making. They believed the “continuities of the deepest structures were central to history, 
beside which upheavals in institutions or the superstructure of social life were of little 
significance, for history lies beyond the reach of conscious actors, especially the will of 
revolutionaries.”13 
 
Out of the modernization, dependency, longue durée and Marxist theories was born one of 
the most widely publicized coexistence theories of modern times: the world-systems theory. 
Immanuel Wallerstein concluded that individual countries do not have economies but are 
part of the world economy. Far from being separate societies or entities, the world economy 
manifests a tripartite division of labor, with core, semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. The 
periphery depends on obtaining processed goods from the center, to which it supplies raw 
materials. This circular trade flow keeps the periphery nation in the underdevelopment trap, 
as it is not in the interest of the center to develop the periphery. If the periphery were to step 
on the path of industrialization, that would mean an increase in the price of raw materials for 
the center and a diminished market for its processed goods. Such countries, that have 
embarked on some sort of value addition to the raw materials, are classified as semi-
periphery (in Wallerstein’s definition, Brazil would be a good example of a semi-periphery 
country). Nevertheless, today’s semi-peripheries still depend in large part on commodity 
exports to the center.14 
 
Map 1. A representation of the organic or stable regions of the core, periphery, and semi-periphery 
between 1975–2002. Countries depicted are those consistently classified in a particular zone throughout the 
27-year period. 
                                                          
13 Olivia Harris Braudel, “Historical Time and the Horror of Discontinuity”, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 
57, No.1, 2004, p. 161–174.  
14 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914, New 
York: Academic Press, 1974, p. 33-65. 
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Source: Salvatore J. Babones, “The country-level income structure of the world-economy”, Journal of World-
Systems Research, Vol.11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 29–55. 
 
Milton Almeida dos Santos, one of the most famous geographers of all times and the father 
of Critical Geography in Brazil, argued the opposite of Wallerstein, saying that micro-
systems do exist. In his work O Espaço Dividido (The Divided Space) Santos develops a 
theory on urban development in underdeveloped countries, highlighting that there are worlds 
inches apart in many Latin American and African cities that never meet. Urban fortresses 
are home to the super-rich (core) with huge communities of slum dwellers (periphery) 
residing on the outer walls of these luxurious establishments. According to Santos, the forces 
of core-periphery-semi-periphery can be found within a few square kilometers and do not 
necessarily pertain exclusively to interactions among nation-states.15 
 
Hungarian researcher Zsuzsa Dömény names the existence of ‘parallel societies’ in Latin 
American states as the consequence of neoliberal policies. She draws the attention of the 
reader not only to the plight of the urban homeless, but that of the indigenous communities, 
who often do not even speak the official language of the nation (Spanish or Portuguese) and 
are segregated from, rather than integrated into, state institutions.16 
 
ii.  Political-economic theories of world systems of the post-War period 
                                                          
15 Milton Santos (ed.), O espaço dividido: os dois circuitos da economia urbana dos países subdesenvolvidos, 
São Paulo: Edusp, 2004, p. 433. 
16 Zsuzsa Dömény, Latin-Amerika: balra át?, Budapest: MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete, 2007, p. 14. 
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When it comes to the economic-political classification of world system, we have to consider 
the teachings of Karl Marx and Johan-Friedrich Engels, those of Marxism. The German 
sociologists based their dichotomy of the world systems not only on the modes of production 
but also on the distribution of wealth. Marx and Engels believed that if capital was 
concentrated in the hands of the few, it would lead to an unfair distribution of wealth and 
consequently to a rich and poor class of people. Thus, Marxism would foster and foment 
revolution among classes within a country. This theory, when projected to the 
macroeconomic level, would entail the creation of wealthy and poor countries. 
 
The Three Worlds Theory developed from Marxism by Chinese Communist leader Mao 
Zedong gave birth to a new division of the globe: the First World consisting of the two 
superpowers of the era (the United States of America and the Soviet Union), the Second 
World of lesser powers (Japan, Europe and Canada), and the Third World of exploited 
nations (Africa, Latin America, Asia except for Japan). Mao’s division of the worlds 
highlighted what he considered to be the patterns of exploitation. The Three Worlds Theory 
developed by Mao Zedong should not be confused with the Western Three-World Model 
which states that the First World comprises the United States and United Kingdom and their 
allies, the Second World the Soviet Union and China and their allies, and the Third World 
the neutral and nonaligned countries.17 In both categorizations, Brazil would belong to the 
group of Third World countries.  
 
The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 signaled the search for a middle 
course alternative by the newly independent former colonies. These countries tried to 
distance themselves from the two Superpowers – with more or less success – and came 
together to form the G-77, a group of 77 developing countries with the common aim of 
fostering development in their ‘own way’. We will discuss the implications of the NAM on 
Brazil-Africa relations in a later chapter. 
 
                                                          
17 French demographer Alfred Sauvy called the Third World (“Tiers Monde”) all the countries that were not in 
this Cold War division, i.e., the unaligned and uninvolved states in the East-West Conflict. Source: ‘Third 
World’, in: Thomas M. Leonard, Encyclopedia of the Developing World, New York: Taylor & Francis, Vol. 
3, 2006, pp. 1542–3. 
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In the post-war years, the Bretton-Woods Conference created a new monetary system based 
on the hegemony of the United States. It divided the world into nations that lead a liberal or 
neoliberal monetary policy and ones that have a conservative fiscal regime. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was meant to oversee that no country drives itself into unreasonable 
levels of indebtedness and if it does, the IMF would come to the ‘rescue’ by prescribing 
corrective measures. These sometimes extremely austere IMF packages were met by 
hostility from the population and led to the rise of alternative problem-solving initiatives as 
governments accused the Western world of “asymmetric globalization”.18 Brazil also reacted 
to the IMF austerity package by electing a Socialist-oriented leader in 2003, Luiz Inácio da 
Silva. 
 
In the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye went a step further and analyzed how 
international politics is transformed by interdependence. They argued that due to the multiple 
channels of interaction among nation-states, the use of military force and hard power in 
international politics is on the decline and will soon be replaced by soft policy tools. Keohane 
and Nye pointed out that various other relations exist between states than the purely formal 
ones (formal foreign office arrangements). The theorists highlighted three factors of 
significant influence that contribute to the development of bilateral relations between 
countries. 
1.  Interstate relations: formal ties between governments and informal ties between 
governmental elites;  
2.  Transgovernmental relations: informal ties between non-governmental elites; 
3.  Transnational relations: ties of the private and business sector which include 
organizations such as multinational banks or corporations and exert substantial 
influence on political decision-makers.19 
 
Keohane and Nye also differentiate between dependence and interdependence, saying that 
while dependence is a one-way, unequal channel of domination, interdependence is a two-
way, mutually agreed upon linkage between two entities. Social, commercial, political and 
                                                          
18 Term coined by A. L. Cervo in: “O Brasil na Atual Ordem Mundial”, Austral: Revista Brasileira de 
Estratégia e Relações Internacionais, Vol. 1, No.1, 2012, pp. 37-59. 
19 Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph Samuel Nye, “Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition” 
(1977), in: Crane, G.T. & Amawi, A. (eds), The Theoretical evolution of international political economy: a 
reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 42. 
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economic interdependence – according to the two political scientists – is the reason why 
countries will rely less on coercive, military force to resolve conflicts and will push for soft 
power solutions through diplomatic channels. 
 
The end of the Cold War made some of the above theories redundant (Third World) and 
signaled the renaissance of those distinctions that were based on economic status rather than 
political orientation. The developed-developing-least developed trichotomy was back in use 
again, just as the emerging/frontier markets expression. The comparison between a 
developed and developing nation (also referred to as less developed or undeveloped country) 
is based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the Human Development Index 
(HDI) indicators, although there is no universally agreed-upon criteria to clearly define the 
two categories. As the world economy evolved, another group, the so-called Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) was added to differentiate between those developing states 
that are close to catching up with the developed world and those that lag behind the most. 
Those countries that are on the verge of attaining the developed status are also referred to as 
newly industrialized countries (Brazil, India, Mexico, China), pre-emerging markets 
(Kenya, Vietnam), and frontier markets (Estonia). Another classification is based on income 
levels: high-, middle-, and low-income. The government of Bhutan introduced a Gross 
National Happiness (GNH) indicator, a holistic approach to socioeconomic development 
takes into consideration such factors as health, environment, community and general well-
being. 
 
An interesting theory proposed by Thomas Friedman looks at development from the 
perspective of the Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and their role as key drivers of 
globalization. In his book, The World is Flat, Friedman develops an argument that today the 
world is characterized by globalization 3.0. This is a situation where individuals are 
empowered to run global businesses. They can process information and organize activities 
with the use of personal computers and the advent of the Internet. This type of globalization 
has replaced globalization 2.0 in which MNEs organized international activity. During this 
era of globalization 2.0 which lasted from 1800 to 2000, MNEs grew and benefited from the 
economies of scale and falling transportation and telecommunications costs (the 
development of railroads, bulk shipping lines, jet aircraft, telegram and telephone lines). 
Previous to this type of globalization, according to Friedman, there existed globalization 1.0. 
This lasted from 1492 to 1800. International exchange was organized across and between 
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countries. International trade was largely explained by labor cost differentials and the 
existence of natural resources and was based on the principle of comparative advantage. The 
fault with Friedman’s theory lies in that he assumed that in the age of globalization 3.0 
information exchange would be free and that there would be no barriers to trade in the global 
economy. Obviously, this is not the case as only a handful of regional integrations have 
succeeded in liberalizing trade and allow the free entry of a foreign entity into the domestic 
market. In the majority of the world markets there exist numerous and cumbersome 
bureaucracies and regulations that impede unhindered free trade.20 
 
Figure 1. Friedman’s Three Types of Globalization. 
 
Source: Alan M. Rugman, Do We Need a New Theory To Explain Emerging Market Multinationals?, Indiana 
University: Kelley School of Business, 2008, p. 19. 
 
The North-South partition of the world was meant to simplify even more the status of 
development of nations based on per capita GDP. The term ‘rich’ was given to the Global 
North, while reserving the ‘poor’ label for the Global South. Being categorized as part of the 
‘North’ implied development as opposed to belonging to the ‘South’, which implied a lack 
thereof. According to Nigerian Professor N. Oluwafemi Mimiko, the South lacks the right 
technology, it is politically unstable, its economies are divided, and its foreign exchange 
earnings depend on primary product exports to the North, along with the fluctuation of 
prices.  The border between the imaginary North and South lies at a latitude of 
approximately 30° North, passing between North and Central America, north of Africa and 
the Middle East, climbing north over China and Mongolia, but dipping south so as to include 
                                                          
20 Rugman, Ibid. p. 4. 
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Australia and New Zealand in the “Rich North”. The line was named after former German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, who first mentioned it in the 1980s.21 
 
Map 2. The Brandt Line, dividing the world into the wealthy North and the poor South. 
 
Source: Nahzeem Oluwafemi Mimiko, Globalization: The Politics of Global Economic Relations and 
International Business. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2012. 
 
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winning American economist, defines globalization as the closer 
integration of the countries and people of the world which has been brought about by the 
“enormous reduction in costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down 
of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser 
extent) people across borders.”22 
 
The Middle Power paradigm is a relatively new concept that aims to place those countries 
on the economic-political power map that do not have enough leverage to be classified as 
Superpowers but are too significant to be dismissed with a wave of the arm. Such Middle 
                                                          
21 Mimiko, Globalization, pp. 22 and 47. 
22 Kara Siddharth, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery. New York – Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 2009, p. 24. 
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powers include Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Italy and the CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa). 
 
Summarizing the above theories, we could conclude that Brazil has evolved from a 
peripheral colony to a Middle Power status in just over a century, a progression that is 
regarded by many as a textbook example of the advancement of states from underdeveloped 
to developing phases. Brazil has become the undeclared leader of the emerging world (i.e. 
South), a trailblazer for the ‘third way’ development that will most likely see it catapult to 
the developed status within a generation’s lifetime. 
 
iii.  Development cooperation theories: from new to modern 
 
Development cooperation is relatively new concept, being coined at the onset of the 20th 
century when the advancement of global communication and transport routes allowed for 
more regular interaction between nations and states. The frequent exchanges gave rise to the 
inevitable comparison of economic wealth between regions of the world and lead to the 
formation of theories that some parts of the world are more advanced from a Western, 
capitalist point of view (economic output) than others. The growing gap between ‘rich and 
poor’ countries, coupled with ideological factors to be discussed in later chapters, lead to the 
evolution of development cooperation theories, whereby wealthier nations are obliged to 
assist their less fortunate counterparts in closing the economic abyss between them.  
 
The United Nations (UN) defines development cooperation in the following terms: 
 
Activity that aims explicitly to support national or international development 
priorities, is not driven by profit, discriminates in favor of developing 
countries, and is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance 
developing country ownership.23  
 
Traditionally, the term ‘development cooperation’ has been synonymous with financial aid 
– or even more narrowly with official development assistance (ODA). But as the number 
                                                          
23 Jose Antonio Alonso and Jonathan Glennie, “What is development cooperation?”, 2016 Development 
Cooperation  Forum Policy Briefs, No. 1, February 2015, p. 4. 
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and diversity of countries and organizations engaged in international development has 
increased, the ways development support is carried out have become more varied than ever 
before. It now goes well beyond financial transfers, with an increasing focus on technical 
and technological cooperation. Furthermore, at the other extreme from traditional financial 
aid, development cooperation can include remittances or foreign direct investment (FDI) that 
supports development, and the General System of Preferences (a discriminatory reduction 
of duties for products coming from developing countries) 
 
The first notable attempt at financing development abroad was the British Colonial 
Development Act of 1929, whose initial annual budget of GBP£1 million was spent on 
schemes designed to develop the infrastructure of transport, electrical power and water 
supply in colonies and dominions abroad for the furtherance of imperial trade.24 The most 
famous economic development assistance in history so far has been the European Recovery 
Program, or Marshall Plan, devised by the USA after the Second World War with the aim 
of helping Europe rebuild from the rubble and to strengthen its ties to the West 
European states with the goal of containing the influence of the USSR. 
 
Development cooperation was mainly focused on the transfer of resources in the form of aid 
and non-refundable grants up until the late second half of the last century. After a 
reevaluation of aid effectiveness that divided the donor world into pro-aid and anti-aid 
camps, the new millennium has brought about an intensification of non-aid based 
development cooperation and has set specific goals and target deadlines.25 The most well-
known of these new development priorities are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
eight international development goals that were established following the Millennium 
Summit of the United Nations in 2000, following the adoption of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration. All 191 United Nations member states at that time, and at least 
22 international organizations, committed to helping achieve the following Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015: 
1.  To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 
                                                          
24 Ravi Kanbur, “The economics of international aid” (2006), in: Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier 
Ythier (eds), Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity: foundations, Vol. 1, Amsterdam-
London: Elsevier. 
25 One of the sharpest critic of development aid is the economist Peter Bauer, who called development aid “… 
an excellent method for transferring money from poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor countries.” 
Source: “A voice for the poor”, The Economist, 2 May 2002. 
 31 
2.  To achieve universal primary education, 
3.  To promote gender equality and empower women, 
4.  To reduce child mortality, 
5.  To improve maternal health, 
6.  To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, 
7.  To ensure environmental sustainability, 
8.  To develop a global partnership for development.26 
 
The progress made on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date (2015) 
has been of varying success. Brazil and China, for example, achieved many of the goals, 
while several African countries did not make any progress at all in any of the eight fields.27 
In the view of accelerating environmental deterioration, the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) replaced the MDGs in 2016. The 2030 Development Agenda “Transforming our 
World” contains 17 goals and 169 targets, most of which are a continuation and expansion 
of the MDGs that never got to be achieved, with an additional element of environmental 
conservation. 
 
iv. The crisis of the North-South Model 
 
The development cooperation of the previous century had one common, overarching aspect: 
it was driven and financed exclusively by the North. If we look at the top 25 members of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, even today it comprises only European 
nations, plus USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (i.e. the Global 
North). The rise of the Middle Powers, most notably that of Brazil, Russia, India and Turkey, 
has had a disruptive impact on North-South Cooperation (NSC), as for the first time in 
history, countries belonging to the Global South have turned from ODA recipients into 
donors of development assistance.  
 
In recognition of this new trend, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964. The creation of UNCTAD as a 
permanent intergovernmental body was based on the concerns of developing countries over 
                                                          
26 United Nations Millennium Development Goals website.  
27 “MDG Progress Report of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015”, MDG Monitor.  
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the international market, multinational corporations, and great disparity between the 
developed and developing world. The forum provided a platform where the industrializing 
countries could discuss the problems relating to their economic development and concerns 
about the inadequacy of the Bretton-Woods Institutions (namely World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) to address their needs. The organization’s motto is “Prosperity 
For All” and its goals are to “maximize the trade, investment and development opportunities 
of developing countries and assist them in their efforts to integrate into the world economy 
on an equitable basis.”28 UNCTAD currently has 194 members, ordinarily meets once in 
four years and its permanent secretariat is seated in Geneva, Switzerland. One of the 
principal achievements of UNCTAD (1964) has been to conceive and implement 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). On the contrary to mercantile trade policies, 
GSP offers special tariff concessions on certain export products of developing nation in an 
attempt to promote value addition in developing countries. Without preferential treatment, 
the least developed countries would never be able to break out from the vicious cycle of raw-
material supplier, underdeveloped peripheries of the world economy. Accepting this 
argument, the developed countries formulated the GSP scheme under which manufactured 
and processed (value-added) goods from the developing countries would enter duty-free or 
at reduced rates to the developed countries. Since imports of such items from other 
developed countries are subject to the normal rates of duties, imports of the same items from 
developing countries would enjoy a competitive advantage (positive discrimination). The set 
of proposals put forward during the 1970s by some developing countries through the 
UNCTAD came to be termed New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO 
challenged the tenets of the old order, whereby multinational corporations had free hand at 
doing business in sovereign states (for example, in the banana republics of Central America), 
developed countries used their power to coerce poorer nations into selling their products for 
below-average prices, and attaching strings and conditions to loans and technical assistance. 
Nonetheless, in spite of all the hype and great expectations around the NIEO, it has not yet 
performed to its full potential, with only a handful of non-legal and non-binding agreements 
signed during the last half a century since the inception of UNCTAD.  
 
The Bretton-Woods Institutions (BWI), originally envisioned to promote open markets and 
liberalism in trade policies, are adapting to the new reality of the South being an active, and 
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– not only passive participant – of policy formulation. The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, long regarded as silent financiers of the North’s interests, are sparing no 
money in an effort to convince the world that “South-South” is important for them. An array 
of institutions have been established over the past few years to prove the reforms of the 
World Bank Group, such as the creation of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).29 The new entities were set up 
to complement the World Bank’s government-to-government loans with private sector 
financing and guarantees for investments. The emerging markets play a preeminent role in 
the World Bank’s strategy for the new millennium, which is detailed in its recent study 
“Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It”. 
 
As the latest sign of the international community’s acknowledgment of the increasing role 
the South plays on the global political and economic scene, the UN renamed its Working 
Group on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) to United Nations 
Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) in 2013. The Working Group on TCDC was 
established in 1974 as part of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and 
Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries by the General 
Assembly in 1978 (resolution 33/134). The newly formed entity will coordinate the 
promotion and facilitation of South-South and triangular cooperation on a global and United 
Nations system basis.30 
 
The UNOSSC facilitates  policy and intergovernmental support, knowledge and advisory 
services, partnership building, South-South and Triangular Coordination and South-South 
Trust Fund management. Triangular coordination is when a developed country is involved 
in a cooperation project between two developing nations, either as a part donor, or as 
contributor of know-how and technical assistance.  The Trust Funds established by 
developing countries and their regional associations, such as IBSA, are frequently managed 
and supported by UNOSSC in order to provide neutrality to the management of these funds. 
The India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Trust 
Fund) will be discussed in a later chapter in more detail. 
                                                          
29 Susana Carillo et al., Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa - South-South Partnering for 
Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012, p. 117. 
30 United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) website. 
 34 
 
The European Union does not want to be left behind either. At the 5th African Union – 
European Union Summit in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in November 2017, the EU announced a 
European External Investment plan (EEI) that will trigger €44 billion investments in Africa 
by 2020, with the intention of creating job opportunities for young people across the 
continent. The plan, dubbed colloquially as the “African Marshall-Plan”, it is another 
indicator that the EU is turning away from the donor-dictated and donor-implemented aid 
programs toward more sustainable, market-dictated, locally implemented development 
strategies.31 
 
From an academic perspective on development theory, there are various interpretations of 
the crisis of traditional North-South development cooperation, its origins, assumptions and 
possible ways of overcoming it. A first interpretation emanates from authors who associate 
cooperation for development with the capitalist mode of production and its logic of 
accumulation. Therefore, overcoming the crisis would necessarily imply regulating 
capitalism or surpassing its production and distribution mechanisms. 
 
A second approach is based on the anthropological critique, and reveals the role of Western 
ethnocentrism in the definition of cultural values and political standards diffused and 
prescribed by international agencies. Development and its sociological corollary – 
modernization – are associated with Western-driven political projects, emphasizing the 
historical nature and supposedly universal character of modernity. For this school of thought, 
the principles of progress and civilization imposed rationalities and universal criteria in 
different socio-cultural contexts, engendering conflicts between indigenous peoples, local 
forms of knowledge and the Western rationale. In this sense, bilateral aid and multilateral 
cooperation policies would go hand-in-hand with foreign policy agendas and priorities of 
Western countries. Bill Cooke, in his essay titled The Managing of the (Third) World, argues 
that Development Administration and Management (DAM) practiced by First World 
organizations is complicit in keeping the Third World in a state of backwardness. Cooke, 
instead, would introduce a participatory approach, whereby Third World employees and 
citizens would take part in formulating strategies, rather than just being agents to carry them 
out. A third view highlights postmodern critiques of development, and warns against the idea 
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of considering development as a universal value. The so-called post-development movement 
believes that, as progress, development can produce effects on the lives and liberties of men 
and women, disguising the interests of some groups as though they were public and general 
interests.32  
 
A fourth approach presents a critique of development models prescribed by international 
agencies, which tend not to recognize universal values on the bases of diversity and 
contextual pluralism. Alternative social networks and contestation movements express the 
need for acknowledging the presence and existence of what is modern and universal also in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.33 
 
v.  Motivational factors 
 
The theory of push and pull factors was developed to explain migration, modern day slavery 
and human trafficking in terms of motivations that induce people to move to a new location 
or oblige them to leave old residences. They can be economic, political, cultural, and 
environmentally based. A few examples of push factors are the following: lack of adequate 
jobs in your country; unlivable conditions; desertification; famine/drought; political 
fear/persecution; poor medical care; loss of wealth; and natural disasters. Pull factors are 
exactly the opposite of push factors; they are factors that attract people to a certain location. 
Examples of such push factors are abundant job opportunities; better living conditions; 
political and/or religious freedom; education; better medical care; and security. 
 
In our analysis we use the theory of push and pull factors to explain Brazil’s newly found 
interest in the South and we will endeavor to identify some of the pull factors (i.e.: large 
number of Afro-Brazilians ‘pull’ the Brazil closer to Africa), as well as push factors (i.e.: 
Oil Crisis of 1973 ‘pushed’ Brazil towards locating new suppliers of energy sources) that 
have shaped the country’s SSDC policies in the past and present. 
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33 Milani, South-South Cooperation, p. 24. 
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II. HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 
 
If one decides to study the relations between Brazil and Africa, it is a requisite to reflect on 
the historical factors that shaped the common history of the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
In this section we will summarize the main ties, from 1500, when the first European set foot 
on Brazilian land, up to the Second World War. I have decided to separate the study of the 
history of Brazilian-African interactions into four phases, based on the level of the 
independence of decision-making mechanisms by Brazilian foreign policy institutions. In 
the so-called First Phase of relations (1500-1822) Brazilian foreign policy was exclusively 
set in Portugal or by the colonial administration based on the directives from Lisbon. From 
the attainment of independence in 1822 until 1960 (Second Phase), the preoccupation of the 
successive Brazilian administrations was with finding their place in the global economic 
order and managing their alliances with the major power of Europe and North America. The 
Third Phase (1961-2003) will be discussed in Section Three of this paper and dates from the 
proclamation of the country’s Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) in 1961 until the end of the 
presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 2002. The Fourth Phase of Brazilian-African 
history (2003-ongoing) is still being written and is having a profound influence on the 
nation’s ideological-political-economic strategy towards Africa up until today. 
 
A. First phase (1500-1822): the two shores of the Atlantic 
 
Brazil and Africa were once part of the same continent mass, called Gondwana, that 
separated and drifted apart over 200 million years ago. The two continents developed 
separately after that until the beginning of the 16th century. Official records hold that 
Portuguese explorer Pedro Alvares Cabral landed on a beach of what is now Brazil on April 
22nd of the year 1500, but findings of the famous cartographer of the era, Juan de la Cosa, 
hint at an “island discovered by the Portuguese” years earlier, that corresponds to the 
shoreline along Cape São Roque and Cape Branco. Professor István Rákóczi’s research 
refers to a visit by the Portuguese in 1438 to the island of St. Mateus – presently known as 
Fernando Noronha –, the easternmost island belonging to Brazil.34 The discovery initiated a 
new era of Trans-Atlantic relations with Europe and Africa. Starting from the 16th century 
onwards, the slave trade turned the South American giant into the country with the second 
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largest black population in the world.35 Nonetheless, slave-ships bringing Africans into 
Brazil were not motivated by either the Africans’ nor Brazilians’ desire for mutual 
development, but more by the colonial masters’ desire to satiate the European appetite for 
sugar and other commodities. 
 
“Brazil would not be what it is today without the participation of millions of Africans who 
helped build our country.”36 Phrases like these from the outgoing president Luiz Inácio 
„Lula” da Silva are responsible for turning him into one of the most popular leaders in 
Brazilian history. The prioritization of African affairs under Lula has its roots in Brazil’s 
“moral and ethical obligations towards Africa.”37 Since the first slave ship arrived on the 
coast of the Portuguese colony in 1538 until the emancipation of slaves in 1888, Brazil 
imported a stunning number of black Africans. “Between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, almost five million people were brought to the former Portuguese colony, mostly 
from Angola and Congo.”38 These slaves made Brazil a sugar and gold powerhouse for 
centuries, fueling the monoculture based, feudalist structure of the society and giving birth 
to landlords’ fazendas and casa-grandes, so well depicted in Gilberto Freyre’s monumental 
work, Casa-Grande e Senzala. 
 
The 17th century saw an intensification of relations between the two Portuguese colonies on 
opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean. A brief Dutch occupation of Luanda (1641-1648) was 
ended by a flotilla sent from Rio de Janeiro, and later many of the troops deployed against 
the kingdom of Congo in the 1660s hailed from Brazil. Troops from Brazil also played a 
pivotal role in the Portuguese victory over the Ndongo kingdom, in 1672, which redrew the 
internal boundaries of Portuguese Angola. In addition to soldiers, Luanda and Benguela 
would frequently rely on Brazil for food supplies, military hardware, and funding for the 
                                                          
35 Currently 76 million Brazilians admit having African ancestry in their bloodline. Nonetheless, this number 
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37 Ibid. 
38 David Eltis, “The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment”, The William 
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slave trade.39 By the early eighteenth century, the trade between Angola and Brazil had 
blossomed to its fullest and Rio de Janeiro had become Angola’s primary commercial 
partner. This trade was mostly conducted within a barter framework, exchanging Indian 
textiles for slaves. Between 1796 and 1828, at least 80 percent of the slave ships that set sail 
from Benguela were bound for Rio de Janeiro.40 
 
Brazilian influence in Angola was not confined to the commercial aspects of the trade in 
slaves and actually extended to the social and cultural milieus of both Luanda and Benguela. 
“The lifestyle of wealthy Luanda residents resembles that of a Brazilian city. Their foodways 
[sic] are as full of strong ingredients as in Brazil. The dialect that they use in the domestic 
affairs is the Brazilian language”.41 The affluent members of the Angolan society, namely 
the descendants of the Portuguese settlers and colonial administrators, merchants, traders, 
view Rio de Janeiro and Salvador as a more advanced system of colonial government within 
the Portuguese Empire. Medical trips, cultural and holiday getaways were as frequent as 
commercial travel between Luanda, Benguela and Rio de Janeiro. Members of the top 
echelon of the Angolan society often hailed from Portugal’s Latin-American possession (the 
governors João Fernandes Vieira, André Vidal de Negreiros, and Baron José de Oliveira 
Barbosa in Angola were all Brazilian).42 
 
The few Luanda women who could fluently speak Portuguese did so with a distinct Brazilian 
accent, due to exposure to Brazilian culture during travels to Brazil and interactions with 
individuals born and raised in Brazil. In the interior, Africans referred to Brazil as mueneputo 
pequeno, a term that mirrored mueneputo grande, generally used to refer to continental 
Portugal.43 This suggests that even outside Luanda and Benguela, Africans were cognizant 
of the deep ties that linked Angola to Brazil. 
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B. Second phase (1822-1960): Lull in luso-tropical relations 
 
i. 1822-1826: Confederação Brasílica and the Treaty of Brazil 
 
Portuguese protectionist policies tried to monopolize and control inter-colony trade, in no 
small part for taxation purposes, especially in light of the fact that Angola in effect became 
an annex of Brazil in the eighteenth century. In 1770, Martinho de Melo Castro, Portugal’s 
foreign minister, wrote that he could not tolerate the fact that “Brazil had control over all 
trade and navigation between the two sides of the Atlantic to the total exclusion of 
Portugal.”44 
 
The close relations continued, however, into the nineteenth century. On February 19th, 1810, 
Portuguese Prince Regent Dom João signed two treaties with Great Britain, one of Alliance 
and Friendship, the other of Commerce and Navigation. It must be said that the Portuguese 
Court – fleeing Napoleon – had just been transferred to Rio de Janeiro from Lisbon two 
years earlier, under the protection and escort of the British Navy. Article X of the first treaty 
stipulated the obligation to abolish slavery gradually – which had already been prohibited in 
Britain as of January 1st, 1808. The treaty allowed for slave trade only between the African 
and South American colonies of Portugal below the Equator. In this sense, the treaty was a 
victory for Brazilian slave interests as, in reality, the manuscript only forbade slave trade 
from the colonies to the mainland, which lies north of Equator, but not to Brazil. On the 
other hand, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation gave Great Britain a preferential tariff 
of 15% for English products. By securing these rights, Great Britain became the ‘mistress’ 
of the Brazilian economy until 1844, when the treaty expired. Among several privileges, the 
British succeeded in having the port of Santa Catarina declared a free port and attaining 
perpetual trading rights with Portugal’s East-African colonies. These treaties generated an 
enormous wave of protests and deep sentiments against British imperialists. The Bahian 
slave traders lost their livelihoods in the face of the increasing British suppression of the 
trade in humans. The business of Rio de Janeiro suffered severely from the opening of free 
commerce with Europe, for they had lost the monopoly on imports and exports that they had 
enjoyed previously. These factors, combined with the frequent seizure of the Brazilian ships 
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by the British, created an air of animosity towards the British among the Brazilian 
population. Paradoxically, slave trade between Africa and Brazil thrived in the years 
following the signing of the treaties as never before.45 
 
Not convinced that the Portuguese would honor the tenets of the 1810 agreement, Great 
Britain made Portugal sign two more treaties in 1815 and 1817, restricting slave trade to 
only a few ports in Africa and Brazil. The fact that other major European powers did not 
abolish slavery meant a competitive disadvantage for Britain, whose companies could only 
compete on the international market if everyone else was forbidden from using free labor. 
Thus, the backbone of the Brazilian industrial and agricultural production was broken, to the 
anguish and dismay of the Brazilian merchant class and latifundistas. Angola was the main 
source of slaves and the ties between the South American and African Portguese colonies 
were more intensive than with the Metropole. Some prominent Brazilian landowners, 
colonial bureaucrats and Benguelan traders did not hide their dissatisfaction with Portugal’s 
servility to Britain and made public their opinion of not abiding by the agreement. The 
relocation of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro in 1807, the growth of Brazil’s 
population and economic output, coupled with an abundance of natural resources made the 
Metropole-colony relations skewed towards the latter in what historians call a “metropolitan 
reversal”, i.e., a colony exercising governance over the entirety of the (in this case 
Portuguese) empire. The transfer of the king and the royal court “represented the first step 
toward Brazilian independence, since the king immediately opened the ports of Brazil to 
foreign shipping and turned the colonial capital into the seat of government.”46 
 
The shared interests on the two sides of the Atlantic – and their common opposition to the 
abolition of slavery – paved the way for the emergence of voices proposing coordination and 
a united voice among the Portuguese colonies on matters relating to them. This movement 
led to the promulgation of the idea of a political union between Brazil and Angola following 
the former’s independence in 1822. The movement to establish the Confederação Brasílica 
emanated from Luanda and Benguela in 1822 and held momentum until 1826. Its explicit 
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aim was to turn Angola into an overseas province of Brazil.47 The colonial traders and slave 
merchants requested that the new Brazilian monarchy ensure the continuation of the special 
relationship they had enjoyed during previous centuries. The decision makers (junta) of the 
Government of Benguela were said to have sent a delegation to Rio de Janeiro to request the 
annexation of Benguela to independent Brazil – an extremely bold move in an especially 
tumultuous decade in Portuguese history. In 1822, two Angolan white members of the 
Portuguese parliament joined the Brazilian independence movement and moved to Brazil as 
representatives of Angola, resigning their seats in the Portuguese parliament. Counselor 
Euzébio de Quieroz Coutinho was one of the “Angolans” elected to the Cortes Gerais 
(General Assembly) in Lisbon, a partisan of Angolan unification with Brazil. Nonetheless, 
it seems that the African side was more enthused by the idea of creating a trans-Atlantic 
empire than the new-born South American monarchy. Emperor Dom Pedro I calmed the 
jittery British Minister Henry Chamberlain that “with regard to Colonies on the coast of 
Africa, we want none; nor anywhere else; Brazil is quite large enough and productive enough 
for us, and we are content with what Providence has given us.”48 
 
Great Britain, which had acted as the mediator between Portugal and Brazil in the 
negotiations that followed independence, did not favor the idea of direct political links 
between an independent Brazil on the one hand, and Angola, West Africa, and Mozambique 
on the other. Citing humanitarian and commercial reasons, it preferred a free South Atlantic 
Cone, with no barriers to its interests in the region. Brazil thus came under constant pressure 
from British interests not to accept the union with Angola. The negotiations conditioned 
Portuguese and British recognition of Brazilian independence on complete cessation of 
political ties between Brazil and Angola. The result is embodied in the third clause of the 
treaty signed by Portugal in 1826 (with British mediation) acknowledging Brazilian 
independence: “His Imperial [Brazilian] Majesty promises not to accept proposals by any 
Portuguese colonies to join the Empire of Brazil”.49 The small-scale revolts that followed 
the declaration in Angola were construed by the Portuguese authorities as attempts to secede 
from Portugal and unite with Brazil.50 
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ii. 1826-1889: from “Brazilian colonization” to “Novo Brasil” 
 
The commercial relations continued to flourish even after the Treaty of Acknowledgment of 
Brazilian Independence in 1826 by Portugal and the installation of a Monarchy in Brazil. 
Slave trade was the main driver of the bilateral trade, but merchandise such as ivory and bees 
wax also flowed from the Portuguese African colony to the newly independent South 
American nation. Touristic and cultural ties also existed, as many well-to-do Angolans went 
on holiday or to seek health care in Rio de Janeiro (including the author of the first Angolan 
manuscript to be published, José da Silva Maia Ferreira). Some scholars call the attitude 
during the early years of Imperial Brazil towards Angola as “Brazilian colonization” of the 
West-African territories.51 
 
With the gradual cessation of slave trade during the second half of the 19th century (total ban 
of slavery only coming in 1888), commercial ties between Brazil and Angola started to wane. 
Human trafficking constituted the greatest part of the bilateral exchange, and as this source 
of income was increasingly being limited, Brazil started to turn its attention more and more 
to its Latin American neighbors and former European landlord. In the meantime, Portugal – 
having slowly realized that its giant South American possession was gone for good – took 
to the process of turning Angola into a “Novo Brasil”, a Brazil-like colony that could supply 
it with cheap raw materials. The European power thus began a conscious colonization of the 
interior of the country, as opposed to the previous 400 years when its interests could be 
served via weakly-manned trading posts along the coast. This revived, intensified colonial 
occupation caused the almost total severance of the old and strong relations with Brazil. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine, declared by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, also signaled the 
end of unchecked European expansion into the New World. 
 
The occasion has been judged proper for asserting... ...the American continents... 
...are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any 
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European powers... ...we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any 
European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States.52 
 
iii. 1885-1914: The Scramble for Africa and “Second Brazil” 
 
The first half of the 19th century was characterized by low levels of intensity in Portuguese-
African interactions. During the blockade of Lagos in 1851 British naval vessels blockaded 
the city under the pretext of stopping slave ships from leaving the port. Guided by the fever 
to spread the values of Christian civilization and to source raw materials for the Industrial 
Revolution in the homeland, the British started to exert more and more influence on the 
coastal enclaves of Portugal, Spain, France and other European nations on the African 
continent. Nonetheless, in the year of 1870 Europeans only held Algeria, Senegal, Cape 
Verde, the Portuguese possessions in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Lagos and its environs, the Cape of Good Hope, the English and Boer territories in 
South Africa and some forts, warehouses and other points along the coasts. The majority of 
the vast continent, including most of the interior, were unknown to the white people, terra 
nullius that belonged to ‘no one’. 
 
The first “Scramble for Africa”, spurred by the Anglo-French rivalry in Africa in the middle 
of the 19th century, divided almost the entire black continent among the European nations 
within a span of slightly more than 40 years, starting from the 1870s. This overzealous 
preoccupation with acquiring land to supply the Old Continent with raw materials consigned 
bystander status to the former Latin American colonies, such as Brazil. Portugal intended to 
 expand its colonial possessions at the mouth of the Congo River, which met with fierce 
resistance with the major powers of the time (Britain and France). Long gone its illustrious 
military might, Portugal had to settle for a tiny enclave, Cabinda, and cede the rest of the 
Congo Basin to France and the Belgian king, Leopold II, at the Congo Conference of 1884-
1885. The meeting of representatives of 13 European states and the United States of America 
in Berlin was a milestone in European colonization efforts in Africa, as it formalized the 
arrangements of European powers and regulated their movements on the black continent. 
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The event – also called Berlin or West Africa Conference – was organized at the behest of 
King Leopold II, king of Belgium, with ambitions to raise his young country into the ranks 
of the old colonial powers, and also to accumulate his personal wealth in what subsequently 
became his personal “backyard”, the Congo Free State. King Leopold II successfully 
persuaded the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, to convene the ministers and 
ambassadors of the major European colonizing nations plus USA in Berlin in November of 
1884 in an attempt to formalize the division of the African continent among them.  
 
Portuguese ambitions to link the two oceans from East to West were manifested at the 
Conference, as part of the proposal put forward by Portuguese Foreign Minister Barros 
Gomes. The plan became known as the Rose-Coloured Map (Mapa cor-de-rosa) and 
intended to assert Portugal’s claim of sovereignty to the land between Mozambique and 
Angola (Shire Highlands). If realized, the area under Portuguese control would be a “Second 
Brazil” for the European nation, comparable to her former South American possession in 
both size and economic importance. To obtain the support of France and Germany, the 
Iberian nation signed treaties in 1886, that would see Portugal give up the area around 
the Casamance River in Guinea to France and agreeing to a southern boundary for Angola 
and a northern boundary for Mozambique that were favorable to Germany. The only other 
European power that had to convinced to acknowledge the Portuguese claim was the Great 
Britain, whose interests in Nyasaland (present-day Malawi), Mashonaland and Matabeleland 
(now Zimbabwe) conflicted with the Portuguese plans. The mention of a British Cape-to-
Cairo Red Line in an 1888 newspaper article, coupled with the discovery that the Zambezi 
outlets in the Indian Ocean a year later thwarted any Portuguese hopes that Britain would 
relinquish her hold on the Shire Highlands regions between Angola and Mozambique.53 
 
On 11 January 1890, the British government sent a formal protest to Portugal, known as the 
1890 British Ultimatum, that forced the retreat of Portuguese military forces from areas 
which had been claimed by Portugal on the basis of historical discovery and recent 
exploration, but which the United Kingdom claimed on the basis of effective 
occupation.  One of the tenants of the Congo Conference that preoccupied the Portuguese 
the most was the Principle of Effectivity that was set up to prevent powers from establishing 
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colonies in name only. The Principle of Effective Occupation stated that powers could 
acquire rights over colonial lands only if they possessed them or had “effective occupation”: 
in other words, if they had treaties with local leaders, if they flew their flag there, and if they 
established an administration in the territory to govern it with a police or military force to 
keep order. The reason for Portuguese worries was that most of the land she claimed was 
ungoverned by the Metropole, save for a few coastal outposts manned by a couple of dozen 
men. As Henry O’Neill, the British consul based at Mozambique Island once remarked: 
 
To speak of Portuguese colonies in East Africa is to speak of a mere fiction—a 
fiction colourably sustained by a few scattered seaboard settlements, beyond 
whose narrow littoral and local limits colonisation and government have no 
existence.54 
 
The Principle did not apply so much to the hinterlands of Africa at the time of the conference. 
This gave rise to hinterland theory, which basically gave any colonial power with coastal 
territory the right to claim political influence over an indefinite amount of inland territory. 
This was one of the arguments the Portuguese relied on when claiming the area between 
Angola and Mozambique. 
 
At around the same time half a world away, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt added 
the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, asserting the right of the U.S. to 
intervene in Latin America in cases of “flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin 
American Nation” to preempt intervention by European creditors. This re-interpretation of 
the Monroe Doctrine went on to be a useful tool to take economic benefits by force when 
Latin American nations failed to pay their debts to European and US banks and business 
interests. This was also referred to as the Big Stick ideology because of the phrase from 
president Roosevelt to “speak low and carry a big stick”.  
 
The Corollary was the unofficial declaration of the start of US economic domination over 
the Western Hemisphere, which did not cater for the interference of European players any 
more. All the attention of the Old Continent turned southwards, towards Africa. The first 
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Scramble for Africa resulted in the almost complete domination of the African continent 
within a span of less than 50 years: in 1870, only 10 percent of Africa was under European 
control; by 1914 it had increased to almost 90 percent, with 
only Ethiopia (Abyssinia) and Liberia still being independent. 
 
iv. The World Wars and the Good Neighbor Policy 
 
World War I completely turned the attention of the fledgling Latin American nations away 
from Africa and towards the Old Continent, where war was ravaging and raw materials were 
direly sought after. One of these, caoutchouc, was of exceptional value for the war 
machinery, and the majority of latex was sourced from the rain forests of the Amazons. The 
rubber boom, which lasted until the end of the Second World War, halted the 
industrialization of Brazil and relegated her once again to the status of a raw material 
exporting periphery nation. 
 
The immediate aftermath of the Great War was characterized by an increasing influence of 
the United States and the diminishing presence of the British and other European nations in 
South-America. The Good Neighbor policy, enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt in 
1933, reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine in terms of multilateralism and non-intervention on 
the part of the United States of America in the internal affairs of the Latin-American 
countries. Overall, the Roosevelt administration expected that this new policy would create 
new economic opportunities in the form of reciprocal trade agreements and reassert the 
influence of the United States in Latin America. 
 
Brazil was set to resume its path to semi-periphery status and more intensified intra-
Americas trade when World War II broke out. The new conflict was a challenge for Brazil’s 
multiethnic society, where a large German, Italian and Japanese population resided, and – 
after a long attempt at staying out of the war – resulted in Brazil’s declaration of war on the 
Axis Powers in 1942.  
 
v. Start of Cold War and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
 
In the post-war period Brazil wavered between democratic and military governments, with 
its foreign policy strongly tied to that of the US and Portugal. It not surprising therefore, that 
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the South-American nation did not openly confront her former landlord on the issue of 
decolonization in the international fora.  The Portuguese dictator, José Antonio Salazar did 
his best to gain supporters for Portugal’s belated imperialistic dreams; the Casas do Portugal 
functioned as informal lobby groups in Brazil with the objective of aligning the two 
lusophone countries’ foreign policy. 
 
In 1948 – upon the initiative of the United States – the Organization of American 
States (OAS) was founded to serve as a multilateral platform for consultation and policy 
making among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Albeit the project was welcomed 
with enthusiasm, there were skeptical voices to be heard, saying that the OAS was American 
neo-imperialism in disguise. Nonetheless, the OAS was established and – as the sceptics had 
foreseen – was mainly used as a political forum for the US to gather support against the 
expansion of Soviet influence on the continent. 
 
In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invoked the Monroe Doctrine at the 10th Pan-
American Conference in Caracas (Venezuela), denouncing the intervention of Soviet 
Communism in Guatemala. President John F. Kennedy said at an August 29, 1962 news 
conference: 
 
The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John 
Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power 
extending its power to the Western Hemisphere [sic], and that is why we oppose 
what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is 
why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace 
in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and 
attention to it.55 
 
During the reign of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945 and 1951-54) Brazil offered unequivocal 
support first to the Allied Powers during World War II, and then to the American anti-
Communist propaganda at the onset of the Cold War. In exchange, Brazil received favorable 
loans and assistance for her industrialization process from the U.S., and supplied the Allies 
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with invaluable natural resources (i.e. rubber) during the war. Vargas’ pragmatic and 
protectionist approach was later labelled as the nationalist-pragmatic bargain by some, and 
autonomy in dependence by other.56  
 
Vargas created state monopolies for oil (Petrobras), mining (Vale do Rio Doce), steelmaking 
(National Siderurgy Company), alkalis (National Alkalis Company) and automobiles 
(National Motors Factory). It was also during his presidency that the “Four Sisters”57 
emerged − modelled on the Japanese zaibatsu system−, family-controlled vertical 
monopolies consisting of a holding company on top and several industrial subsidiaries 
dominating specific sectors of a market, either solely, or through a number of subsidiary 
companies. Some of these corporations have survived up until today and have been playing 
a significant role in the creation of commercial ties with Africa. We will see in later chapters 
how these mammoth conglomerates exert their influence on decision-making at the highest 
level when it comes to the SSDC agenda of the government. It was also under Vargas’ reign 
that vocational training was rolled out on a nationwide scale in order to accelerate the 
industrialization of the nation. 
 
It was only in 1961 when the then President of Brazil took the courage to devise its own 
foreign policy for Brazil that would build on relations with both the Communist and 
Capitalist worlds. The policies of President Jânio Quadros will be analyzed in the third 
section, under ideological motivations, as that post-1960 era belongs to the field of 
contemporary politics and exerts strong influence on current Afro-Brazilian relations as well. 
 
C. Ethno-cultural factors 
 
i. Ancestry and ethnicity 
 
As already touched upon in the Historical chapter, currently 76 million Brazilians admit 
having African ancestry in their bloodline. This makes Brazil the third largest nation in the 
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construction sector that have been dominating the public works sector from the 1940s up to today. Source: “As 
quatro irmãs: Odebrecht, OAS, Camargo Corrêa e Andrade Gutierrez”, Brasil de Facto, 14 July, 2014. 
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world with inhabitants of African origin (after Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo). The number may even be higher as mixed relationships were more common in 
Portuguese colonies than in other European possessions. Some estimate that up to 80% of 
the actual population of Brazil (i.e. 160 million people) have African DNA somewhere in 
their genetic lineage. It is, nevertheless, a question of prestige to “whiten” oneself in Latin-
America, thus, in a voluntary survey many with only one European ancestor and the rest 
African would declare themselves Caucasian rather than Black. The truth must lie 
somewhere between the two figures, nevertheless, it is an undisputed fact that Brazil is one 
of the biggest “African” nations in the world. 
 
Brazil was the world’s leading sugar exporter during the 17th century. From 1600 to 1650, 
sugar accounted for 95 percent of Brazil’s exports, and slave labor was relied upon heavily 
to provide the workforce to maintain these export earnings. It is estimated that 560,000 
Central African slaves arrived in Brazil during the 17th century in addition to the indigenous 
slave labor that was provided by the bandeiras, bounty hunters foraging into the interior of 
the continent to capture Native Americans and runaway slaves. The discovery of gold and 
diamond deposits in the mountains of Minas Gerais in the 1690s dramatically increased the 
demand for manpower, contributing to the importation of over 1.7 million new slaves over 
the course of the next century. 
 
By 1819 the population of Brazil was 3.6 million, and at least one third were African slaves. 
By 1825 the figure may have been as high as 56%. In 1826 the first article of a convention 
drawn in Rio de Janeiro stated it should  
 
not be lawful for the subjects of the Emperor of Brazil to be concerned in the carrying 
on of the African slave trade, under any pretext or in any manner whatever, and the 
carrying on of such after that period, by any person, subject of His Imperial Majesty, 
shall [should] be deemed and treated as piracy.58 
 
                                                          
58 Lawrence F. Hill, The Abolition of the African Slave Trade to Brazil, General Research Division, The New 
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Nonetheless, slave trade continued until 1888, the year of final abolition of the dreadful 
institution in Brazil. In the 19th century alone more than three million Africans were shipped 
to South America. 
 
Table 1. Destination and volume of slave trade from 1440 to 1870. 
Country / Destination  
Slaves 
Delivered Percentage 
Brazil 4,000,000 35.50% 
Spanish Empire 2,500,000 22.10% 
British West Indies 2,000,000 17.70% 
French West Indies (incl. Cayenne) 1,600,000 14.10% 
British North America & U.S. 500,000 4.40% 
Dutch West Indies (incl. Surinam) 500,000 4.40% 
Danish West Indies 28,000 0.20% 
Europe (incl. Portugal, Canary Islands, Madeira, Azores) 200,000 1.80% 
Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade, The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870, New York: Simon 
& Schuster Paperbacks, 1997, p. 804. 
 
Studies show that around 75 percent of the around 4 million slaves transported to Brazil 
originated from the areas that currently belong to four countries (Angola, the two Congos 
and Mozambique). This figure, even if only half true, would mean that an enormous pool of 
genetic, ethnic and cultural similarities exists up to today between Brazilians and the 
inhabitants of the West Coast of Africa.  
 
The first three rows of the below table show the embarking points of three-fourth of all the 
slaves destined toward the Portuguese colony in South America. 
 





Loango 750,000 5.80% 
Congo / Angola 3,000,000 23.10% 
Mozambique / Madagascar 1,000,000 7.70% 
Senegambia (including Arguin), Sierra Leone 2,000,000 15.40% 
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Windward Coast 250,000 1.90% 
Ivory Coast 250,000 1.90% 
Gold Coast (Ashanti) 1,500,000 11.50% 
Slave Coast (Dahomey, Adra, Oyo) 2,000,000 15.40% 
Benin to Calabar 2,000,000 15.40% 
Cameroons / Gabon 250,000 1.90% 
Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade. 
 
Newspaper advertisements often boasted of Angolan slaves arriving in the port. 
 
For sale a creole slave, a skillful shoemaker, with a very good figure, about 
twenty years of age, with no vices or bad habits. His final price is 300,000 reis. 
Anyone interested in him should go to Travessa do Paço No. 11, upstairs, where 
he will find someone to speak to about the matter. For sale, a black man of the 
Angola nation, about 20 to 25 years of age, a very good maker of combs, both 
tortoise shell and animal horn.59 
 
ii. Societal role of the Negro in Brazil 
 
For much of the 20th century Brazil was seen as a post-racial society, with the mixed-
race mulato as the national ideal. This idea was advanced by Gilberto Freyre’s Casa Grande 
e Senzala (translated into English as Masters and Slaves), which represented master and 
slave living in a symbiotic relationship that, because of the intermingling of races, produced 
a stronger Brazil. Nonetheless, the reality was much different and much less romanticized 
as portrayed by Freyre. Racism, abuse of power and mistreatment were part of everyday life 
in a pigmentocratic, feudal Brazil. 
 
This excerpt from a book published in 1894 in the aftermath of abolition, portrays the view 
of contact between slaves and free men and women. 
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Once Indian slavery had been eliminated, the happy, carefree, and affectionate 
African, with the primitive morality of the savage, with the bitterness that 
belongs to those who are persecuted, intruded into the family, into society, into 
the home. He rocked the hammock of his mistress [sinhá], served as page to his 
young master [sinhô-moço], as attendant to his lord [sinhô]. As the nurse, the 
slave girl suckled every Brazilian generation; as the personal servant [mucama], 
she lulled them all to sleep; as a man, the slave toiled for every generation; as a 
woman, she surrendered herself to all of them.60 
 
Black slaves infiltrated all aspects of the elite, mainly white society, from childbirth to death. 
Most white children grew up on breast milk from black wet nurses, as women of African 
origin were more accustomed to the climate and had more milk than their European 
counterparts. As one French doctor working in Brazil advised mothers selecting a wet nurse, 
the predominant view at the time was that 
 
white wet nurses would be preferable in every respect, if in this climate they 
offered the same advantages as those of the African race. The latter, organically 
formed to live in hot regions, in which their health prospers more than it does in 
any other place, acquire in this climate an ability to suckle babies which the same 
climate generally denies to white women.61 
 
iii. Maroon societies: mocambos, quilombos, and Palmares 
 
The Negroes endured captivity for over three centuries without a voice being raised in their 
defense, except for a small handful of clerics, such as Father Antonio Vieira and Father 
Manuel Ribeiro da Rocha. Father Rocha, nicknamed “the pioneer of abolitionism” centuries 
later, condemned the slave trade and argued for the liberation of black slaves in his book 
Etíope Resgatado (Rescued Ethiopian).62  
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Nonetheless, the preferred and most widely practiced form of resistance of black slaves to 
captivity was flight. The runaway slaves formed varies types of communities in the 
hinterland, ranging from small village-like settlements (mocambo) to large, organized units 
(quilombos). The word quilombo originates from the Kimbundu language (kilombo), native 
tongue of most of the slaves imported from the Kingdom of Kongo, and refers to armed 
camps where warriors were trained. 
 
The most notable maroon state was created in Northeastern Brazil, in the state of Alagoas, 
called Palmares. The Quilombo dos Palmares was established in 1605 in the mountains 
behind the town of Pernambuco and endured almost a century until its final destruction by a 
Portuguese-led force in 1694. At the peak of its existence, it had more than 30,000 
inhabitants, mostly runaway slaves of Angolan origin, and had a well-organized leadership 
structure, headed by the king Ganga Zumba and later by his nephew, Zumbi. The long lasting 
presence of Angola Janga (“Little Angola” as Palmares was known at the time by the locals) 
was due to some external factors too in addition to the brave resistance put up by its 
inhabitants. The quarter of a century of Dutch occupation of the areas around Palmares 
(1630-1654) diverted the resources of the Portuguese colonial government from fighting the 
quilombolas and provided them with relative tranquility.  
 
iv. African influences on Brazilian culture, religion and everyday life 
  
From samba and Carnival to food, sports, music and religion, African culture is omnipresent 
in Brazil. The African cultural traditions would inevitably blend with the Portuguese and 
Amerindian customs, to produce a unique cultural manifestation of its own under the 
Brazilian ‘brand’. The most famous Brazilian tradition is Carnaval, a fusion of Portuguese 
Catholic traditions peppered with indigenous Amerindian and African rituals that is 
celebrated 40 days before Easter. One the most well-known dances – often erroneously 
associated with Brazil as its inventor – is the samba. Samba is not only the official music 
and dance of Carnaval, but is also a linguistic remnant of the Africans in Brazil. The word 
samba means to dance and invoke the African spirits. Another Afro-Brazilian dance is the 
capoeira, whose origins thought to be from Angola, where it was referred to as “ngolo” or 
“engolo.” The two traditions share many of the same moves, rhythms and sounds. 
Characterized by powerful kicks disguised as graceful dance movements, capoeira is 
believed to have emerged in response to Portuguese slave masters’ rules forbidding African 
 54 
customs, especially martial arts. In Brazil, it was also utilized by fugitive slaves to fend of 
the bounty hunters (capitães do mato) who were sent to recapture them.   
 
As far as religion is concerned, African autochthonous beliefs and traditions deeply 
infiltrated the Roman Catholicism that was introduced by the Portuguese. Candomblé 
developed in a creolization of traditional Yoruba, Fon, and Bantu beliefs brought from West 
Africa by enslaved captives in the Portuguese Empire. Between 1549 and 1888, the religion 
developed in Brazil, influenced by the knowledge of enslaved African priests who continued 
to teach their mythology, their culture, and language. 
 
Practitioners of Candomblé believe in one all-powerful God, Oludumaré, who is 
served by lesser deities called orixas. Collectively, ancestors are called Egum in 
Brazil. During important ceremonies, priests and priestesses masquerade as 
Baba Egum and specially choreographed dances will be performed in order to 
become possessed of each ancestor spirit.63 
 
On the music scene, Brazil owes a lot to the musical traditions of its former slaves. Maracatu 
is an Afro-Brazilian musical tradition, which is played primarily in the Recife and Olinda 
regions during Carnaval. It evolved out of ceremonies conducted during colonial times in 
honor of the Kings of Congo, who were African slaves occupying symbolic leadership 
positions among the slave population. Also, important female characters are performed by 
cross-dressed male performers, and all African and Afro-Brazilian personages are performed 
using blackface makeup.  
 
Lundu, jongo, ciranda, frevo and forró – among many others – are music and dance forms 
of African roots and are widely popular in mainly northern and northeastern Brazil. 
Sertanejo and caipira are mostly listened to in the southern and central parts of the country 
and, although they resemble more the country music of the United States, they incorporate 
a variety of elements and instruments from African folk music. 
 
As for the musical instruments, a long list of percussion instruments and drums brought in 
through the slave trade have enriched Brazilian music over the centuries. The berimbau is 
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made from a wooden bow, a steel string and a gourd and is a vital part of the capoeira rituals. 
Samba and carnival cannot be imagined without the familiar sounds of the ganza, a 
cylindrical shaped music shaker filled with beads, or the pandeiro, a hand frame drum that 
is played by holding it in one hand and striking its head with the other hand to create sound.64 
 
In the late 1960’s an unusual confluence of art, music and politics merged into the art 
movement known as Tropicalia. The Tropicalia Movement thrived on the philosophy of 
‘cultural cannibalism’, which was based on blending influences from all genres to create 
something new. In effect young artists began combining poetry, rock and roll, African 
rhythms and performance art to critique the political oppression of the Brazilian dictatorship. 
Two of the most outspoken musical forces behind Tropicalia, were Caetano Veloso and 
Gilberto Gil. Due to their consistent critique of the government and their growing popularity, 
the two artists were considered to be a threat to the government. Consequently, both artists 
were incarcerated and later exiled to London. As time passed both Gilberto Gil and Caetano 
Veloso continued to fuse and experiment with musical genres, the Brazilian government also 
experimented with various forms of political evolutions. In an ironic twist of fate, Gilberto 
Gil a former political prisoner, was appointed as Brazil’s Minister of Culture in 2003. During 
his tenure he created the Culture Points program, which provides arts education grants to 
underprivileged Brazilian children to become cultural visionaries and entrepreneurs. 
 
Although Afro-Brazilians are a central part of Brazilian history, an organized Black 
Consciousness Movement did not develop in Brazil until the 1970s. At the forefront of the 
movement was Ilê Aiyê, an organization dedicated to the promotion of Afro-Brazilian culture 
and social empowerment in Brazil. Their members mostly come from the Bahian black 
community, descendants of former slaves, and dress as sugarcane plantation workers during 
the Bahian Carnival in Salvador. The group pioneered the type of carnival group known as 
the bloco afro, featuring themes from global black cultures and history, and celebrating the 
aesthetic beauty of black people. As Ilê Aiyê passes, carnival crowds sing along by the 
thousands to songs about the importance of African and Afro-Brazilian culture and religion. 
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On the gastronomy scene, the Africans introduced the Brazilians to new cooking styles and 
tastes, such as cooking food in dendê (palm oil), using okra as a thickener and a vegetable, 
and using the banana in different dishes. Africans also introduced a wide variety of chili 
peppers and ginger to season food, and this practice has continued to be part of Brazilian 
cooking. Another cooking technique Africans took to Brazil was the use of dried smoked 
fish and shrimp. The oldest African dish in Brazil, carurú, dates back to the 1600s. It is a 
spicy stew made with smoked fish or shrimp, quiabo (okra), onions, dendê (palm oil), and 
peppers. In the twenty-first century, the African influence on ingredients and cooking 
techniques still thrives, especially in the northeastern state of Bahia. Religious meals of the 
Candomblé belief include black beans, since they are thought to be the main deity, Oxalá’s 
favorite food.65 
 
Sport has also connected the two sides of the Atlantic, mainly through the common passion 
for football. Brazil is the only country to win the World Cup five times and the game is 
revered as a quasi-religion in the South-American country. Football’s effect on the 
promotion of black identity in Brazil is understated; stars like Garrincha, Pelé, Didi, Ronaldo 
and scores of others unite all colors and races in the country as the wealthiest, blanket white 
oligarch and the dark-skinned shoe cleaner cheer for the same team. A large number of 
Brazilian football players, who rose to global fame, started their careers in townships 
(favelas), playing barefoot with nothing more than a bundle of cloths formed into a ball. Two 
of them are worth mentioning in more detail, for their contribution to the forging of the 
Freirean Brazilian national identity. 
 
Manuel Francisco dos Santos, known by the nickname Garrincha (wren) was the child of 
mulattos, mixed offspring of Africans and Europeans in Brazil. He was born with a 
deformity that left one of his legs curved and shorter than the other. Due to his underage 
stature and deformity, doctors ruled out that he would ever become a professional athlete. 
Life had different plans for the “little bird”: in 1958 and 1962, Garrincha won the FIFA 
World Cup with the Brazil national team and his jaw-dropping dribbling skills and neck-
twisting tricks on the field played a big role in giving Brazilian football the image of the 
most creative, fun-to-watch soccer nation in the world. Due to his immense popularity in 
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Brazil, he was also called Alegria do Povo (People’s Joy) and people painted on the wall of 
his tomb: “Obrigado, Garrincha, por você ter vivido” (Thank you, Garrincha, for having 
lived). 
 
Edson Arantes do Nascimento, known as Pelé, is widely regarded as the greatest football 
player of all time. Pelé’s life epitomized the struggle that the descendants of former slaves 
faced in the 50’s in their attempt to achieve glory, respect and fame. Pelé grew up in poverty 
in the state of São Paulo, he earned extra money by working in tea shops as a servant. Taught 
to play by his father, he could not afford a proper football and usually played with either a 
sock stuffed with newspaper and tied with a string or a grapefruit. Twenty years and three 
World Cup titles later Pelé would be remembered as the greatest football player who has 
ever set foot on a football pitch. He received more than half the votes for FIFA Player of the 
Century in a vote held in 2000.66 Pele’s fame became so widely known, that during the 1967 
Nigerian Civil War the warring factions agreed to a 48-hour ceasefire, so they could watch 
Pelé play in an exhibition game in Lagos. In Brazil, Pelé is hailed as a national hero for his 
accomplishments in football and for his outspoken support of policies that aim to improve 
the social conditions of the poor.67 
 
i. Jeito, jeitinho and ginga: the Brazilian way of life 
 
“Dar um jeito” (to find a way) is a popular expression when Brazilians are faced with 
challenges in everyday life. It roughly translates to “no worries, we will find a solution” in 
English and is a typically Brazilian method of social navigation. The lack of resources and 
an incompetent social service system have made Brazilians creative and invent new ways of 
resolving daily challenges, such as acquiring food and basic necessities of life.  
 
Its diminutive form, jeitinho refers to finding a way to accomplish something 
by circumventing or bending the rules or social conventions. Most of the time it is harmless, 
made for basic ordinary opportunistic advantages, as gatecrashing a party just to get free 
food and beverage. But sometimes it is used for questionable, serious violations, such as 
fraud, embezzling of public funds, and exerting influence with little regard to the law. 
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Jeitinho is a major factor in both the successes of Brazilian companies in Africa, and also in 
their domestic downfall. Doing business in Africa involves a certain degree of creativity and 
flexibility for one to navigate in the loose regulatory waters and relationship-based web of 
decision-makers. Without jeitinho and the capability to adapt to the ever-changing 
circumstances, delivering massive infrastructure projects would not be possible on the 
continent. On the other hand, jeitinho also plays a major role at home in winning lucrative 
publicly funded contracts from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and in obtaining 
favorable financing from the National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES). In the latter case, jeitinho takes advantage of the social network and human capital 
accumulated by the management of the contracted entity to exert influence on the decision-
makers. In popular jargon, such interactions are labelled “corruption” or “illicit practices”, a 
behavior inherent to the Brazilian political-economic landscape, as we will see it in a later 
chapter when analyzing the massive graft scheme uncovered in the country recently. 
 
Jeito-jeitinho originates from the concept of “ginga” (pronounced jeen-gah). In informal 
Brazilian Portuguese, ginga signifies a cool way of moving, freely and loosely and is said to 
be rooted in those who have African blood. It cannot be taught nor learned, one has to be 
born with ginga. Ginga means “not to take life too seriously and to confront hardship with 
the right combination of toes, heels and hips.”68 The Portuguese word conjures up an almost 
dance-like way of running. It is mostly associated with sport, especially football and 
capoeira, but it also reflects the Brazilians attitude toward life: seize the day and do not be 
afraid to try new things since God is there to protect you. 
 
Jeito, jeitinho and ginga play an invaluable and unmeasurable role when it comes to 
Brazilian-African interactions. The mentality of not-taking-anything-too-seriously-yet-
somehow-making-things-work-out permeates the relations of businessmen, diplomats, 
tourists and social workers on both sides of the Southern Atlantic. We will see in a later 
section the importance placed on jeito by the private corporations active in Africa from the 
results of the surveys filled out. In a time of cultural intolerance, one of the most unique 
resources Brazil has to offer the world is its rich knowledge and diverse heritage acquired 
from the mix of African, European and Asian influences. 
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III.  IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 
 
I purposefully do not call this chapter political dimensions, but rather ideological, as the 
force behind Brazil’s rediscovery of the African continent had more depth to it than purely 
political. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, ideology is defined as “a systematic 
body of concepts especially about human life or culture”69. Brazil’s rejuvenated focus on 
Africa was more than just politically motivated, as we will see from the discussions below. 
  
A. Geopolitical motivations 
 
i. The 1950s: liberation of Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement 
 
The post-WWII period signaled the end of the era of formal colonization as the returning 
African soldiers, who fought alongside their colonizers during World War II, took to the 
fight for liberation in their homeland. This, coupled with the increasing tensions of the Cold 
War, all contributed to the acceleration of independence movements, both peaceful and 
violent, on the African continent, and the gradual declaration of independence of more and 
more nations (Libya: 1951; Egypt: 1953; Tunisia, Morocco: 1956; Ghana: 1957). The peak 
year for independence came in 1960 when about 17 countries gained independence. 
 
The sudden influx of so many newly independent states into world politics made it necessary 
for these young nations to either align themselves with one of the two Super Powers or to 
find a third way of political discourse. The African arena became a hotspot for ideology 
export of both the Soviet Union and the United States, spurred on by the intent of the two 
Super Powers to increase their respective spheres of influence around the world. Some of 
these newly liberated nations thought it would be better not to be bullied by the major world 
powers and they came up with a ‘middle course’ policy that would keep them equidistant 
from both dominating political ideologies. The founding fathers of the so-called Non-
Aligned Movement were Josip Broz Tito of Socialist Yugoslavia, Jawaharlal 
Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Kwame 
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Nkrumah of Ghana. Their actions were known as The Initiative of Five. A significant 
milestone in the development of the Non-Aligned Movement was the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, a conference of Asian and African states hosted by Indonesian 
president Sukarno, who gave a significant contribution to promote this movement. The 
twenty-nine countries that participated at the Bandung Conference represented nearly one-
quarter of the Earth’s land surface and a total population of 1.5 billion people, roughly 54% 
of the Earth’s population at the time. Brazil was given observer status at the Conference. 
 
The Non-Aligned Movement as an organization was founded in Yugoslavia in 1956, at the 
initiative of the Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito. Its first formal meeting, the Conference 
of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in 1961, in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia. The main principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were based on the 
Hindu behavioral codex called Panchsheel (five restraints): 
a) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
b) Mutual non-aggression. 
c) Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs. 
d) Equality and mutual benefit. 
e) Peaceful co-existence.70 
 
The Non-Aligned Movement signaled a trend that was to have a profound influence on future 
international cooperation. The Non-Aligned Movement was the first ever South-South 
cooperation among states of the periphery and semi-periphery of the world economy. It 
currently comprises 120 members, including all African countries with the exception of 
South Sudan, and held its 17th Summit in Venezuela in 2016. Nonetheless, the end of the 
bipolar world signaled a reduction of influence of the Non-Aligned Movement on world 
politics, as new challenges arose at the turn of the 20th century (terrorism, regional conflicts, 
global warming, pollution and overpopulation among others).   
 
The post-War years also witnessed the first attempt at unifying the Latin-speaking countries 
of the world. The Latin Union, established in Madrid in 1954, was an international 
                                                          




organization of nations that used Romance languages, with the aim of protecting, projecting, 
and promoting the common cultural heritage of Latin peoples and unifying identities of 
the Latin, and Latin-influenced, world. Its members included most of South and Central 
America, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania from Europe, the PALOP countries and 
Equatorial-Guinea of Africa, as well as the Philippines and East Timor from Asia. Due to 
financial difficulties, the Latin Union announced on 26 January 2012 the suspension of its 
activities, the dissolution of its Secretariat General (effective July 31, 2012) and termination 
of employment for all the organization's personnel.71 
 
B. Third Phase (1961-2003): The Independent Foreign Policy and the rekindling of 
Brazilian-African relations 
 
The first significant push factor to shape Brazilian foreign policy was the rapid expansion of 
Soviet influence in the world. Disregarding the Communist bloc was not an option anymore 
as it encompassed almost one third of the world’s territory and population. The founding of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 furthermore accelerated the developing 
countries’ drive for collective self-reliance. The short, but turbulent presidency of Jânio da 
Silva Quadros signaled a turning point in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation as the staunch 
NATO-ally started to look behind the Iron Curtain in an attempt to diversify its foreign 
relations, in a move that was termed Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa 
Independente, PEI). 
 
Although Quadros’ motivations were guided more by practical than ideological factors, it 
attracted voracious internal criticism from anti-Communist forces within the country. Some 
of Quadros' countrymen accused him of planning to deliver Brazil into the neutralist camp; 
others, despite denials from Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos, thought the President’s 
overriding ambition was simply to pull a few tail feathers out of the U.S. eagle. Nonetheless, 
Brazil opened its embassy in Moscow in 1961 and established diplomatic relations with four 
Socialist countries (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania) in the same year.72 Various 
technical, scientific and educational cooperation agreements were signed, the Studies 
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Program for Undergraduate Students (PEC) was launched, through which students and 
experts from Socialist countries were awarded scholarships to study in Brazil.  
 
João Belchior Marques Goulart (1961-1964) continued his predecessor’s politics and Brazil 
– for the first time in history – positioned itself on the contrary of its former fatherland, 
Portugal, by supporting the nationalist liberation movements in Portugal’s waning African 
empire. In 1962, Brazil voted in favor of UN Resolution 1742 which “reaffirmed the right 
of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence [and] disapproved of 
repressive measures and the denial of human rights and fundamental liberties to the Angolan 
people.”73 According to Jerry Dávila, the long line of abstentions and no votes against UN 
resolutions of decolonization can be attributed to the fact that while the majority of Brazil’s 
population had African roots, those in decision-making positions didn’t. They were, in fact, 
mostly descendants of Portuguese landlords and European feudal families who felt 
‘ethnically attached’ toward Portugal. In the words of Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos, 
“Salazarist diplomacy was shrewder, and firmer – it did not vacillate like ours. It dragged 
Brazil along, exploiting the sentimentalism of some of our elites, drawing in politicians and 
intellectuals through paid trips and conferring honorary titles; manipulating the press through 
its economic influence, especially in Rio de Janeiro.”74 
  
i. 1964-1985: Military government in Brazil and involvement in Africa 
 
The coup d’etat of 1964 brought on twenty years of military government in Brazil that 
initially reverted the Brazilian foreign policy back to the pro-American, anti-Communist 
standpoint. Any UN resolution that was aimed against Portugal was either vetoed or 
abstained, silencing the pro-decolonization critics in the country. As the famous sociologist, 
Gilberto Freyre phrased it in a speech in 1968 after the annexation of Goa by India: “a 
Portuguese wound is Brazilian pain.”75 See below a list of Brazilian votes in the UN General 
Assembly on Portuguese Colonization from 1960 to 1973. 
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Table 3. General Assembly Votes by Brazil and the United States on Portuguese Colonialism. 
 
Source: Lynn Schopen, Hanna Newcombe, Chris Young, and James Wert, (eds), Nations on Record: United 
Nations General Assembly Roll-Call Votes (1946-1973), Oakville-Dundas: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 
1975. 
 
From a Brazilian political perspective, the African continent was once again forgotten. 
Nonetheless, economically speaking, the year of the coup d’etat saw the establishment of the 
Group of 77 (G-77) at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, Switzerland. The G-77 started out as a grouping 
of seventy-seven developing nations with the common aim “of the South to articulate and 
promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on 
all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote 
South-South cooperation for development.”76 Although the members of the G-77 have 
increased to 134 countries, the original name was retained due to its historic significance. 
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The South-Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) was an ambitious vision in the 70s to create 
a common defense mechanism of the South-Atlantic region, based on the pattern of the 
NATO. However, this implied certain levels of cooperation with the Portuguese colonialist 
regime and South Africa’s racist one. 
 
The Oil Crisis forced the South American nation to look for alternative supply routes of this 
basic resource, which were procured almost exclusively from the Middle East until 1973. 
Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company had been involved in off-shore drilling along the 
Angolan coast when Portugal suddenly abandoned the territory, plunging it into a civil war 
between the US-financed UNITA and the Soviet-backed MPLA. Brazil was the first to 
recognize the MPLA as the legitimate representative of the Angolan people. As José Vicente 
de Sá Pimentel explains, Brazil’s decision to side with the MPLA was based on a “thorough 
diagnosis… …that only the MPLA is “capacitated to maintain the integrity of Angola’s 
territory.”77 
 
During the Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974) government, although in political terms 
the most repressive of the military regimes, Brazil became the country of the Economic 
Miracle. On one hand, with its income concentration and fast industrial growth, Brazil was 
in need of markets and raw materials, mainly oil. On the other hand, Brazil served as a model 
for many African states: a former European colony that inherited a backward, monoculture 
economy and had been able to take advantage of the tropical technology to generate 
progress. It was also in Brazil’s interest to gain African diplomatic support for the 
legitimation of the expansion of its Territorial Sea limits to 200 hundred miles. At the same 
time, the SATO project came to a dead end.78 
 
General Ernesto Beckmann Geisel (1974-1979) introduced the politics of Responsible 
Pragmatism, marked not only by a “third worldist” stance and condemnation of the apartheid 
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regimes, but by a careful balance between the two superpowers in an attempt to safeguard 
Brazilian interests on the continent. Responsible Pragmatism “refers to the idea that 
Brazilian foreign policy should adopt political realism, remain closely linked to national 
development strategies and avoid being constrained by ideological alignment.”79 
Notwithstanding, Brazil played its cards well by linking its support for Western anti-
communism to receiving foreign aid to assist national development programs. On the non-
aligned front, the Buenos Aires conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing 
Countries (TCDC) in 1978 made landmark recommendations. Promotion of TCDC came to 
be recognized as the responsibility of the entire international community, while the primacy 
and leadership role of developing countries was maintained. The significance of the TCDC 
was remarkable, as was one of the first attempts at defining South-South cooperation in the 
world. 
 
The most important event relating to South-South cooperation during the presidency of João 
Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-1985) was the the North–South Summit (officially 
called the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development), held in 1981 in Mexico. 
The Summit was an unsuccessful attempt at changing the terms of trade between the 
developed and the developing world. It was attended by representatives of 22 countries from 
5 continents, including Brazil. At the height of the Cold War, the meeting was strongly 
influenced by super power interests, with the USSR abstaining from participation and Cuba 
being blocked from participation by the United States. The Summit did not have a predefined 
agenda and did not go further than some well-sounding declarations about the need to alter 
the current course of events in world trade. No further summits were convened later within 
the same framework. 
 
ii. 1985-1990: The South Atlantic finally gains momentum  
 
José Sarney de Araújo Costa (1985-1990) was the first president to have looked beyond the 
short-term economic gains and his goal was to build an institution based upon common 
cultural, historical and social values. His idea was manifested in the creation of the 
International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IIPL), a forerunner to the Community of 
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Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) that was established in 1996.  The IIPL’s aim was 
to promote cultural exchange and knowledge among the lusophone nations. Its first 
important achievement was the common Orthographic Accord of the Portuguese language 
in 1990.80 
 
The Falkland War of 1982 shifted the focus from the North Atlantic to the South and revealed 
the military superiority of the Western countries over the proud, but ineffective Latin 
American forces. The humiliating defeat of Argentina at the hands of Great Britain – another 
push factor – lead to the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone 
(ZPCAS) in 1986, for countries from both sides of the South Atlantic convened to discuss 
security issues and ocean frontiers. Two years later the first South Atlantic Summit was held 
in Rio de Janeiro, with the participation of nineteen African nations. Current topics in Africa 
were on the agenda: apartheid, a Peace Plan for Angola and mutual economic development.81 
However, it was not until the UN Peacekeeping mission in Angola that Brazil actively 
engaged itself in Africa again. Brazilian Brigadier General Péricles Ferreira Gomes headed 
UNAVEM I (1988-1991), the first of the three UN Angola Verification Missions, that was 
deployed in the country to supervise the withdrawal of Cuban troops. 
 
iii. The 90s: The Pentecostal Decade 
 
The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 90s diverted 
attention away from South-South cooperation, at least from a political and diplomatic 
perspective. On the other hand, this decade can showcase some significant results on the 
social front, being the time when Brazilian culture became inseminated in the everyday lives 
of many African families, through the increasingly popular soap operas and Pentecostal 
Churches.82 Latin America and Africa are among the continents that have experienced a 
Pentecostal explosion within the last half century. In Latin America, the explosion could be 
traced back to the 1960s, while the African experience started in the 1970s. The case of one 
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extremely successful Brazilian Pentecostal Church that rose to prominence in post-apartheid 
South Africa is worth looking at in more detail. 
 
The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), a Pentecostal Church of Brazilian 
origin, first entered South Africa in the early 1990s. The church opened its first South 
African branch in 1992 among a small, white, Portuguese-speaking community in 
Johannesburg − with modest success. In 1993, the UCKG shifted its missionary focus to 
black South Africans and started to attract large numbers of followers. It quickly became 
one of the fastest growing churches in South Africa. To date, the UCKG has opened 320 
branches and is a visible presence in all major towns and cities in the country’s nine 
provinces. The church distributes hundreds of thousands of free newspapers weekly, has a 
sophisticated website, a national call-center and a pastor training center in Johannesburg.83 
 
The main recruitment base of the UCKG in both Brazil and South Africa is the large pool of 
the unemployed and disenfranchised, who stream to the church to get healed of poverty, 
illnesses, emotional and social problems. Ilana van Wyk attributes the attractiveness of the 
UCKG to the structural similarities between South Africa and Brazil in the 90s (i.e. 
neoliberal economic policies and austerity measures), that led to the marginalization of large 
segments of the society.84 Some consider the UCKG and other Pentecostal Churches hoaxes 
that just have the aim of appropriating membership fees from the poor for their own material 
benefits. The UCKG pastors justify these beliefs by declaring that “the language of the world 
is money.” As the most important currency of value, the pastors assert that money is the 
medium through which people should engage with God.  
 
The top management of the UCKG is based in Brazil and functions like a multinational 
corporation, elaborating complex business plans and calculating return-on-investment ratios. 
Once these plans are finalized, the Brazilian bishops send pastors and bishops abroad to fill 
and run the new churches. In their new stations, the pastors are subject to the authority and 
command of a national bishop who in turn reports to the high command in Brazil. The UCKG 
has other sources of income than purely members’ contributions: it owns the second-largest 
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television network in Brazil, scores of radio stations across the world, publishing houses, 
various newspapers, construction companies, furniture factories, a bank, a travel agency, a 
commercial airplane, recording studios and other parallel businesses. 
 
Regardless of whether it is viewed as an efficacious, materially orientated faith that delivers 
‘all answers’, or as a predatory business aimed at exploiting the poor, the phenomenal 
success of the UCKG on both sides of the Atlantic can be attributed to the existence of large 
masses of disenfranchised poor, who have become tired of the eternally empty promises of 
the elite political class and are thirsty for hope and healing. In addition to the new evangelical 
churches, Brazilian soap operas have also become everyday scenes in the lives of African 
families, transmitting aspects of Brazilian cultural and social values to all levels of society. 
85 
 
From a political perspective, the end of the Cold War and its reverberations kept the 
technocrats of the Itamaraty occupied during the 90s. Intraregional integrations were favored 
(leading to the establishment of the MERCOSUR in 1991) and relations with the former 
Soviet bloc countries received more attention than Africa. The number of Brazilian 
diplomats on the continent declined from 34 in 1989 to 24 in 1995.  
 
The Presidencies of Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello (1990-1992) and Itamar Augusto 
Cautiero Franco (1992-1994) were more preoccupied with the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the Iron Curtain in Europe from an external relations perspective than with African affairs.  
 
The election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) was the precursor of 
what was to follow during his successor’s administration, as he reinvigorated relations with 
the African continent. FHC – as he was known among his followers – visited Angola and 
the post-apartheid South Africa right after his inauguration to reassure both countries that 
Brazil was willing to offer advice and help in the process of reconstruction. UNAVEM III 
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already featured 739 troops, 20 military observers and 14 civilian police from Brazil, the 
largest contingent of all contributors to the peacekeeping mission.86  
 
Cardoso was a pioneer in arguing that neoliberal economic principles favored more the 
developed North than the underdeveloped South, which led FHC to initiate greater 
convergence in global diplomatic affairs and in multilateral forums. South American 
integration such as MERCOSUR can be partly attributed to the push effects of the neoliberal 
corrective measures prescribed by the IMF and to the pull factors of regional cooperation in 
search of a common, Latin American solution to the region’s problems. 
 
Celso Lafer, professor and ex-Minister of foreign affairs, credits Cardoso with many of the 
achievements that are now attributed to Lula, such as South American integration, 
multilateralism and the emphasis on the newly emerging economies (China, India, Russia 
and South Africa). Cardoso also maintained close relationships and signed several treaties 
with the Portuguese-speaking African countries, commonly referred to as PALOP 
(Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe).87  
 
In 1995 the intergovernmental organization South Centre was set up as a continuation to the 
South Commission. The South Commission, originally set up in 1987 and chaired by 
President Julius K. Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania, was an informal grouping 
of heads of state who realized “that developing countries have many problems and much 
experience in common.”88 The Commission emphasized the need for countries of the South 
to work together at the global level. In its monumental report published in 1990, titled “The 
Challenge to the South”, the South Commission recommended the creation of a South 
organization charged with undertaking this challenge. The South Centre, an independent 
intergovernmental think-tank of developing countries, was then created to do research, 
analysis and provide technical and policy support for the emerging countries to develop 
common points of view and to work together on major international development-related 
policy issues. The South Centre currently has 54 members, all developing countries, and is 
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headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It is affiliated to the UN and has observer status on 
various bodies related to the UN.89 
 
The long-planned Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) was finally 
established in 1996, whereby cultural and security cooperation was emphasized in the 
transatlantic relations. Unfortunately, less desirable spin-offs of these ties also flourished, 
namely more active ‘cooperation’ among drug and arms cartels, smuggling and money 
laundering networks. 
 
In terms of South-South security relations it is essential to mention ATLASUR, an initiative 
of the Argentinean and South African governments in 1993 to enhance greater cooperation 
and exchange of experiences between their respective navies. Brazil and Uruguay joined the 
initiative in 1995 and since then, every two years joint naval exercises take place between 
the navies of the four Southern hemisphere nations. 
 
A less fortunate and more nefarious connection between Brazil and Africa that has also 
intensified over the last decades is the trade in narcotics. According to the UN’s Office of 
Drugs and Crime, seizures of Brazilian supplied cocaine and heroin in West Africa increased 
tenfold between 2005 and 2009, from 25 tons to 260 tons. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru are 
cocaine growers and refiners that share relatively porous borders with Brazil. Marijuana 
from Paraguay also enters Brazil and exits to West Africa by air (private in big executive 
jets or as commercial cargo) across the Atlantic Ocean to Angola and Nigeria, and then on 
to Europe or other parts of Africa.  It is suspected that much of the resulting smuggling 
operations to Europe are, at least in part, controlled by criminal gangs who channel these 
profits to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram (in Nigeria) and Iranian-backed 
Hezbollah (from Lebanon).90 
 
C. Fourth phase (2003-ongoing): Lula and the emergence of Brazil as Leader of the 
Global South 
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The successor of President Cardoso, Luiz Inácio „Lula” da Silva continued his predecessor’s 
foreign policy of “autonomy by diversification”91, attempting to reduce Brazil’s dependence 
on the US and Europe by enhancing the bilateral relations with Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. From his populist election campaign that made investors flee the country and 
almost plunged the country into a financial crisis to his unprecedented popularity that made 
some call for amending the Constitution so he could run for a third term, Lula has been a 
man of contradictions. On the domestic front, two of Lula’s social policies achieved a more 
equal distribution of wealth and consequently a reduction in the levels of poverty in Brazil. 
In addition to soaring popularity at home, the Fome Zero and Bolsa Família programs gained 
international fame for President Lula as ‘champion of the poor’. 
 
i. The Zero Hunger social development program 
 
Launched in 2003, the Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) initiative includes several programs 
sponsored through a strong partnership among 12 ministries and agencies coordinated by the 
Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (Ministério de Desenvolvimento 
Social e Combate à Fome or MDS). Zero Hunger comprises diverse strategies such as 
creating water cisterns in Brazil’s semi-arid areas, creating low-cost restaurants, educating 
people about healthy eating habits, distributing vitamins and iron supplements, supporting 
subsistence family farming and giving access to microcredit. It is thought to be the biggest 
initiative to date by a Brazilian government to combat hunger in the history of the country, 
and builds on similar assistance programs implemented by previous Brazilian governments 
and experiments in other countries, such as Mexico. The Mexican experience will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
 
Figure 2. The 4 Axis of the Zero Hunger Social Development Program. 
                                                          




Source: “Social Development and Fight against Hunger: Government and society working together.” 
Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication (Brazil), 2008. 
 
 
The most comprehensive and best-known program under Zero Hunger is called Family 
Stipend (Bolsa Família), a conditional cash-transfer program created as an institutional 
umbrella for several existing social projects. Family Stipend follows three basic guidelines: 
(1) to provide its beneficiaries with immediate relief from poverty through direct cash 
transfers; (2) to help families overcome the intergenerational cycle of poverty with 
conditions that involve children and youth in each family that benefits; and (3) to boost 
families’ progress and development through complementary social projects related to issues 
such as adult literacy and income generation. Family Stipend’s purview is intersectoral, 
covering education, health, and prevention of child labor (or the recovery of children from 
child labor). Another characteristic is its decentralization and shared management across 
agencies and levels of government. Each participating ministry oversees social assistance, 
health, and education at the state and municipal levels, monitoring conditions in its own 
fields of expertise. 
 
As of 2011, Family Stipend has registered 19 million families across the country (see Map 
3. below). The experience of Zero Hunger and other Brazilian social projects is being 
adapted and replicated in other developing countries. 
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Map 3. Evolution of the Geographical Scope of the Zero Hunger Social Development Program (2004-
2010). 
 
Source: “Social Development and Fight against Hunger: Government and society working together”, Ministry 
of Social Development and Hunger Eradication (Brazil), 2008. 
 
Family Stipend currently gives families with per-capita monthly income below the poverty 
line (US$56) a monthly stipend of US$13 per vaccinated child (<16 years old) attending 
school (up to 5), and US$15 per youth (16 or 17 years old) attending school (up to 2). 
Furthermore, to families whose per-capita monthly income is below the extreme poverty 
line, (US$28), the program gives the Basic Benefit US$28 per month. This money is given 
preferentially to a female head of household, through so-called Citizen Cards which are 
mailed to the family. This card operates like a debit card and is issued by the Caixa 
Econômica Federal, a government-owned savings bank (the second largest bank in the 
country).92 
 
A study by the UNDP’s International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth found that over 
80% of the Family Stipend benefits go to families in poverty (making under half the 
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minimum wage per capita), thus most of the benefits go to the poor. Family Stipend was also 
found to have been responsible for about 20% of the drop in inequality in Brazil since 2001, 
which is welcome in one of the most unequal countries on the planet.93 
 
In the northeastern state of Alagoas, one of Brazil's poorest, over half of families get Family 
Stipend. Some 70% of the population in Alagoas is either illiterate or did not complete first 
grade at school. Life expectancy at birth is 66, six years below the average for Brazil. “In 
terms of human development,” says Sérgio Moreira, the planning minister in the state 
government, “Alagoas is closer to Mozambique than to parts of Brazil.” 94 As well as 
providing immediate help to the poor, Family Stipend aims in the long run to break this 
culture of dependency by ensuring that children get a better education than their parents. 
There are some encouraging signs. School attendance has risen in Alagoas, as it has across 
the country, thanks in part to Family Stipend. The scheme has also helped to push the rate 
of economic growth in the poor north-east above the national average. This has helped to 
reduce income inequality in Brazil. Although only 30% of Alagoas's labor force of 1.3 
million has a formal job, more than 1.5 million of its people had a mobile phone last year. 
“The poor are living Chinese rates of growth,” says Aloizio Mercadante, a senator for São 
Paulo state.95 
 
Critics of the Bolsa Família point out three concerns: (1) fraud, that money will leak to illicit 
hands; (2) disincentive to find employment for those who can live off the benefits; (3) the 
cash transfers are straightforward forms of vote-buying. While all these concerns may have 
some legitimate base, empirical evidence shows most of the money does go to the right 
people: 70% ends up in the pockets of the poorest 20% of families according to a World 
Bank study. As for discouraging people from working, studies show that adult work is not 
impacted by income transfers. In some cases adults will even work harder because having 
this safety net encourages them to assume greater risks in their activities.96 As for the vote-
buying concern, since the program is rolled out nationwide, one cannot accuse the governing 
party of gerrymandering the map by singling out pro-government areas for implementation. 
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Where the mayor is of the opposition parties, he/she will also benefit from the positive 
publicity gained through the Family Stipend project. 
 
What are the positive results of the the Family Stipend program? A World Bank study 
conducted in 2004 highlighted the following as the most important impact factors of the 
program: 
1. Efficiency gains, in terms of reduced federal administrative costs due to the 
consolidation of four previously existing programs into one (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa 
Alimentação, Auxílio Gás and Cartão Alimentação);  
2. Positive impacts on local economies, with the transfers generating local economic 
activities (particularly in smaller, poorer localities); 
3. Good targeting, with the majority of benefits going to the extreme poor; and 
4. Improvements in school attendance. 97 
 
One positive effect of the program which is not immediately apparent is that it makes a 
significant impact on the ability of the poorest families to eat. Children in public schools 
receive one free meal a day – two in the poorest areas – so less of their family's limited 
income is needed to pay for food. In a survey of Family Stipend recipients, 82.4% reported 
eating better; which has a positive effect on their performance in class and consequently, on 
their performance and results in school. If we consider that the Family Stipend program only 
costs Brazil 0.8% of its GDP, then there is no doubt that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. 
 
During a trip to Brazil in 2005, the former president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz 
said, “Bolsa Família has already become a highly praised model of effective social policy. 
Countries around the world are drawing lessons from Brazil’s experience and are trying to 
produce the same results for their own people.”98 Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Ghana 
and various other developing countries immediately approached Brazil for assistance in 
customizing the Family Stipend program to their respective population’s requirements. It is 
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not an overstatement to say that the Family Stipend not only made President Lula popular at 
home, but it also helped establish his image as Patron of the poor abroad.  
 
ii. The Lula Institute 
 
Upon his farewell from the Presidency, President Lula established the Lula Institute to serve 
both as a memento and inspiration of his legacy for those who follow him. According to its 
statute, the Lula Institute is committed to the national development and reduction of 
inequalities, aiming at the socioeconomic progress of the country, as well as the study and 
sharing of public and private policies aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, 
access to education for the promotion of equality, universalization of health care, 
environmental sustainability and the promotion of the political and social participation of 
citizens in all spheres of national public life. The first quarterly publication of the institute, 
called “Diálogos Africanos” was published in July 2015. The institute also intends to act as 
a think tank and consultative body between Africa and Latin America concerning projects 
stimulating economic, social and democratic development.99 
 
On the defense cooperation front, Lula initiated another prominent joint naval exercise to 
complement the decade-old ATLASUR, called IBSAMAR.  The launch of the initiative – 
that added India to the ATLASUR – took place in Cape Town (2008) during the presidency 
of Luiz Inácio da Silva, having the development and perfecting of naval tactics for the 
defense of terrestrial platforms, and the conduct of operations fighting threats to member-
countries as its main objectives. IBSAMAR II, III and V, carried out in 2010, 2013 and 2016, 
respectively, happened off the South African coast. 
 
President Lula, on his last trip to Africa in his visit to Cape Verde in 2010, warned Brazil’s 
next leader: “Whoever comes after me has the moral, political and ethical obligation to do 
much more.”100 Lula’s legacy will remain a preferred topic of research in academic circles 
for years to come. 
 
iii. Dilma Rousseff and the continuity of Brazil’s pro-African policies 
                                                          
99 Lula Institute website.  
100 “Brazil’s Lula pays tribute to Africa’s historic role”, BBC News, 4 July 2010.  
 77 
 
The year Dilma Vana Rousseff was elected as President of Brazil (2011) did not offer such 
an optimistic outlook as that which had contributed to the Brazilian economy’s upsurge in 
the previous decade. This time a massive financial crises was crippling Europe and North 
America and was extending its ripple effects around the world. On the domestic level, 2011 
was marked by concern over the return of inflation and the rising value of the national cur-
rency, the Real, relative to other currencies, which contributed to undermining the 
competitiveness of Brazilian products. Despite her commitment to continuing with the 
policy of South-South engagement, President Rousseff first had to tackle domestic issues 
that diverted attention away from her predecessor’s flamboyant Africa-oriented policies. 
 
The changing dynamic of Brazil’s engagement with Africa is evidenced by the pattern of 
presidential trips abroad. Between January 2011 and September 2013, Rousseff made seven 
trips to Africa as opposed to Lula, who made 28 visits to Africa.101 However, although Africa 
did not in fact become proportionally less important in the presidential calendar, the 
countries selected by President Rousseff for her foreign trips are generally those in which 
Brazil has significant economic interests. 
 
Albeit both governments’ programs are quite similar in terms of international policy, 
underscoring regionalization efforts, engagement with developing and emerging countries, 
and Brazil’s presence in multilateral forums, Rousseff’s approach is thought to be more 
pragmatic by analysts. Lula’s rapprochement with Africa was more visible from a media 
perspective due to two factors: (1) it signaled the first time Brazil so abruptly broke away 
from his predecessors’ pro-Western, conservative foreign policies; (2) Lula’s leftist 
inclinations lent an ideologically-charged campaign to ‘unite the poor of the world’. By the 
time Rousseff arrived on the scene, the world had digested Brazil’s new-found orientation 
and the continuity of Lula’s policies did not provide enough fuel for the world press. The 
less favorable economic environment of Rousseff’s first term forced the revision of the 
budgets of the Itamaraty and its development agency, the ABC. While the Lula governments 
continuously expanded the staff and budget of both institutions to accommodate for the 
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lavish expenses of opening new missions on an almost monthly basis, the two government 
entities suffered cutbacks as of 2010. See below a chart showing the effects of budgetary 
cuts on the ABC’s cooperation development funds around the world. 
 
Figure 3. Change in the ABC’s budget implementation by region, 2003-2012 (in US$ million). 
 
Source:  Carolina Milhorance de Castro, “La politique extérieure Sud-Sud du Brésil de l’après-Lula”, Afrique 
Contemporaine, Vol. 4, No. 248, 2013, p. 55. 
  
Rousseff’s pragmatism can be witnessed in her prioritization of the restructuring of export 
promotion for Brazilian SMEs abroad. In contrast to her predecessor’s policies of 
cooperation development that involved financial aid from Brazil to the recipient with little 
return, Dilma – under pressure from the business sector – placed emphasis on export 
financing that would yield economically visible benefits. 
 
One initiative of President Rousseff to stimulate trade with Africa is the policy of debt relief 
for African countries. This measure aims to make loans to these countries legally possible, 
especially supplier credit. The announcement of the creation of a new agency under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Trade would take the place of the ABC when it comes to technical 
development cooperation that involves private sector actors. This agency would focus on 
development aid, trade, and investment targeting Africa and Latin America. Critics say that 
such a move would make the ABC redundant and shift the practice of development 
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cooperation even further from its initial claims of having no economic agenda and make it 
more akin to China’s aid policy.102 
 
A new working group for Africa was set up within the Ministry of Trade, known as “GTEX 
África”, that offers legal advice and consulting to reduce risk and support the actions of 
exporting enterprises with simple instruments such as issuing documents and visas for cross-
border trade.  
 
On the multilateral front, the emphasis was being placed on the BRICS and G20 groupings 
during the Rousseff administration. The idea of ‘BRICS having its own development bank’ 
to finance infrastructure and energy projects in the South as an alternative to the Washington 
institutions was proposed at the 4th BRICS summit in 2012 in Delhi. The 7th BRICS 
summit in Ufa, Russia (July 2015) marked the entry into force of the Agreement on the so-
called New Development Bank.103 As New Development Bank (NDB) vice-president Paulo 
Nogueira Batista recently remarked: “The Washington institutions fundamentally reflect the 
point of the view, the interest, the ideology of the North Atlantic powers, the Europeans on 
one hand and the Americans on the other.” The US$100 billion Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement, agreed to at the 2014 summit in Brazil, provides emergency lending in the 
case of a liquidity crisis. It, too, was created specifically as an institutional alternative to the 
IMF. 104 
 
The Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) was presented to Brazilian 
investors in the context of a meeting organized by the BNDES and the Lula Institute. The 
works are to be financed through the NDB. On the diplomatic stage, the Rousseff 
government has come to the conclusion that it is time to start reaping the benefits of Brazil’s 
generosity over the last decade, and the Itamaraty began consultations with the African 
ambassadors in Brasilia about coordination and support to Brazil’s actions in the G20 and 
the UN. The organization of the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Agriculture and Food Security 
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in Brasilia in May 2010 − in which about 40 African ministers participated − was part of a 
master plan to lobby for candidature of the Brazilian José Graziano as Director General of 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). In another successful lobbying move, the 
election of the Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo as head of the WTO in 2013 was also made 
possible thanks to support from African countries. 105 
 
President Dilma also teamed up with the Jacob Zuma administration in South Africa in the 
launch of Operation Phakisa in 2014, which comprises four South-South projects directed 
at the South Atlantic coast in the areas of  marine transport, protection and governance, 
offshore oil and gas exploration and aquaculture.106 
 
In a nutshell, we can conclude that the Rousseff administration placed more emphasis on 
higher visibility return-on-equity projects than flashy, ideologically-motivated development 
assistance. The financial vehicles that enhance the export activity of the small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) were adjusted, in addition to the debt relief efforts of the least-
developed countries (LDCs) and talks on a Southern development bank in the framework of 
the BRICS grouping. Rousseff operated in a pessimistic international economic 
environment, in the midst of the global financial crises and surrounded by acute domestic 
problems. We can, thus, summarize President Rousseff’s South-South foreign policy as one 
associated with national development and delivering tangible results to appease a more and 
more critical populace. 
 
iv. Michel Temer and the future of Brazil’s South-South cooperation 
 
Michel Miguel Elias Temer Lulia took office on 31 August 2016 after the impeachment and 
removal from office of his predecessor Dilma Rousseff. He had been Vice President since 
2011 and Acting President since 12 May 2016, when Rousseff was suspended while she 
faced an impeachment trial. Temer, an ardent proponent of the free market with business ties 
to the United States and Europe, has not yet confirmed the continuation of his two leftist 
predecessors’ solidarity-based Southern cooperation. As a member of the Brazilian 
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Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the largest party in Brazil, Temer never took part in 
workers’ demonstrations, nor guerilla movements. He did not work in steel factories nor 
spent time in jail, unlike Lula or Rousseff. 
 
At the 8th BRICS summit in the Indian coastal resort town, Goa, Brazilian foreign policy 
seemed ambivalent, to say the least. To start the event, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Jose 
Serra revealed his unfamiliarity with the BRICS group by struggling to remember the names 
of its members. He couldn’t recall South Africa’s place in the acronym BRICS. At the 
common walk-in session, Russian President Vladimir Putin snubbed the Brazilian president 
by not holding his hand, while embracing the hand of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 
 
Illustration 1. Brazilian President Michel Temer (on the left) at the 8th BRICS summit in Goa, India on 
15-16 October 2016. 
 
Source: Marco Vieira and Henrique Menezes, “Brazil is breaking with its South-South focus. What it means 
for BRICS”, The Conversation, 20 November 2016. 
 
On the other hand, Temer accepted the Goa Declaration, which is in contrast to his 
administration’s rhetoric of alignment with the US and the denial of the legacy left by his 
predecessors. One of the clear contradictions between Temer’s views and the Goa 
Declaration is reform of the UN Security Council. The new Brazilian Foreign Minister, 
Serra, commented in an interview that Brazil’s accession to the UN Security Council is not 
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a current priority for the administration.107 At the same time, the Goa Declaration prioritizes 
the reform of the main decision making organ of the world body.  
 
China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status and role of 
Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration 
to play a greater role in the UN.108  
 
In addition, the final declaration of the BRICS summit reemphasized the importance of 
multilateral trade regimes, which is the opposite of what the new Brazilian administration 
has been communicating to the press. In his inaugural speech Serra said that Brazil would 
prioritize bilateral and multilateral negotiations, a move away from Brazil’s investment 
in multilateralism within the WTO. It is noteworthy to mention that the United States is a 
major proponent of bilateralism in terms of trade agreements. 
 
One of the first BRICS-related results of the Temer administration is that in April 2017, just 
under five years after the idea of the New Development Bank (NDB) came out of the Delhi 
summit, the bank signed its first development loan agreement in Brazil. The loan, valued at 
US$300 million  aims to add 600 MW of renewable energy capacity to Brazil’s grid and will 
be managed by BNDES domestically.109 
 
Serra recently requested a study to account for the costs of the country’s diplomatic 
representations on the African continent. This may have important consequences for 
relationships with Africa, where the new administration could undo President Lula’s 
expansionist policy of having opened over 13 embassies in ten years of his reign. 
 
It is still too early to judge President Temer’s stance on Brazil’s South-South cooperation, 
but what we can deduce from his actions so far is that he is trying to appease both the pro-
Western lobby and the pro-continuity faction of his electorate. Whatever his intentions, the 
current rhetoric does not seem to support the actions taken at the 8th BRICS summit in India. 
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The future will tell whether South-South cooperation will keep its momentum of almost two 
decades or come to halt in Brazilian foreign policy. 
 
 84 
D. Economic-strategic motivations 
 
Africa played a pivotal role in President Lula’s foreign policy, significantly more attention 
was dedicated to the black continent than throughout the previous 180 years of Brazil’s 
independence: eight trips and twenty-five nations visited in eight years. Why did Brazil 
suddenly turn its eyes towards Africa and Asia at the onset of the new millennium? To 
answer this question, we must look at the factors that shaped Brazil’s economy over the last 
couple of decades. 
 
Brazil’s commercial interaction with Africa started immediately after the arrival of the first 
Portuguese settlers on the land. The monoculture nature of production of the settlers of first 
sugar, then coffee, rubber and cattle all required intensive human labor that the local 
population could not or was not willing to satisfy. This gave rise to one of the most lucrative 
international commercial dealings ever, that of slaves. The trade in humans went on for 
almost three centuries and resulted in the transfer of millions of Africans to the Americas. 
The Brazil of today is the fruit of their tireless, hard labor, toiling in the sugar and coffee 
plantations, mines and rainforests. Although slave trade was the main driver of the bilateral 
trade up to the middle of the 19th century, ivory, bees wax, tropical fruits and textiles also 
found room in the cargo holds of ships crossing from Africa to Brazil. 
 
Brazil’s post-independence development from a monoculture, raw material exporter country 
to an industrialized, semi-developed nation can serve as a model for many African nations 
(tropical industrialization). Although the first half of the 20th century relegated both Brazil 
and Africa to raw-material providing roles to the war-ravaged nations of Europe, North 
America and Asia, the post-War period allowed for a more independent foreign policy for 
Brazil, that – starting from the 70s – engaged more with the newly liberated Portuguese 
colonies in Africa.  
 
i. 1973: Oil means Africa 
 
The most notable push factor to tilt Brazil’s attention towards its Eastern neighbor was the 
oil crisis of 1973.  The increase in the price of oil from Gulf providers meant that Brazil had 
to look for new oil suppliers and Africa seemed to be the ideal choice for several reasons: 
(1) geographically it is closer to South-America than the Persian Gulf countries; (2) the 
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suppliers are not all members of OPEC, thus are less likely to raise prices in a coordinated 
manner.  
 
In the light of Africa’s “rediscovery”, Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to 
officially visit the continent: Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Cape Verde and Algeria. In Angola 
Brazil has been present since before the onset of its independence, partly for feeling indebted 
for having extracted such a large number of slaves from the region (push), and partly for 
helping the off-shore exploratory drilling in the oil-rich waters of the country (pull). 
Braspetro, the overseas arm of Brazil's state oil company, started drilling for oil off the shores 
of Angola as the nation was fighting for its liberation. It came as no surprise that in 1975 
Brazil was the first Western nation to recognize Angola's new Marxist Government. Since 
then Brazilians have placed a high priority on rebuilding their links with Angola. 
 
One of the major achievements of the Cardoso government in African-Brazilian relations 
was the signing of a framework agreement to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement between 
South Africa and MERCOSUR during Nelson Mandela’s trip to Brazil in December 2000. 
This was the first step of an interregional cooperation that would unfold three years later in 
the world’s first transcontinental dialogue forum among developing countries.  
 
Cardoso’s successor, President Lula was keen on continuing his predecessor’s legacy and 
elevating it to levels never seen before. Lula has never been an ardent fan of the neoliberalist 
model and the New York terror attacks of 2001 strengthened his conviction that a world full 
of injustices and inequalities cannot be overcome by laissez-faire economic principles. A 
former Union leader and sensitive to the plight of the working class, Lula was keen to 
transpose this image to the international scene by taking up the role of spokesman for the 
least developed countries, most of which are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. As one of 
the largest agricultural producers of the world, Brazil has been trying to coordinate the 
policies of the suppliers, mostly developing countries, in the face of the protectionist 
measures of the North. Lula’s aim has been to achieve “greater negotiation weight and more 
balanced relations with the great powers EU and USA.”110 The pace at which China and 
India have been growing has opened up new market opportunities for Brazil’s agricultural 
surplus production, primarily for soy and corn. 
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At home, several push factors played a key role in Lula’s policies. In order to pay off the 
immense foreign debt of his country, Brazil needed to diversify its exports and could not 
rely exclusively on the rich countries. Lula also had to please the large number of Afro-
Brazilian voters, who welcomed his initiatives to train more diplomats of African origin to 
serve in Africa and the setting up of research centers at universities specializing in African 
affairs. In 2010 the Brazilian government established the African University in the city of 
Redenção, the first to liberate the slaves in the late 19th century. Half the students are 
Africans and the fields of specialization are defined by the African countries.111 Echoing the 
words of former President Jânio Quadros: “Brazil has a moral and ethical compromise with 
the African continent,”112 these initiatives were clear signs that the new orientation of 
Itamaraty does not stop at the rhetoric level.  
 
ii. Multilateralisms, minilateralisms, new regionalisms 
 
An average Latin-American nation belongs to eight agreements, but in the case of Brazil, 
this number is already exceeded by the number of agreements with Africa alone. 
Notwithstanding, as researcher Béla Soltész points out in his essay, the integration processes 
in Latin America took a quantitative turn, rather than qualitative at the beginning of the 21st 
century. There are currently ten incomplete regional organizations that exist parallel to the 
each other.113 Another Latin America expert, Marianna Racs notes that there are two 
tendencies developing in the regional integration politics of Latin American states, that of a 
pro-US stance (OAS, MERCOSUR) and that of a pro-autonomy orientation (ALBA, 
UNASUR).114 
 
At the inaugural lecture given at Rio Branco Institute in April 2003, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Celso Amorim summarized the first hundred days of government, with what can be 
considered as the four strategical axis of Brazil’s international insertion: (1) South America; 
(2) commitment with multilateralism in the construction of peace; (3) an assertive 
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commercial agenda and (4) diversified partnerships with developed and under-developed 
countries.115 
 
Shortly after taking office, Lula started implementing the third objective in what Visentini 
calls more active and affirmative diplomacy116, namely the joining of hands with developing 
nations in the name of common interests and needs. The G-20 was created just days before 
the fifth ministerial World Trade Organization (WTO) conference of 2003 in Cancún, 
Mexico. Brazil assumed the role of preferential spokesperson against the protectionist 
policies and trade-distorting measures. The importance of G-20 members in agricultural 
production and trade is considerable, representing almost 60% of world population and 70% 
of rural population all over the world. By the beginning of the new millennium, it has become 
undeniable that South-South trade is on the rise and will soon outstrip the traditional North-
South commercial relations in both numbers and intensity (see Figure 4. below). 
 
Figure 4. South-South interaction as percentage of global GDP and trade. 
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Source: Rising Powers and Independent Futures. How do Rising Powers Drive Global Change? Economic and 
Social Research Council’s (ESRC) Rising Powers Research Programme. 
 
The G-20 is a coalition of countries, which has been formed to address the concerns of its 
members that are also common to most developing countries, relating to: the elimination of 
practices that distort agricultural trade and production; the search for substantial 
improvement in market access; and the rural development, food security and/or livelihood 
security needs. 
 
The G-20 did not achieve all the ambitious goals envisaged by its founders (besides Brazil, 
Argentina, China, India and South Africa), as the US maneuvered cleverly to offer bilateral 
agreements to member states, shrinking the G-20 to G-12 and then back to G-19. To increase 
the potential of the G-20, Brazil played an active role in bringing as many nations under the 
roof as possible. At the invitation of the Ministerial Conference of the G-90 group, Minister 
Amorim gave an energetic speech in Georgetown, Guyana on 3 June 2004. 
 
I see the exchange of views between the G-90 and the G-20 as a key element for 
the success of the Doha Round… …Together, the G-90 and the G-20 constitute 
the bulk of WTO membership. We also share a commonality of interests 
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centered in translating the Doha Development Agenda into reality… …But 
unless we are capable of deploying a broad-based coalition of developing 
countries, the attainment of the Round´s development objectives will be hindered 
by interest groups in developed countries… …The G-90 members stand to gain 
from the liberalization of agricultural markets and from the elimination of 
distortions that plague it. But in order to get there, we need the participation of 
all WTO stakeholders to support our fight. I certainly count on you!117 
 
Brazil, in concordance with the last of its foreign policy objectives, was keen on promoting 
South-South trade as a priority by all members of the G-20. The Third Round of Negotiations 
in the sphere of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing countries 
took place within this context during UNCTAD XI in São Paolo in June 2004. The idea 
conceived by President Lula concerning a possible launching of a free trade area among G-
20 members was also recalled, but rejected due to fears of larger developing countries’ 
domination in agriculture. The GSTP is a multilateral trading system which was established 
in 1988 as a framework for the exchange of trade preferences in order to promote intra-
developing-country trade. The basic idea was that member countries make concessions – on 
a unilateral basis – that they do not have to extend to developed countries. Negotiations are 
dealing only with non-agricultural goods so as to avoid sensitive issues and to protect smaller 
nations from agricultural giants like Brazil and India. There are currently 44 participants – 
among them several African nations – and approximately 900 products are covered by the 
tariff schedules of the participants. 
 
Multilateralism is an effective tool for pressuring more powerful but less numerous states. 
Nevertheless, it has its drawbacks, as the higher the number of participants, the lower the 
likelihood of the “common interests” factor. Also, coordination and leadership pose a 
challenge to groups like the G-20 and G-90. Brazil, still a novice in world diplomacy, is not 
yet ready to exercise an international leading role faced with traditional powers like the EU 
and the USA. 
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In 2005, the UK government initiated the practice of inviting five leading emerging markets 
− Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa − to participate in the Group of Eight (G8) 
meetings of the industrialized nations that came to be known as G8+5; but this practice was 
short-lived. The Heiligendamm process that grew out of it in 2007 was an initiative to 
institutionalize high-level dialogue between the G8 and the five most important emerging 
economies as listed above, known as the Outreach 5 (O5). Four areas were covered at the 
G8 Summit in Germany: 
(1) Promoting and protecting innovation; 
(2) Strengthening the freedom of investment by means of an open investment climate, 
including strengthening the principles of corporate social responsibility; 
(3) Determining joint responsibilities for development, focusing specifically on Africa; 
(4) Joint access to know-how to improve energy efficiency and technology co-operation, 
with the aim of contributing to reducing CO2 emissions. 118 
 
The O5 later turned into the Group of Five (G5), comprising the leading emerging economies 
that share similar principles and beliefs about how to overcome global challenges in the 21st 
century.  
 
iii. Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) 
 
The idea of creating a grouping for the Portuguese-speaking world − based on earlier similar 
initiatives of the Francophonie and the Commonwealth − was a topic of discussion among 
the Heads of State of Portugal, Brazil and the PALOP countries in the late 80s. The first 
attempts to bring together the lusophone world was the International Institute of the 
Portuguese Language (IIPL), commenced under the Presidency of José Sarney in 1989. The 
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP after its Portuguese acronym) grew 
out of the IIPL in 1996 and started out with seven members. East Timor joined the formation 
as the eighth member after gaining independence in 2002. The interest for accession to the 
CPLP was so great, that the president of Equatorial Guinea even offered to amend the 
Constitution and introduce Portuguese as official language of his country in order to fulfill 
the requirements of accession. His request was heeded to at the Meeting of the Heads of 
States in 2012 and Equatorial Guinea became the ninth member state of the CPLP. Currently 
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the CPLP consists of nine members on four continents with a total population of more than 
280 million. It also has ten associate observers, one of which is Hungary, having been 
granted associate observer status to the organization at the 11th summit held in Brasilia in 
2016.119 
 
While the IIPL’s main seat is in Cape Verde, the CPLP is headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal 
and is mandated to carry out the following objectives: 
(5) Political-diplomatic coordination among its member states, in particular to 
strengthen its presence on the international scene; 
(6) Cooperation in all fields, including education, health, science and technology, 
defense, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public safety, 
culture, sports and media; 
(7) The materialization of projects of promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese 
language (via the IIPL).120 
 
Some of the achievements of the CPLP include a common Orthographic Accord of the 
Portuguese language, the declaration of May 5th as Day of the Lusophony (Dia da Cultura 
Lusófona), and a Trust Fund to finance specific projects in the area of education and 
professional formation. The CPLP is also another forum where Brazil can gain supporters in 
the campaign for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council. In a meeting of the CPLP’s 
General Assembly, President Pedro Pires of Cape Verde paid homage to Lula in Santa Maria 
in July 2010: “Brazil is a country that is respected and listened to, and its president is a great 
defender of Africa's interests. It should have a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.”121 
 
iv. IBSA or the G-3 
 
Recognizing the wisdom of not putting all its eggs in one basket, Brazil also pushed for the 
development of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) Forum, an alternative to its 
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growing alliance platforms. The way for the three-party ‘trialogue forum’ was paved by 
Nelson Mandela’s visit to Brazil in 2000 and the signing of a framework agreement on a 
Free Trade Agreement. The idea of creating a unique, South-South, interregional 
cooperation forum was promoted by Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry of South 
Africa. The concept suits well with South Africa’s butterfly strategy of diversifying trade 
with South America and Asia (the wings), while focusing on the African continent (the 
body). South African fears of being “isolated in a globalized world, in which the abyss 
between developed and less developed countries is ever growing”122 was the main 
motivation for bringing in the two giants into the trilateral agreement. As Danglin points out, 
IBSA differs from all previous alliances because (1) it has no members from the North, and 
(2) it functions on a democratic platform. 
 
IBSA (or as often called within UN-circles, the G-3) was formally announced in September 
2003 at the 58th UN General Assembly by the respective leaders of the three countries: Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee of India, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa. The goal of IBSA is to unite their voices in the UN, IMF and most importantly in the 
WTO negotiations. China was left out of the group due its hegemonic ambitions on world 
trade and state-controlled political structure. Danglin refers to IBSA as minilateralism, 
limiting the number of members to a mere minimum in order to achieve the highest 
diplomatic and economic efficiency. In addition, the members deepen the bilateral relations 
with each other, trying to avoid areas which might arouse suspicion or competition. Another 
important element of this formation is the fact that all three members are vying for a 
Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council. The fact that they are located on three different 
continents does not render them competitors, but actually strengthens their bargaining power 
when it comes to designating the regional representative for the (to-be-reformed) Security 
Council. By joining hands in the IBSA, Brazil and India have unofficially given their support 
to the candidacy of South Africa to represent Africa over Nigeria or Egypt, the two other 
major pretenders to be included in the “the ‘Holy Grail’ for whomever seeks international 
status.”123 Similarly, South Africa and Brazil are likely to vote for India over Pakistan to 
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represent the Indian subcontinent, while Brazil’s selection to be the voice of Latin America 
is not likely to be challenged by Mexico. 
 
IBSA is not merely a political formation, it has set up active working groups in fields as 
diverse as biofuels, education, customs administration, nanotechnology and retroviral 
diseases (AIDS, malaria, etc.). Forums consisting of women, business representatives, 
members of Parliament, cultural actors were also launched to achieve synergies in common 
areas of concern. IBSA also created a humanitarian fund – to be managed by the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) – that would provide emergency assistance to crisis regions 
(Haiti, Laos, Burundi, Cape Verde, Bissau-Guinea, etc.). On the economic aspect of the 
cooperation, the target figure of US$10 billion in intra-IBSA trade was reached in 2008, 
representing an astounding 156% growth in seven years. The Defense Ministries of Brazil 
and South Africa agreed on the development of the new generation of air-to-air missiles and 
in 2008 the navies of the two countries performed a joint maritime exercise off the coasts of 
the African nation.124 It is, thus, no wonder that István Tarrósy calls the IBSA “one of the 
most exciting cooperation networks among the «new regionalisms» of today.”125 
 
The India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (more 
commonly known as IBSA Trust Fund) is a pioneering initiative to implement South-South 
cooperation for the benefit of other Southern countries in partnership with the United Nations 
system. Its purpose is to identify replicable and scalable projects that can be disseminated to 
developing countries as examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger. 
The IBSA Fund, which was established in 2004 and became operational in 2006, supports 
projects on a demand-driven basis through partnerships with local governments, national 
institutions and implementing partners. Initiatives are concrete expressions of solidarity and 
objectives range from promoting food security, to addressing HIV/AIDS, to extending 
access to safe drinking water – all with the aim of contributing to the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design and 
implementation of the Fund’s projects include capacity-building among project 
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beneficiaries, built-in project sustainability, and knowledge sharing among Southern experts 
and institutions. 
 
An example of an IBSA funded project is the Youth Empowerment Project in Sudan that 
lasted from 2014 to 2016, whereby 2,000 young, unemployed unskilled and semi-skilled 
laborers were given technical training to undertake road maintenance and waste management 
work as well as manage small businesses. The project had a budget of US$1.3 million and 
accomplished the following objectives: 
(1) A total of 1,502 youth were trained, of which 419 obtained job placements at the 
Khartoum Cleaning Company or received financing from the Family Bank 
(2) Key partnerships have been forged with the Higher Supervisory Department for 
Cleaning and the Family Bank 
(3) Labor-based Coordination Unit was established at the Ministry 
(4) Staff members were trained in project management, labor-intensive methods, and 
information systems. 
(5) A Database for labor-intensive records was developed126 
 
The successes and innovations of the IBSA Fund have been recognized by governments, 
United Nations officials, academicians and development practitioners. 
 
v. New financing institution for the South: Bank of the South 
 
President Lula tried to dissociate Brazil from the Bretton-Woods institutions that have 
pushed Latin America into debt slavery in the last half century. Historically, the Worker’s 
Party (PT) has voiced a string of criticisms against the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which it considers an instrument of North American political 
domination, but the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 was the last drop that made the cup 
overflow for Brazil. President Lula viewed subsidies from rich countries to sectors of their 
economies as ‘scandalous’ and foresaw the decline of the influence of the Western countries 
in world politics after the crisis.127 
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Lula advocated for the creation of a new Southern development institution to counteract the 
narrative of the WB and the IMF. His words found support with Venezuelan leader Hugo 
Chavez who was dreaming of a Bank of the South (Banco del Sur) to counter the “tools of 
Washingston.”128  The bank  was officially launched on 26 September 2009 in Caracas, 
where its headquarters were established, with seven founding member-states – Venezuela, 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador. The intention of the bank is to 
lend money to nations in the Americas for the construction of social programs and 
infrastructure and had an initial capital of US$20 billion. The project has been endorsed by 
Nobel Prize-winning former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz: “One of the advantages 
of having a Bank of the South is that it would reflect the perspectives of those in the South.... 
It is a good thing to have competition in most markets, including the market for development 
lending.”129 Nonetheless, the Bank of the South only exists as a legal entity, it never received 
its first deposits by 2016, with South American governments still holding discussions on 
how to fund the bank. By 2017, the Bank of the South program was on hold. 
 
vi. The Africa Summits, the BRIC(S) and the BASIC 
 
The busy year of 2003 also witnessed the Brazil-Africa Summit in Fortaleza, where food 
security issues were discussed in addition to current political topics. The I Africa-South 
America Summit (ASA) in 2006 was a milestone in Brazil’s relations with West Africa, 
especially with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Abuja 
Declaration recognized the need to intensify cooperation within the group as an alternative 
force to face the unequal new international economic (dis)order. The Declaration lead to the 
creation of research centers on both continents, aiding the dissemination of information and 
knowledge about both Brazil and Africa to the local population. Seminars are being held at 
schools and higher education institutions to raise awareness of common historical challenges 
and achievements. The Summit also created an executive organ, the ASACOF, whose 
activities will be coordinated by Nigeria, on the African side, and Brazil on the South 
American side. 
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First named in 2001 in a Goldman Sachs report, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
grouping would quickly arouse the interest and focus of its peers, for its alleged geo-strategic 
potential. The overwhelming numbers of their economic force combined – for the past 
decade, the four countries contributed over a third of the world’s GDP growth – have 
understandably brought their activities under a new light, with the world looking upon this 
gathering with some curiosity and apprehension. At their latest summit in Brasília on 16 
April 2010 South Africa was admitted as full member, giving birth to the new acronym 
BRICS.130 
 
On the other hand, BRICS is not as brick-solid as imagined, with the sheer size of the 
Chinese economy altering Brazil’s, in ways both salutary and worrisome. China’s insatiable 
hunger for soy has created the new El Dorado in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, with 
soy plantations springing up like mushrooms (at the expense of the Amazon rainforest).131 
At the same time, Vale dos Sinos, the center of Brazil’s footwear industry is dying, being 
crushed by cheap Chinese shoes and by increasing leather prices due to the increased demand 
spurred by the Asian giant once again. 
 
The latest association of Brazil, South Africa, India and China is the so-called BASIC, 
created in April 2010 with the aim of uniting their voices ahead of the Copenhagen Climate 
Summit. It played an active role in negotiations with the US and EU and blames the 
developed countries for most of the greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
vii. Africa in numbers: Brazil’s trade figures with Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Brazil-African trade relations in the 21st century are a tale of two cycles. From the first year 
of the new millennium until 2008 there was a dramatic upward trend in both imports and 
exports. The period corresponds to President Lula’s helm at the Brazilian leadership and to 
the expansion of the world economy. The global financial crisis of 2007 initially made a 
bump in the trade curve but Brazil recovered faster than most of the Western economies. By 
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2010 the trade figures reached new heights between the two sides of the Atlantic. The shock 
came four years later, when the world seemed to finally recover from one of the longest 
recessions to date, the Brazilian bubble burst and cast the economy to pre-2008 levels. The 
graph below illustrates the dynamic evolution of trade between Brazil and Africa from 2001 
to 2017. 
  
Figure 5. Development of Brazilian imports and exports from Africa, 2001-2017. 
 
Source: International Trade Centre (ITC), TradeMap.  
 
The financial crisis that hit Brazil in 2014 had inverse effects on trade between the two blocs, 
resulting in a sharp drop in exchanges, with the volumes slowly picking up as of 2016. 
Nonetheless, the 2016 trade volume (US$12.7 billion) still does not even reach half of the 
2008 figures (US$26 billion).132 The fact that trade volume fluctuates on such a large scale 
between Brazil and Africa can be attributed to the nature of exports and imports. The 
majority of imports is crude oil imported from Angola, Nigeria and gas from Algeria. The 
price of these minerals influence the volume of trade, and the domestic recession also 
decreased the demand for both oil and gas and Brazil. All the same, trade with Africa in 
general shows an upward trend, especially when we compare it with the modest US$130 
million of 1975. Notwithstanding, it is important to point out that the purchases of equipment 
and construction contracts by African governments via loans offered by BNDES to finance 
Brazilian development projects in Africa are often accounted for as African imports, 
although they merely represent a transfer from a Brazilian state-owned institution to a private 
one via an African interlocutor. These transactions tend to distort the actual import volume 
of African nations and could be the reason why Brazil’s trade balance has turned positive 
over the last decade. 
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From a private sector perspective, in 2010 there were around 500 Brazilian companies in 
operation on the continent (compared to 13 in 1995). “Although they are present throughout 
the continent, Brazilian company operations are concentrated primarily in the infrastructure, 
energy and mining sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa.”133 The main Brazilian firms investing in 
Africa, in terms of investment and sales volume, are the government-subsidized 
conglomerates created during the Vargas-era, namely Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Corrêa, 
Odebrecht, Petrobras, Queiroz Galvão, Vale, OAS and Marcopolo. 
 
A more exciting statistic is the change in the composition of Brazil’s trading partners on the 
continent. While South Africa represented 90% of all trade until the middle of the 20th 
century, it has been relegated to fourth place, having been taken over by Nigeria, Algeria 
and Angola. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of total trade of Brazil’s top African trading partners.  
 
Source: International Trade Centre (ITC). TradeMap. 
 
The top 10 products Brazil imports from Africa represent 95% of total African imports for 
Brazil. The top import products from Africa in 2016 were mineral products (70%); chemical 
products (13%); food, beverages and tobacco (5.1%) and base metals (0.9%). These products 
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signify 89% of African exports to Brazil. Brazil’s exports are composed mainly of (1) 
commodities (soybeans, sugar, tobacco and meat); and (2) industrial items (aircrafts, 
vehicles and parts, steel, chemicals and footwear). 134 
 
Let us have a quick look at Brazil’s main trading partners in Africa to see how relations have 
been developing on bilateral basis. 
 
viii. South Africa: from pariah to friend 
 
Although Brazil sharply criticized the apartheid government in international forums, trade 
with South Africa was the only considerable commercial connection between the Latin-
American nation and the black continent up until the 1970s. The end of segregation meant a 
new, more open form of trade activity that resulted in a drastic increase in exports and 
imports. The first framework agreement of 2000 lead to the creation of the IBSA and 
preferential trade terms, with the ultimate goal of reaching a Free Trade Agreement between 
the two countries (and consequently with their adjoining customs unions, the MERCOSUR 
and SACU). Most of Brazil’s exports to South Africa are industrial goods (vehicles and 
machinery), while imports are mainly minerals (gold, platinum, chromium, coal). In terms 
of South African exports, if in 1999 Pretoria had exported USD$140 million to MERCOSUR 
countries, in 2009 this amount was reaching USD$340 million. In terms of South African 
imports, the same period saw an increase from USD$300 million to USD$1,500 million.135 
 
The Marcopolo Group, established in 1949, has four brands (Marcopolo, Ciferal, Volare, 
and Banco Moneo). The company is the third-largest manufacturer of bus bodies in the 
world, whether for tourist or urban transport. Marcopolo has factories in seven countries, 
including four in Brazil and two in Africa − Egypt and South Africa. The presence of 
Marcopolo in Pietersburg, South Africa, began in 2000. The following year, it transferred its 
facilities to Johannesburg, and in 2008 it began its activities in Egypt. Marcopolo stands out 
for its unique profile. While many established Brazilian players have been concentrated in 
infrastructure, mining, and oil for about 30 years, Marcopolo entered the African 
manufactured-goods market only about a decade ago. Marcopolo may be a good example 
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for the many Brazilian companies that follow Brazilian delegations on missions to Africa, 
especially as it not only exports to Africa but has also set up a physical presence there. The 
company is one of the few Brazilian firms that have been successful in Sub-Saharan Africa 
outside of the resource extraction and related pursuits area, and outside construction. 136 
 
Besides the economic links, Brazil and South Africa have similarities in other aspects as 
well: both of them are young democracies with multiracial populations and a bulging 
economy that has made them regional powerhouses, but at the same time has created large 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth. In addition, both of them need to tackle problems 
related to criminality, drug trafficking and rapid urbanization. IBSA seems to be an adequate 
platform for finding common solutions to common challenges. 
 
ix. Angola: Brazil is “an alternative to Portugal” 
 
In a 1985 interview to The New York Times, the Angolan Minister of Petroleum and Energy, 
Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem said that “[they] think that Brazil can serve as an alternative to 
Portugal to help [them] in technical cooperation.”137 Angola is the African nation that is 
closest to Brazil, both geographically and historically. A large part of Brazil’s population 
can trace its descent to tribes that populated Angola. Both territories were colonized for over 
300 years by the Portuguese, leaving as a heritage the Portuguese language. In 1975, Brazil 
was the first to recognize the MPLA government and sent a large contingent of peace keepers 
to the African country to supervise the armistice in the 90s.  
 
To date, Brazil has financed several impact socio-economic projects in the country, with 
emphasis on the construction of the Laúca Hydroelectric Dam, the Cambambe Dam, the 
water supply system for the cities of Benguela, Lobito and Catumbela, the Luanda-Viana 
freeway, Catumbela International Airport, the construction of the Capanda Industrial hub, 
among others. On the development assistance front, SENAI, Brazil’s technical training 
institute, set up a flagship center for professional training in Luanda in 2007 with the goal of 
training locals in the fields of engineering, construction and other technical professions.138 
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The Brazilian private sector is also involved with energy issues in Africa. A good example 
is BIOCOM, a joint venture between the Brazilian firm Odebrecht, the Angolan state 
company Sonangol, and the Angolan firm Demer. An investment of US$400 million aims 
at using sugarcane to produce sugar, ethanol, and power. Odebrecht Construtora S.A. was 
also part of the consortium building the Capanda Hydroelectric Plant worth US$500 million 
in 1984, while Braspetro has been involved in offshore drilling since 1973. Odebrecht 
currently manages 24 ongoing projects in the country, having recently won a US$1.8 billion 
maintenance tender for three hydroelectric plants. To have a better idea of the major growth 
in the commercial partnership with Angola it is important to understand the fact that the two-
way trade jumped from US$4 million in 1973 to US$230 million in 1984 and close to US$6.2 
billion in 2016. Angola ranks as Brazil’s number one foreign direct investment (FDI) partner 
in Africa, with US$250 million being invested in Angola in 2014. Another interesting figure 
shows that Odebrecht has become the largest private employer in Angola.139 
 
It is not a coincidence that between 2001 and 2014, Brazilian companies have benefited not 
only from cooperation for development, but also from a broader political relation between 
the governments. If we consider that this period corresponds to the time when President Lula 
da Silva made three official visits to the country (2003, 2007 and 2010), one can assume that 
there is complementarity between governmental and private interests behind the Brazil and 
Angola bilateral relations in the last years. We will see in later chapters how these political-
economic interests are intertwined and the fact that Odebrecht received close to four-fifths 
of BNDES disbursements to Angola in these years is not purely attributed to merit. 
 
Figure 7. BNDES disbursements, by firm, year and country.  
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Source: Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, “Brazilian foreign policy and investments in Angola”, Austral: 
Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 9, p. 248.  
 
In the scientific and educational fields, Brazil and China announced in November 2007 that 
they would distribute free for all the African continent images from the Sino-Brazilian Earth 
Resources Satellite (CBERS). The images would enable African governments to monitor 
natural disasters, deforestations, drought, desertification, etc. As one mark of Brazil’s current 
connection to Africa, Brazil and Angola for the first time will be connected by a Japanese 
supplied fibre-optic submarine cable, enabling high speed and high capacity data 
transmissions for the Internet and telecoms. 
 
x. Mozambique: from civil war to civil coal 
 
Mozambique is one of Africa’s poorest countries plagued by a long-lasting civil war after 
breaking away from Portugal in 1975. In the words of Professor Visentini, Brazil’s soft 
imperialism seems to be a more smoothing alternative to Portugal’s hard imperialism. In 
2004 Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the world’s second-largest mining company, 
won a bid to exploit the coal complex of Moatize, located in Northern Mozambique. The 
US$2 billion coal mining project is expected to produce 11 million tons of coal a year, to be 
exported to Brazil, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In total, the project is expected to 
generate 22 million tons of metallurgical coal annually, which is used for the production of 
steel. It will also produce 2.5 million tons of thermal coal, which is used for electricity 
generation, every year. To accomplish such a project, Vale will also count on the works of 
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other 20 Brazilian companies, enlarging the dimension of the project for bilateral 
relations.140 
 
In addition, an agreement between Petrobras and Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos 
(ENH) of Mozambique envisions research and production of biofuels, in line with the 
Brazilian government’s promotion of the “revolution of biofuels”. Brazil and Mozambique 
signed six new cooperation agreements in 2011, in the fields of social security, training, 
maternal health care, distance education for women, food security and agriculture.141 With 
these agreements and project in place, Mozambique has become the largest recipient of 
official Brazilian development cooperation funds.  
 
xi. Bissau-Guinea: a guinea pig of CPLP cooperation 
 
Bissau-Guinea has been performing the role of guinea pig for CPLP strategic coordination, 
with constant challenges that need to be tackled through the CPLP framework. In 1998, the 
end of hostilities between the conflicting parties was overseen by ECOWAS and CPLP, with 
considerable success, according to the Secretary General of the UN and the US and French 
governments. An unsuccessful attempt was the delivery of Brazilian electric urns for the 
elections of 2007 in Bissau-Guinea, which faltered on renewed clashes and the postponement 
of the voting. 
 
xii. Ghana, Nigeria and other African countries 
 
In Ghana, a major intervention of Brazilian origin has occurred in private sector investments 
in the rice sector in the Volta Region, by a Brazilian company, Brazil Agro-Business Group. 
This company has introduced techniques of rice cultivation developed in southern Brazil. It 
has acquired 5000 ha of land in the Volta Region and has brought technicians from southern 
Brazil to develop commercial rice production.142 Nigeria, Brazil’s largest trading partner on 
the continent, was not mentioned separately, due to the fact that almost all the trade flow is 
composed of oil exports towards Brazil. Brazilian exports to Nigeria are minimal. In the 
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energy sector, Brazil is working on a US$900 million, 700 megawatt (MW) oil-fired 
electricity producing facility in Bayelsa State, scheduled to be finished in 2019. This is the 
first of a series of ventures to improve Nigeria’s power supply agreed upon by Nigerian 
Federal Ministry of Power and Electrobras, the Brazilian state company, to provide plants 
capable of generating as much as 10,000 MW of electricity. In the oil exploration field, 
Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, found the same type of oil in both Bacia de Campos 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) and Obgia (Bayelsa State, Nigeria), which can be attributed to the 
similar geological structure of the once united landmasses.143  
 
Equatorial Guinea is a recent example of intensified trade relations between the two sides of 
the Atlantic. The hispanophone African country recently became a major exporter of oil to 
Brazil and a new destination for many Brazilian companies, with the ambassador of 
Equatorial Guinea in Brasilia confirming the high priority given by his country’s government 
to economic relations with countries that promote a policy of non-interference in domestic 
affairs. Equatorial Guinea even changed its constitution to add Portuguese as an official 
language to gain membership in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) 
in 2014.144 
 
A study from Senegal, finished in early 2011, aimed to decrease the country’s dependence 
on one single source of energy, and research verified the feasibility not only of sugarcane-
based biofuels, but also of fuels based on peanut bark as well as solar and wind. In 2011, 
EMBRAPA and the ABC presented their initial proposals to the government of Senegal; a 
final decision is awaited.145 
 
There are dozens of other places in Africa where Brazilian companies are operating either 
independently or delivering technical development cooperation through the Brazilian 
government, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Mali, Algeria, Libya and Tanzania, 
but the major partners are the ones listed above. 
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS 
 
A. The Cornerstones of Brazil’s Southern partnership policy 
 
Brazil has been working in partnership with friendly countries and international 
organizations for about six decades. Technical development cooperation (TDC) programs 
and projects generate benefits in important sectors such as social development, public 
management, the environment, energy, agriculture, education and health, which have made 
it possible to build stronger institutions capable of performing at the highest level of 
excellence. 
 
The concept of “partnership for development”, adopted by Brazil, consolidates the idea that 
the cooperation relationship entails, on both sides, sharing efforts and benefits. The proposed 
initiatives are evaluated in the light of impact and outreach on recipient communities. This 
involves improving negotiation, evaluation and project management mechanisms in order to 
fit them into national priorities. Brazil consciously avoids the use of ‘aid’ and ‘development 
assistance’ from its diplomatic vocabulary, as – according to Brazilian thinking – these terms 
tend to infer a level of subordination of one of the parties to the other, usually the one giving 
the aid or development assistance. Brazil is proud to call herself a same-level player with 
other developing nations and does not miss any opportunity to remind the North that she is 
still part of the South. 
 
The origins of Brazil’s Southern partnership policy can be traced back to the post-War years 
and the emergence of a bipolar world order. The 1950s saw an increasing industrialization 
of the developing world that brought with it a more accentuated stratification of the society, 
whereby the exploited workers were becoming more and more aware of their state of 
exploitation. This in turn lead to the rise in attractiveness of the Socialist ideology and 
presented a real challenge to the hegemony of the free-market, capitalist mode of production. 
At the same time, the Latin American republics were disappointed with U.S. economic 
assistance after World War II. They argued that they had supported America during the war 
by increasing their production of vital raw materials and keeping their prices low, yet when 
the United States began massive aid programs to Europe and Japan after the war, Latin 
American nations protested that they also deserved economic assistance. Their anger was 
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apparent during Vice President Richard Nixon’s trip through the region in 1958, when a mob 
attacked his car at a stop in Caracas, Venezuela.  
 
To stave off the spread of Communist ideology in Latin-America President Juscelino 
Kubitschek sent a letter to President Richard Nixon of the US detailing steps America could 
take to address issues of social injustice and underdevelopment on the continent. The 
proposal, coined Pan-American Operation (Operação Pan-Americana - OPA) listed the 
following five areas of concern that the US was invited to address: 
1.  Introduction of financial investments in the neediest regions of the continent; 
2.  Establishment of technical assistance to increase productivity, leading to greater 
financial returns on investments; 
3.  Conservation of commodity prices marketed by Latin America; 
4.  Promoting international institutional liberalization; 
5.  Research for a constant expansion of the range of available resources.146 
 
The US government was open to the idea presented by Kubitschek and although no concrete 
action was taken as part of the OPA, the initiative gave rise to the Inter-American 
Development Bank in 1959 and the Alliance for Progress in 1961, a 10-year, multibillion-
dollar aid program for Latin America.  
 
The real change in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation came in 1961, when President Jâ nio 
Quadros presented the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) to Parliament. The aim of 
diversifying Brazil’s foreign policy was not to break off relations with the United States, but 
to establish ‘beneficial contacts’ with countries of different ideologies in an attempt to attain 
social justice at home and to reduce tensions internationally.147 The three stances of the PEI 
were: (1) universalism, (2)  independentism, (3) developmentalism. 
 
Universalism meant that Brazil had to recognize and come to terms with a new bipolar world, 
that things have changed since the early years of the 20th century and the USA is not the only 
superpower anymore. Consequently, Brazil needed to adjust its foreign policy to take into 
                                                          
146 “Operation Pan-America, 1959”, An Aide Mémoire Sent by the Government of Brazil to Governments of 
Other American States.’ The Internet Modern History Source Book, Fordham University.  
147 Afonso Arinos Filho, Diplomacia independente: um legado de Afonso Arinos, São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2001, 
p. 156.  
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account this new reality. Independentism referred to the careful balancing act of 
maneuvering between the two superpowers and their allies in such a way that Brazil’s 
national interests would stay always at the forefront of the government’s interests. It was not 
an easy task as any step taken to foster relations with the Communist bloc drew ire and 
resentment from the hardcore pro-American members of the ruling elite in Brazil. The ‘with-
me-or-against-me’ mentality of the Cold War years meant that Quadros was labelled a 
diehard Communist by some, although he had no intentions whatsoever to distance his 
country from the US. Independentism also referred to the idea of non-intervention in another 
nation’s domestic affairs. Developmentalism was the term coined to emphasize that any 
action taken was in line with the nation’s developmental goals of improving social justice 
and decreasing inequalities of income and opportunities among the various sectors of the 
population. Developmentalism also referred to a more enhanced partnership with the newly 
independent states of Africa, with whom a series of cooperation agreements were signed.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a global shift towards an emerging consensus around 
a more ‘egalitarian philosophy’ in technical cooperation. Ideals of horizontality and non-
conditionality influenced the guiding principles of Brazilian technical cooperation, also 
resonating with the country’s perceptions on its previous experiences as an aid recipient. 
These ideals of non-intervention, autonomy, pacifism, and universalism were closely aligned 
with Brazil’s foreign policy principles. 148 
 
President João Goulart followed in the footsteps of his predecessor and implemented many 
of the initiatives of the PEI. His so-called basic reforms signaled a more central intervention 
in  the  affairs  of  the  economy  with  the  objective  of  achieving  social  justice. President 
Goulart initiated major changes in the fields of agriculture, education, finance and electoral 
process, and also nationalized the major oil and energy producing foreign multinationals, 
that were repatriating huge profits made in Brazil. Goulart’s measures were considered very 
progressive from a social point of view and even bordered on Communist during the early 
60s when devising legislation to help the poor and deprived were synonymous with 
Sovietization. It did not come as surprise that a military coup d’etat ended his reign 
prematurely in 1964. 
                                                          
148 Amado Luiz Cervo, “Socializando o Desenvolvimento: Uma História da Cooperação Técnica 
Internacional do Brasil”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol.37, No.1, 1994, pp. 37–63. 
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Brazil’s intensified SSDC policy has exerted influence on the United Nation’s adoption of a 
resolution on South-South cooperation in 2009.  
 
… South-South cooperation is a common endeavor of peoples and countries of 
the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their 
common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of 
respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. 
South-South cooperation should not be seen as official development assistance. 
It is a partnership among equals based on solidarity … South-South cooperation 
embraces a multi-stakeholder approach, including non-governmental 
organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors that 
contribute to meeting development challenges and objectives in line with 
national development strategies and plans.149 
 
The main guiding principles of Brazil’s partnership with the South were copied almost word-
for-word when formulating the UN’s policy and operational principles of South-South and 
triangular cooperation: 




iv.Complementarity (mutual benefit) 
b) Operational principles 
i. Mutual accountability and transparency  
ii. Development effectiveness  
iii. Coordination of evidence- and results-based initiatives  
iv. Multi-stakeholder approach.150 
 
                                                          
149 United Nations, Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and 
triangular cooperation, SSC/19/3, New York: High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, 14 March 
2016, New York. 
150 Ibid. 
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The above should not come as a surprise since Brazil was a founding member of the global 
organization and has been an active member of the UN’s policy formulations with respect 
to South-South engagements. The chart below recapitulates the country’s commitment to 
South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). 
 
Figure 8. Guiding principles and narratives of Brazilian SSDC. 
 
Source: Brazil’s Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate. p. 81. 
 
Let us have a look in more detail what these principles entail in the case of Brazil. We will 





From the beginning of the liberation movements, the majority of Brazilians supported the 
colonized people of Africa and Asia in their quest for freedom from oppression. However, 
due to foreign pressure, the governing elite acquiesced to supporting Portugal’s colonial 
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empire, or to abstaining from voting on the UN resolutions that denounced it. The civilian 
governments that followed attempted to rekindle the solidarity initiatives between the two 
continents and today Brazil must follow the principle of “cooperation among peoples for the 
progress of mankind,” as set out in the Federal Constitution (Article 4, IX). Solidarity in 
diplomacy, respect for national sovereignty and ownership, or as Former Foreign Minister 
Celso Amorim coined the term, non-indifference151, has been a key driving force behind 




This principle is key to Brazilian diplomacy, reflecting other guiding principles set out in 
the Constitution, such as national independence, self-determination of the peoples, and 
equality among states (Article 4: I, III, and V); in Brazil’s South-South cooperation 
approach, these principles are reflected by the fact that demands and needs are identified in 
partnership with national counterparts. Non-interference and non-imposition of one’s will 
on the other are basic tenants of Brazil’s foreign policy, meaning that cooperation programs 
are developed through consultation and coordination. 
 
As a result of its own past, and without the colonial “upper hand” of many northern countries, 
Brazil has decided to take a different approach in its new role as an aid provider. Brazil’s 
long-term endeavor to establish partnerships, share knowledge, and contribute to processes 
that lead to sustainable development projects the image of solidarity with the nations 
concerned. It is in this spirit that for three decades, through the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (ABC), it has been involved in technical cooperation with Latin American, 
Caribbean and African countries in a wide range of sectors, including the fight against 
hunger and poverty, agriculture, public security, public health, environment and education. 
Brazil is also very generous when it comes to debt repayment allowance, having written off 
US$900 million of debt repayments of various African countries over the last decade.152 
 
iii. Non-conditionality 
                                                          
151 Former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, coined the term non-indifference as an alternative usage to 
solidarity. Source: Inaugural Lecture given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Celso Amorim, at 
the Rio Branco Institute. Brasilia, 10 April 2003. 
152 “Brazil to ‘write off’ almost $900m of African debt”, BBC News, 25 May 2013. 
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As a rule, conditions are not imposed on South-South activity planned or implemented by 
the Brazilian government. There is no penalty, nor conditions tied to receiving assistance. 
Brazilian’s conscience towards their own poor has always dictated that “[here] the poor are 
poor because of a historical process of social exclusion, and we owe them a debt.”153 Care 
and compassion are the main words that come to mind when talking about the less privileged 
and not conditions and contracts. President Lula’s main aim was to make the developing 
world see Brazil as a trustworthy partner and not simply as another donor. 
 
On the other hand, Brazil’s current legislation does not allow, as a rule, the direct transfer of 
public money to other governments except through multilateral organizations, which is 
usually done through the UN system − the best example being the partnership between the 
ABC and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This principle emphasizes the 
transfer and exchange of technology and knowledge and thus avoids losses of funds to 
corruption, diversion, and so on. As Cameroon’s ambassador to Brazil has put it, “What 
Brazil has to offer is not money, it is knowledge.”154 In fact, Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (TCDC) strengthens political, economic and trading relations among 
these countries and envisages the transfer of technologies and experiences on a non-
commercial basis. The exchange of experiences and knowledge materializes the feeling of 
solidarity and responsibility among the peoples, benefiting all the parties involved in the 
cooperation. Technical cooperation projects are efficient promoters of social development, 
as well as represent the efforts of many professionals, demonstrating that with political will 




According to Oxford Dictionaries, complementarity is “a relationship or situation in which 
two or more different things improve or emphasize each other's qualities.”155 Brazil shares 
historical memories with most African countries, having survived centuries of inequality 
through colonization, slavery, oppression, and humiliation, leading to harsh conditions of 
                                                          
153 Ananya Roy, Emma Shaw Crane, Territories of Poverty: Rethinking North and South. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2015, p. 119. 
154 Carillo, Bridging the Atlantic, p. 37. 
155 ‘Complementarity’, in: Oxford Dictionaries.  
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extreme poverty, weak institutional capacity, and difficulties in providing public goods. 
Brazil does not have to overcome the legacy of colonialism that still haunts many European 
countries and provokes distrust and suspicion from the local population. These are some of 
the reasons why Africans look at Brazilians differently from how they look at Europeans, 
Asians or Americans. Brazilians, thus, start an African venture with a comparative advantage 
compared to their competitors, with at least a warmer welcome than the others. Thriving for 
mutual benefits is the foundation of Brazilian development cooperation, as it has experienced 
in the past the results of one-sided relationships. Every development policy has as an integral 
part the transfer of know-how, capacity building and exchange of ideas, experiences and 
skills between the partners. Brazil consciously avoids the terms “aid” or “assistance” and 





B. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE after its Portuguese acronym), also known as 
Itamaraty, is responsible for Brazilian foreign policy and international relations in bilateral, 
regional and multilateral levels. The Ministry advises the President of the Republic on 
foreign policy and on the implementation of diplomatic relations with States and 
international organizations. Itamaraty has 220 diplomatic representations abroad, of which 
20 embassies in Africa were opened in the last 15 years (for a total of 38 foreign missions 
on the continent). The gesture was reciprocated by the African countries: since 2003, 18 
African nations have established diplomatic missions in Brasilia, bringing the total to 34, in 
the largest concentration of African embassies in the southern hemisphere. Only the US, 
China, France, Turkey and Russia have more diplomatic missions on the continent than 
Brazil. The intensification of relations with Africa can be seen from 12 trips to Africa by the 
former president Lula da Silva, who visited 29 countries during his two tenures as head of 
state. In the opposite direction, Brazil received 47 visits of African kings, presidents, and 
prime ministers from 27 nations. 
 
Table 4. African countries visited by Brazilian presidents, 2000-2010.  
 
Source: Carillo, Bridging the Atlantic, p. 41. 
 
On top of the President’s frequent trips to Africa, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made 67 
official visits to 34 African countries during his time with the Lula government. Brazil 
created 400 positions for new diplomats during Lula’s administration: before 2005, Brazil 
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had 997 active diplomats, today, 1,397. Lula also restructured the Department of African 
and Middle Eastern Affairs within the MRE, creating a specific Africa Department with its 
own budget.  
 
Another initiative of the Lula administration was the reorganization of the Rio Branco 
Institute, Brazil’s renowned foreign service school. Up until the turn of the century the Rio 
Branco Institute was a college for the privileged youth, mostly the descendants of political 
dynasties of European origin. Lula encouraged the ‘colorization’ of the institute by offering 
study incentives for Afro-descendants with underprivileged backgrounds. The president was 
an ardent believer that Brazilian diplomacy should reflect the composition of its people and 
not only that of the – mainly white – elite. Especially in the case of the African diplomatic 
missions Lula advocated the posting of Brazilian diplomats with African ancestry.156 
 
The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) is a 46-year old public foundation linked 
to the MRE, whose main objectives are: (1) to organize and promote cultural and educational 
activities in the areas of international relations and Brazilian diplomatic history; (2) to 
organize and promote studies and research initiatives on problems pertaining to international 
relations; (3) to increase awareness of Brazilian foreign policy in its general aspects; (4) to 
contribute to a better public understanding of international issues; and (5) to support the 
preservation of the Brazilian diplomatic memory. The FUNAG works in collaboration with 
the above research institutes in the upkeep of archives and research activity in the field of 
Brazilian diplomacy through its two units, the Institute for Research on International 
Relations (IPRI) and the Center for History and Diplomatic Documentation (CHDD). The 
FUNAG, in addition to supporting publishing and dissemination work of authors about 
Brazilian diplomacy, also organizes courses for foreign diplomats and maintains cooperation 
with other countries’ research institutes in the fields of international relations.157 
  
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which celebrates 30 years of existence this year, 
was originally established to receive foreign assistance for the development of various 
sectors of the Brazilian economy from the developed world. Now, an integral agency within 
                                                          
156 Carillo, Bridging the Atlantic, pp. 40-42. 
157 Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) website. 
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the structure of the MRE, the ABC is the sole institution in charge of coordinating official 
Brazilian development cooperation projects around the globe. Data publicized by 
COBRADI show that Brazilian development cooperation has evolved from approximately 
US$160 million in 2005 to more than US$900 million in 2010.158 We must note that this 
figure takes into account Brazil’s humanitarian and peacekeeping operation, which we are 
not going to consider in this paper.  
 
The ABC is giving back what it had received for so long, in the form of international 
technical cooperation to the developing world. The ABC also pairs up with Japan, Spain and 
Germany, amongst others, to deliver trilateral technical and vocational assistance to the 
developing world. Before looking at the ABC more in depth, let us examine the efforts of 
the MRE in using education and sports as soft diplomacy tools in its foreign policy. 
 
i. Partnerships in science and education 
 
President Lula announced a series of collaborative scientific projects with Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and South Africa.  Those initiatives were 
intended to draw heavily on Brazilian expertise, to train local scientists, offer university 
technical and scientific training to undergraduate and graduate students from Portuguese-
speaking African countries, and to send teachers from Brazilian universities to Africa. His 
administration promised to work jointly with African health ministries to help combat 
HIV/AIDS, waterborne diseases, and malaria. 
 
One area where Brazil has always been keen on showing solidarity is education. The 
Brazilian “black movement” has contributed to developing a new set of public policies and 
norms, including the mandatory study of Afro-Brazilian and African history and culture in 
public and private schools and universities.  
 
The oldest student exchange program of Latin America, the Exchange Program for 
Undergraduate Students (PEC-G), was launched in the first year of the military dictatorship 
(1965) to offer stipend for students from developing countries at Brazilian higher education 
                                                          
158 “Orientações COBRADI. Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: Primeiro 
Levantamento (2005–2009)”, Guia de Orientações Básicas, Brasília: IPEA, 2010. 
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institutions. The program is still running and has trained over 20,000 students from Africa 
over half a century of its operations.159 Nonetheless, there is a strong over-representation of 
students from the PALOP countries (African Countries with Portuguese as Official 
Language), as can be seen from the table below. It is largely due to the fact that the courses 
in Brazil are in Portuguese, which serves as an automatic filter when students decide where 
to apply to pursue higher education studies. 
 
Table 5. PEC-G scholarship candidates from African countries, 2000-2017. 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brazil) website. 
 
                                                          
159 “Torna Obrigatorio O Registro De Estudantes Estrangeiros Beneficiarios De Convenios Culturais 
(Estudantes-Convenios) E Da Outras Providencias”, Dec 55.613/1965 (Decreto Do Executivo) 01/20/1965, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil website. 
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The MRE has developed a program named Science without Borders (SwB) in 2011, which 
aims at granting 100,000 scholarships until the end of 2014, stimulating scholarly exchange 
in areas of knowledge considered priorities for the national development. The program 
grants allow both sending Brazilian college students and researchers to educational 
institutions abroad, and attracting foreign scholars to Brazilian universities and research 
centers. 
 
In the field of sports diplomacy, Brazil is taking advantage of its “Decade of Sport”, whereby 
it hosted three major sporting events within three years (2013: Confederations Cup; 2014: 
World Cup; 2016: Olympic and Paralympic Games). Established in 2008, the General 
Coordination for Cooperation and Interchange on Sports is the unit of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in charge of sports cooperation as a tool to strengthen diplomatic 
partnerships and to contribute to attracting and holding major sporting events in Brazil. Sport 
is also a tool for promoting peace and cooperation – which uses and reinforces Brazil's soft 
power. Brazil has signed Memoranda of Understanding on sports cooperation with over 70 
countries – and has received an increasing demand for this type of agreement. The Ole Brazil 
initiative offers technical cooperation in soccer to various African countries, as will be 
demonstrated later on.160 
 
The Open University of Mozambique launched in 2011 by four Brazilian and four 
Mozambican institutions in the fields of math, biology, pedagogy, and public administration. 
The initiative includes a joint academic project, with half the curricula developed by 
Mozambican universities and the other by Brazilian universities; a mix of online and onsite 
learning; and dual certification with diplomas from both universities. Brazil committed to an 
initial investment of US$30 million over nine years with the potential for renewal, 
representing the country’s largest cooperation activity in education. Most of this contribution 
will be for scholarships in Mozambique. The project is benefiting 700 Mozambican students 
in three centers (Maputo, Beira, and Lichinga), and in five years an estimated 10,000 
students will have taken part. 
 
The Federal University for Luso-Afro-Brazilian Integration (Universidade Federal da 
Integração Luso-Afro-Brasileira or UNILAB) was officially launched on Africa Day (May 
                                                          
160 “Sports Cooperation”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brazil) website. 
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25), in 2011 in the city of Redenção (Ceará), the first Brazilian district to abolish slavery.56 
It offers access to higher education to students and teachers from Portuguese-speaking 
African countries, and aims to reinforce the positive historical and cultural links between 
Brazil and Lusophone countries in Africa and elsewhere. This is the first initiative of its kind 
and, given its recent launch, local impacts remain to be seen. It is, however, possible to 
anticipate positive outcomes, not only for African students, but also in reinforcing the 
African dimension of Brazilian history.161 
 
The most productive of these is the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), 
at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). The author of this dissertation had 
the privilege of spending a month at the institute, researching the vast database of the 
Brazilian Nucleus of Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), and interviewing its 
fellows, including Professor Paulo Fagundes Visentini, the globally acclaimed Africanist. 
The findings of the research and interviews are incorporated in this paper. 
 
Other interesting research centers worth mentioning is the Study Group on Africa 
(GEÁFRICA) of the Federal University of Pampa (UNIPAMPA) and the Articulação Sul 
(Research Center for South-South Cooperation). GEÁFRICA emerged in November of 
2013, out of the need to institutionalize the research of the most varied subjects concerning 
the African continent. The research carried out within the scope of the group aims to expand 
the academic production on Africa, deepening the knowledge about the continent, working 
together with CEBRAFICA at the UFRGS, center of reference in research on the subject.162 
Articulação Sul is an independent research institute based in São Paulo, Brazil, whose aim 
is to ensure that South-South Cooperation policies and practices are informed by empirical 
evidence. The center conducts the following activities to support its goals: 
 Research and analysis of existing policies and practice; 
 Monitoring and evaluation of cooperation programs and projects; 
 Studies on public policies and Brazilian emancipatory practices; 
                                                          
161 Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira (UNILAB) website. 
162 Grupo de Estudos sobre África (GEÁFRICA) website. 
  
 119 
 Facilitation of learning processes.163 
 
The direct dialogue between Brazilian and Sub-Saharan African universities like the 
Universidade Federal de Viçosa is a good example of a more comprehensive engagement. 
From the initial personal connections between Brazilian researchers and professors and their 
counterparts in Africa, this university has developed a more institutionalized approach than 
others during the past few years. Multidisciplinary teams are now working with African 
peers to identify constraints and priorities in areas such as school meals and agricultural 
productivity (needed, for example, in São Tomé and Príncipe) and techniques for online 
education (as required in Mozambique, for instance). The comparative advantage of this 
university is in agrarian sciences, in which several projects are being consolidated. For 
example, a multidisciplinary team is working with peers in the Gambia and Zambia to 
identify demands of zoonosis and agro-livestock, respectively. On its international missions, 
university staff are usually supported by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).  
 
Upcoming initiatives include the creation of the Brazil-Africa Center in Dakar, Senegal, 
undertaken by the Institut Supérieur de Management to promote joint academic research, 
seminars, and curriculum development. A few bilateral agreements between Brazilian and 
African universities have also been signed, but are limited in scope. Other important 
initiatives at the federal level include support from the Coordination for the Improvement of 
Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) to open the first public university in Cape Verde in 
late 2006; and the Africa Program, from the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Development (CNPq), to stimulate research projects directly in Africa to 
promote technological and scientific development. 
 
On the social front, Brazil and several African countries share similar challenges, such as 
inadequate and insufficient housing, huge inequalities in the distribution of wealth and large 
sections of the society without access to education and basic health care. Several other 
developing and least developed countries have immediately demonstrated interest in poverty 
reduction strategies and conditional cash transfer programs implemented by Brazil. We have 
already had a look at the most promising Brazilian social welfare program of the beginning 
of the 21st century, the Zero Hunger and within that specifically the Family Stipend. Brazil 
                                                          
163 Centro de Estudos e Articulação da Cooperação Sul-Sul (ARTICULAÇÃO SUL) website.  
 120 
is keen on assisting other nations who show interest in experimenting with similar programs 
and has already offered a hand to Ghana, Egypt and the Dominican Republic. 
 
C. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) 
 
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MRE, or Itamaraty) is the agency of the Brazilian Federal Government in charge of all 
international technical cooperation involving Brazil and other countries and international 
organizations. Since it is unique internationally as well, that one single agency deals with all 
international development programs of such a large and diverse country as Brazil, we need 
to take an in-depth look at the history and operational structure of the agency. We will also 
present some of the most prominent African development cooperation projects implemented 
by the ABC and its partners. Since the ABC is not an implementing body itself, it relies 
heavily on research institutes, universities, the private and civil sector, as well as non-
governmental organizations to execute its mandate. In the later part of this chapter, we will 
also take a look at three of the most active state-owned research institutes on the African 
continent (SENAI, EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ).  
 
The first initiative to implement an International Technical Cooperation System in Brazil 
occurred in 1950, when the Brazilian Government created the National Technical Assistance 
Commission (CNAT), made up of government representatives from the Secretariat of 
Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sector Ministries. Its main attribution was to 
establish the priority of the requests of Brazilian institutions requesting technical assistance 
from abroad, provided by industrialized countries with which Brazil had specific technology 
transfer agreements. Among the legal competencies of the CNAT were studies on Brazil’s 
participation in technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States. 
 
After nineteen years in 1969, a broad institutional reform of the System was decided, 
centralizing, by decree, the basic competences of international technical cooperation 
(external negotiation, planning, coordination, promotion and follow-up) in the Secretariat of 
Planning of the Presidency of the Republic (SEPLAN) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
chosen as the central bodies responsible for its management. On that occasion, a growing 
volume of programs and projects of official cooperation between Brazil as beneficiary and 
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countries and international organizations were identified as donors, including foreign non-
governmental organizations. It was necessary, therefore, given the extensive volume of 
external resources made available to the Brazilian institutions of education and research, to 
strengthen the System and to adapt the demand to the guidelines and priorities defined in the 
National Development Plans. 
 
As of 1984, the need for a new review of the System’s management mechanisms was already 
outlined in order to provide it with greater managerial effectiveness. In fact, the Technical 
Cooperation System had a double command: the Technical Cooperation Division of 
Itamaraty and the Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation 
(SUBIN). While SUBIN performed the technical functions − prospecting, analysis, approval 
and monitoring of projects − the Division was in charge of the political aspects of technical 
cooperation. 
 
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was created in September 1987, through Decree 
No. 94,973, as part of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), linked to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE).164 In 2012, as established in the Internal Regulations of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is the responsibility of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
to plan, coordinate, negotiate, approve, execute, monitor and evaluate, at the national level, 
development cooperation programs, projects and activities in all the areas of knowledge 
received from other countries and international organizations and that between Brazil and 
developing countries, including related actions in the field of training for the management 
of technical cooperation and dissemination of information. The ABC / MRE acts, within the 
ambit of the Itamaraty, linked to the Under-Secretary-General for Cooperation and Trade 
Promotion. 
 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was an important partner in the 
construction of the Agency: it supported ABC in human resource training, in the adoption 
of appropriate management techniques for the management of Brazilian technical 
cooperation, in the implementation of computerized monitoring of projects, among other 
lines of work developed. The main objective of this cooperation has always been to 
strengthen the agency created by the Brazilian Government, with a long-term vision of 
                                                          
164 Decree No. 94, p. 973. 
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providing the country with autonomy in the area, without neglecting to obtain concrete 
results in the short and medium term. The UN identifies four criteria for what constitutes 
development cooperation: 
1.  It aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities 
2.  It is not driven by profit 
3.  It discriminates in favor of developing countries 
4.  It is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country 
ownership165 
 
The creation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) occurred at a time of great changes 
in the flow of international cooperation for development. These transformations materialized 
in Brazil in two ways. Initially, in the context of Brazil’s technical cooperation relations with 
the multilateral system, a new management model of multilateral cooperation was 
introduced in the country beginning in the late 1980s, which called for technical cooperation 
programs implemented by international organizations. It is important to point out that until 
then there was the so-called Direct Execution, that is, the one carried out by the cooperating 
international organizations, which held both the administrative and financial management 
and the technical management of the projects in the beneficiary countries. 
 
In order to change this framework, the United Nations Assembly approved a resolution in 
1989 recommending the implementation of a Government Execution policy, later 
consolidated in the expression National Execution of Projects, with the objective of 
promoting greater ownership and accountability of developing countries on technical 
cooperation programs implemented in partnership with United Nations system 
organizations. 
 
A second and even more important strand of Brazilian foreign policy that allowed itself to 
be expanded from the creation of the ABC was the South-South Technical Cooperation (SST-
C or simply, SSC). Having been primarily created to act as the axis of Brazilian South-South 
cooperation, the operational structure of the Agency and the composition of its human 
resources and management systems framework was progressively structured pari-passu to 
the expressive growth of horizontal cooperation programs of Brazil, which have expanded 
                                                          
165 Alonso and Glennie, What is development, p.1-2. 
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geometrically in terms of partner countries served, projects implemented and resources 
effectively disbursed. Currently, South-South cooperation in Brazil is present in all 
continents, either through bilateral programs and projects, or via triangular partnerships with 
foreign governments and international organizations. 
 
The ABC consists of four Directorates General that coordinate all Brazilian inter-
governmental cooperation efforts with the world. Note that they are grouped according to 
the means of cooperation, not per territorial or functional roles. The General Coordination 
of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (CGPD) is what concerns outgoing 
technical assistance, while the Multilateral and Bilateral Coordination Units (CGCM and 
CGCB) focus on incoming projects. The last unit (CGAO) administer the finances and 
budget of the agency.166 
 
A comprehensive approach and broad participation is guaranteed in Brazilian development 
policy via the use of cross-sectoral networks and consultative forums, such as the National 
Council for Food Security (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar), which has 
representatives from 19 ministries and 36 civil society organizations. Multilateralism is a 
key element of Brazil’s foreign policy and thus of the country’s cooperation in international 
development. Several arrangements are done via other international partners, such as Japan, 
most commonly in trilateral formations. 
 
Figure 9. Number of technical cooperation activities coordinated by the ABC, 2003-2009. 
                                                          
166 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) website.  
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Source: ABC 2009. 
 
i. Horizontal cooperation 
 
Technical cooperation in Brazil is developed along three lines: horizontal (i.e. South-South) 
cooperation; vertical cooperation (i.e. North-South); triangular cooperation (i.e. North-
South-South or International Organization-South-South). In line with the thesis of the 
dissertation, we will only discuss horizontal and triangular cooperation in this paper. 
 
Horizontal cooperation refers to the technical cooperation implemented by Brazil with other 
developing countries, through which the sharing of experiences and knowledge available in 
a wide range of Brazilian institutions with institutions of countries interested in cooperation 
with Brazil allows them to promote their respective relations in different dimensions, within 
the framework of a foreign policy of solidarity in the field of Cooperation for Development. 
 
Brazil, as a provider of horizontal technical cooperation, is partner to more than 500 projects 
around the globe. Brazil maintains technical cooperation relations with Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Africa, with specific actions in Asia (East Timor, Afghanistan and 
Uzbekistan), the Middle East (Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories) and Oceania. In 
2009, the ABC approved and coordinated the execution of 413 South-South technical 
cooperation projects and activities, benefiting 61 developing countries. Brazil’s bilateral 
South-South technical cooperation is concentrated in the areas of agriculture (including 
agricultural production and food security), vocational training, education, justice, sport, 
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health, environment, information technology, work accident prevention, urban development, 
biofuels, air transport and tourism. Other areas such as culture, foreign trade and human 
rights are covered in more recent projects and activities. 
 
See below the two pie charts showing the sectoral and geographic allocation of development 
funds by country. Linguistic similarities are the reason why most of ABC’s projects are 
centered around the countries of Cape Verde, Bissau-Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Angola and Mozambique. Another important avenue of technical cooperation is the CPLP, 
the community of Portuguese-speaking countries of the world, that includes Portugal, East-
Timor and Macau in addition to the PALOP member states. 
 
Figure 10. Main areas and recipients of Brazil’s cooperation activities in Africa, 2009. 
 
Source: ABC 2009. 
 
Some of the major African cooperation projects implemented by the ABC are listed below: 
a) Education 
i. Mozambique: Training of primary and secondary education teachers and 
support for higher education through distance learning; Professional training in 
tourism and hospitality 
ii. Benin: Transfer of social technology to Olodum school 
iii. Cape Verde: Establishment of National Technical School for Health 
iv. Guinea-Bissau, Kenya: Ole Brazil - technical cooperation in soccer 
b) Agriculture 
i. Cotton 4 Project: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali 
ii. Mozambique: ProSAVANA – support in tropical agriculture in the savannah 
regions  
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iii. Ghana: EMBRAPA Center (agricultural research) 
iv. Angola: Support for National Agricultural Research Center 
v. Senegal: Rice Experimental Center (also serves Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and 
Mauritania), Technical training on cattle management for beef and milk 
production 
c) Health care 
i. Guinea-Bissau: Establishment of National Health Institute; Establishment of 
training school for malaria prevention 
ii. Zambia: Training and skills development of health workers 
iii. Mozambique: FIOCRUZ field office (health care) and construction and 
implementation of pharmaceuticals factory; Fight against HIV/AIDS and 
training for production of anti-retroviral drugs; Institutional strengthening of 
pharmaceutical regulator and introduction of the “popular pharmacies” 
program; Implementation of the National Polytechnic Institute of Health 
iv. Equatorial Guinea: Support for development of policies affecting women and 
breastfeeding infants 
d) Industry and manufacturing 
i. Angola, Bissau-Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe: Urban development; 
Implementation of a vocational training center 
ii. Senegal, Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique: Support for the production of biofuels 
 
Let us have a deeper look at one of the most prominent bilateral programs Brazil has 
introduced first, domestically, then in selected African countries. 
 
1. More Food International 
 
The main Brazilian bilateral agricultural program initiated in Africa has been the More Food 
International (MFI), modelled on its homonym in Brazil, which is aimed at African 
smallholders and rural farmers in the form of microcredits for farm inputs and machinery. 
The MFI is managed by the Brazilian Ministry of Agricultural Development (MDA) in col-
laboration with the Chamber for Foreign Trade (CAMEX) within the Ministry of Trade.  A 
credit line of US$640 million is extended to smallholders to allow for the purchase of tractors 
and other farm machinery, Brazilian seeds and other inputs. The program also involves 
technical assistance to farmers. 
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The MFI has been introduced in Mozambique, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Kenya to promote 
family farming. An attempt at intermeshing between development cooperation policy and 
trade, the results have been mixed. In the non-Portuguese speaking countries Indian and 
Chinese companies have three big advantages over Brazil: (1) both India and China are major 
producers of farm inputs and machinery at competitive prices; (2) they have been in those 
countries longer and in the case of India, can count on a significant diaspora population; (3) 
they offer more generous credit lines to the local farmers when it comes to purchasing farm 
inputs.167 
 
ii. Triangular cooperation 
 
A remarkable feature of the rise of these emerging countries has been their engagement in 
development assistance through South-South cooperation mechanisms and innovative aid 
modalities, such as Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC). The United Nations defines 
triangular cooperation as the following: 
 
Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or 
more developing countries supported by a developed country(ies)/or multilateral 
organization(s) to implement development cooperation programmes and 
projects. Evidence shows that in many instances, Southern partners in 
development cooperation require the financial and technical support and 
expertise of multilateral and/or developed-country partners in the course of 
assisting other developing countries. Northern partners also benefit by being able 
to take advantage of increased institutional capacity in the South and to increase 
the impact of their aid disbursements by leveraging the resources of multiple 
Southern partners.168  
 
                                                          
167 Kojo S. Amanor and Sergio Chichava, “South–South Cooperation, Agribusiness, and African 
Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique”, World Development, Vol. 81, 2016. 
168 United Nations Framework of operational guidelines, p. 45.  
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Brazil currently maintains several triangular technical cooperation programs and projects 
with countries or with international organizations for the benefit of developing countries. 
Although bilateral cooperation is a priority in its foreign policy, the Brazilian Government 
considers TDCs as a strategic tool to strengthen its South-South narrative, once traditional 
donors are obliged to adopt Brazilian’s guiding principles, which “represent a progress in 
relation to the traditional North-South cooperation, as they promote a horizontal perspective 
instead of a patronizing attitude.”169 
 
In the case of trilateral partnerships involving third countries, their particularity is to develop 
initiatives in third countries mainly with countries traditionally partners of Brazil in the scope 
of bilateral cooperation received (such as Japan, Germany, UK). 
 
Brazil’s triangular SSDC is implemented through thematic projects or programs focused on 
capacity building (training and technical advice), sometimes combined with the construction 
of small-scale infrastructures, demonstration farms and the provision of equipment essential 
to the activities. Contrary to bilateral cooperation, where the Brazilian Government finances 
the SSDC initiatives themselves (full financing), in the case of trilateral cooperation the third 
party involved also takes on some of the financial burden. It is important to emphasize that 
Brazil does not present itself as a donor country, even if it finances triangular actions with 
an international organization or with donor countries.170 According to the diplomat Carlos 
Puente, even in the face of uneven development levels between Brazil and some of its 
partners, “using the terminology ‘partner’ would help to promote a spirit of equality that is 
operationalized in an innovative way during the whole process of identifying the partner’s 
demands and jointly negotiating, designing and planning projects.”171 
 
Figure 11. Triangular cooperation agreements between Brazil and third countries. 
                                                          
169 Fernando José Marroni de Abreu, “A evolução da Cooperação Técnica Internacional no Brasil”, Mural 
Internacional, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2013, p. 13.  
170 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) website.  
171 Costa, Brazil’s Engagement, p. 20. 
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Source: Abreu, A evolução da Cooperação. p. 19. 
 
2. Mozambique – an experimental ground for TDCs 
 
Mozambique has been neglected by traditional donors for a long time, mainly due to its 
former Socialist orientation, unstable security environment and lack of knowledge about its 
natural resources. These – coupled with the cultural similarities arising from the common 
Portuguese colonial past – make it an ideal experimental ground for Brazil to test its new 
model of Southern partnership, triangular development cooperation. An example of a typical 
trilateral development cooperation is the Brazil – Mozambique – Switzerland Technical 
Cooperation Mission aimed at capacity-building and technology transfer on rainwater 
collection, storage and use through underground dams for technicians of the Institute of 
Agricultural Research of Mozambique (IIAM), Swiss cooperation technicians (Horti 
Sempre), farmers, and extension agents in the Northeast of Mozambique.172 
 
Let us look at some of the major TDC projects going on in the African country, which has 
over the last two decades become the largest recipient of Brazilian TDC in the world. I have 
chosen to dissect the ProALIMENTOS and ProSAVANA projects, as they have been at the 
forefront of discussions in the local and international media, as well as among professionals 
                                                          
172 “Researchers build underground dams in Mozambique”, Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(EMBRAPA) press release, 22 December, 2017.  
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and experts in the fields of agriculture and development assistance. For a full list of Brazil’s 




D. The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and the 
Brazilian Export Credit Agency (APEX) 
 
Brazil uses three large export finance mechanisms: the BNDES-EXIM program, the PROEX 
export finance program, and the FGE export guarantee fund. We will have a deeper look at 
the two largest initiatives below: the BNDES-EXIM and the PROEX programs. 
 
The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) is the main financing 
agent for development in Brazil and abroad for Brazilian companies. Since its foundation, 
in 1952, the BNDES has played a fundamental role in stimulating the expansion of industry 
and infrastructure in the country. Through BNDES’s export-import financing vehicle Exim 
Automático, the bank offers export financing for Brazilian products through accredited 
foreign banks hosted in the buyer country. BNDES loans reached US$96.32 billion in 2010 
– more than three times the loans provided by the World Bank in that year. 
 
In 2012, the BNDES developed a new strategy aiming to strengthen its international role by 
signing agreements with African financial institutions. These agreements are designed to 
implement co-financing instruments along with multilateral bodies, ensure the exchange of 
information on national contexts, and satisfy requests from Africa. In April 2013, BNDES 
created a new division that will take care of matters related to Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean. It also inaugurated its representative office in Johannesburg in the same year − 
known as BNDES Africa. The purpose is to increase financing to Brazilian companies that 
export goods and services to the countries of these two regions. The creation of the new 
division is taking place after BNDES president Luciano Coutinho stated that the bank had 
abandoned the policy of creating “National Champions”, which encouraged the formation 
of large Brazilian companies for the purpose of competing in the international market. 173  
 
This statement, however, tends to contradict figures from BNDES that show that in Angola, 
contracts are signed with the government and mainly benefit the engineering companies 
Odebrecht, Camargo Correia, Andrade Gutierrez, and Queiroz Galvão as well as the civil 
aviation company Embraer. More than 80 operations and a portfolio of US$7 billion in credit 
lines have been approved since 2006 for Africa, with Angola receiving 23% of total 
                                                          
173 Bruno Rosa, “BNDES cria nova diretoria para América Latina e África”, O Globo, 24 April 2013. 
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disbursements between 2007 and 2012. Loans are granted for importation of Brazilian goods 
and services for infrastructure works, with oil receivables as guarantees. According to 
BNDES, funding has been directed towards the following countries: Mozambique (US$80 
million in 2009 for the construction of the Nacala airport), Ghana (where the Brazilian firms 
Oderbrecht and Andrade Gutierrez will construct the eastern road corridor in a project 
budgeted at a cost of over US$200 million), and Angola (where four Brazilian construction 
companies have an approved credit line of US$3.5 billion for national reconstruction 
projects).174 
 
Mr. Coutinho was probably not aware at the time of his speech of a major graft and bid-
rigging scheme that was unfolding in the Brazilian public tendering procedures and whose 
first leaks started investigations in 2014 that are still ongoing. BNDES was also named by 
the prosecutors for giving overly discounted loans under pressure from high-level 
government officials to exactly those “National Champions” Mr. Coutinho was referring to. 
We will discuss the corruption surrounding BNDES and the firms involved in a later section 
when we look at case studies involving non-institutional actors in development cooperation. 
 
The Brazilian Export Credit Agency (APEX) offers its Export Financing Program (PROEX) 
as an important instrument of the Federal Government to finance Brazilian exports of goods 
and services, mainly aimed at supporting exports of micro and small enterprises. Banco do 
Brasil is the intermediary agent for the Program, which is aimed at companies that are not 
eligible for BNDES loans due to the insufficient turnover their businesses generate. It also 
organizes trade fairs and events to promote African investment opportunities for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). “Brazil Trade Africa” was one such event, held in April 
2010 in São Paulo; over 70 Brazilian companies met with entrepreneurs from African 
countries and closed deals amounting to about US$25 million. APEX opened an office in 
Angola in 2010, where the largest number of Brazilian SMEs operate on the continent. 175 
 
E. The research institutes SENAI, EMBRAPA and FIOCRUZ 
 
                                                          
174 The National Bank for Economic and Social Development  (BNDES) website. 
175 Programa de Financiamento às Exportações (PROEX), Invest&Export Brazil website.  
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The projects implemented by the ABC are executed by specialized government agencies, 
universities, think tanks or private entities that meet the requirements of the respective 
activity or are selected by the ABC directly. There have been dozens of implementing bodies 
in the history of the ABC, but it is worth highlighting three important institutions in detail, 
as their experiences and activities in Africa have shaped Brazil’s development policy over 
the last half a century. 
 
i. National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) 
 
As the Taiwanese-born professor, Wan Chi Ming phrased it, “SENAI is like the UN, it 
integrates everyone.”176 The National Service for Industrial Training has its roots in 1942, 
when a government decree was passed to further the training of the unskilled labor force in 
Brazil to cater for the industrial and manufacturing needs of the growing economy. Up to 
2017, more than 55 million professionals have graduated from SENAI, which operates 809 
mobile and fixed operational units throughout the country. Courses cover all 28 industrial 
areas identified by Brazil’s government and range from professional learning to high school 
degrees, and even include college and graduate degrees. Not only does SENAI offer 
Brazilians quality professional education, it also, in partnership with Brazil’s Ministry of 
External Relations, operates workforce-training centers in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guatemala, Paraguay and East Timor. In addition, it is creating centers of professional 
education in Mozambique, Peru, Jamaica, São Tomé and Príncipe and Haiti. 
 
ii. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) 
 
The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) is a state-owned research 
corporation affiliated with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. Since its inception on April 
26, 1973, it has been devoted to developing technologies, knowledge and technical-scientific 
information aimed at Brazilian agriculture, including livestock. Their mission is to develop 
research for innovative solutions for the sustainability of agriculture for the benefit of 
Brazilian society. EMBRAPA’s organizational structure is composed of 46 centers that can 
be divided into Research Units or Service Units, and of 17 Central Units that comprise the 
                                                          
176 Isabela Barros, “Senai-SP Superação: ‘O Senai é uma ONU, integra todo mundo”, FIESP press release, 12 
July, 2017. 
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corporation's headquarters. Such research centers are distributed throughout the country in 
nearly all Brazilian states. EMBRAPA’s activities abroad also contribute to the Brazilian 
Government’s technical cooperation program, which aims at transferring and adapting 
Brazilian technologies to the tropical realities of different countries. EMBRAPA has been 
instrumental in transforming Brazil into an agricultural superpower, a sector that contributes 
more than US$60 billion annually to the country’s GDP.177 
 
3. The Cotton-4+Togo Project 
 
An ABC-EMBRAPA cooperation worth mentioning with regards to South-South 
Development Cooperation (SSDC) is the Cotton-4+Togo Project. The Brazilian government 
has sought to support African cotton-producing countries in their efforts to develop the 
cotton sector. The focus of the Brazilian cooperation action is concentrated in the countries 
of Africa’s Cotton Belt, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. Togo was later added 
to the list, although it is not a member of the Cotton-4 Group. 
 
Notwithstanding the peculiarities of each of the countries, the most fragile points in the 
cotton chain refer to (a) biological pest control; (b) soil management and; (c) seed variety 
management. It is important to note that the technical staff of all the countries visited have 
clear understanding of the difficulties affecting the cotton chain in their respective countries, 
they lack, however, access to technologies that would enable them to act in accordance with 
modern concepts of agronomic management. 
 
The proposal for a technical cooperation program to be offered by the Brazilian Government 
to C-4 member countries was based on the criterion of sustainability, that is, it was elaborated 
based on economic, environmental and food security variables. The work proposal 
developed by ABC and EMBRAPA had as an objective the stimulation of capacity building 
and involved joint work between Brazilian and African technicians in the implementation of 
a demonstration unit for cotton cultivation techniques. The demo farms were set up in areas 
selected by the participating countries with the help of Brazilian technicians who supervised 
the activities of their African colleagues. The management of the unit was eventually 
transferred to the respective country that housed it at the moment the training process was 
                                                          
177 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) website.  
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completed. In addition to the Cotton 4+Togo Project, Brazil also coordinates the Cotton 
Victoria Project (Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya), the Shire Zambezi Project (Malawi and 
Mozambique) and projects in Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Haiti.178 
 
4. The African–Brazilian Agricultural Innovation (MKTPlace) 
 
The African–Brazilian Agricultural Innovation Marketplace (MKTPlace) is a South-South-
North partnership to foster agricultural research and innovation for development by 
supporting policy dialogue and collaborative projects. It is an international initiative − 
independent of the ABC −, supported by several partners with the aim of connecting 
Brazilian, African, Latin American, and Caribbean specialists and institutions. 
 
The MKTPlace funds projects developed between African and Latin-American private 
entities in the following fields: 
1. Productivity Enhancing Technologies 
2. Natural Resource Management Improvement 
3. Policy, Institutional and Market Strengthening and Knowledge Management 
4. Smallholder and Poverty-Alleviation Targeted Technologies 
 
More than 60 projects have been implemented already between African organizations and 
EMBRAPA institutions over the last decade. The projects range from the generation of virus 
resistant variants of seeds to capacity building in the areas of organic farming and 
biodiversity. For a full list of country-specific projects see Annex B. 
 
5. EMBRAPA Africa Regional Office 
 
EMBRAPA has operated an African regional office in Accra, Ghana, since 2008, from 
which they coordinate their African projects and cooperation agreements. The Accra Office, 
among other things, facilitates technical co-operation activities for agricultural development, 
technology transfer, ensures availability of research findings to industry and enhances 
                                                          
178 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) website.   
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human resource capacity building. In 2017 a laboratory was installed in the office, where 
tests can be conducted on inoculants, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides.179 
 
6. Evaluation of questionnaire 
 
In a survey conducted by the author of this dissertation, the head of the Ghana office, Mr. 
Erich Schaitza, pointed out some of the development work done by EMBRAPA in Ghana 
and Africa (see Annex D. for the full questionnaire). Mr. Schaitza explained in the 
questionnaire that EMBRAPA carried out its projects via the Africa Brazil Agriculture 
Innovation Market Place platform or in cooperation with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
(ABC) in over 19 African countries. They operate in conjunction with locals, with experts 
travelling to the respective African country for specific missions. In some cases, they have 
a couple of experts stay for a longer time, depending on the duration and necessities of the 
said project. To the question of whether being a Brazilian entity has added any benefit to 
their operations in Africa, Mr. Schaitza replied that  
 
… in general there is a good will towards Brazilians, but nothing that we could 
say that lead to an advantage. Being a tropical country and sharing soil and 
climatic conditions with African countries facilitate the understanding of 
problems inherent to production systems in agriculture. Finally, Portuguese is an 
asset in Portuguese speaking countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Cape 
Verde, Guiné Bissau and São Tomé e Principe.180  
 
Mr. Schaitza identified the less structured and dynamic agricultural production systems in 
Africa as a major challenge to their work. As for the importance attached to the following 
factors relating to the work environment, the office director of EMBRAPA Ghana gave the 
following rating (1 = not important, 6 = very important): 
 
Complying with local regulations 
over minimum local workforce 
requirements 
6 Willingness to be trained 4 
                                                          
179 “Lab in Ghana produces first inoculant doses”, EMBRAPA,  8 June 2017.  
180 EMBRAPA Questionnaire. 
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Skills/expertise 6 Long-term retention of workforce - 
Cost advantage over ex-pat workforce - Sustainability of skills (will employee 




An interesting score to point out is the willingness to be trained (4) and sustainability of 
skills (4). It seems like EMBRAPA is not as interested in the willingness of the Ghanaian 
workforce to be trained and in the sustainability of their skills as in complying with local 
regulations. Since EMBRAPA is a governmental organization, it is understandable that 
compliance with the host country’s laws is prioritized. At the same time, since EMBRAPA 
works with local partners to deliver pre-agreed projects in the field of agricultural research, 
it does not directly employ locals, thus the lower rating on the above two aspects. Also, since 
EMPBRAPA only hires a small ex-pat office staff in Accra and all the projects are run 
through local partners, the cost advantage of local workforce over ex-pat and the long-term 




ProALIMENTOS, fully named Projeto de Apoio Técnico aos Programas de Nutrição e 
Segurança Alimentar de Moçambique, is the first trilateral agreement signed between ABC, 
USAID-Brazil and Mozambican Agriculture Ministry (MINAG) in 2011, after the 
ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Brazil and 
United States for the Implementation of Technical Cooperation Activities in Third Countries 
on 3 March 2010. Although its budget is inferior to that of Plataforma and ProSAVANA 
(US$2.4 million) ProALIMENTOS is considered a benchmark for Brazilian TDC, as it 
brings to the ground specialized institutions of the three countries – the University of Florida 
(UF) and Michigan State University (MSU) on behalf of USAID-Brazil; EMBRAPA on 
behalf of the ABC; and the Agricultural Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM) on behalf 
of the MINAG – and has a balanced distribution of financial resources, even though the 
agreement determines that USAID-Brazil is responsible for the purchase of equipment and 
machinery, while the ABC covers the travel expenses of EMBRAPA, and EMBRAPA and 
IIAM pay for the technical hours of their own researchers and technicians. The project’s 
main goal is to increase horticulture production and enhance the capacity of small local 
farmers located in the cinturão verde (green belt) around the capital Maputo by three 
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integrated activities: conducting socioeconomic research, strengthening local farmers’ 
production and providing post-harvest capacity and training.181 
 
The ProALIMENTOS project was at the same time a showcase of South-South-North 
cooperation that sprouted from challenges identified by researchers at IIAM (bottom-up, 
demand-driven), and a learning experience for cooperation work from so many different 
cultural backgrounds (North-American versus Latin-American versus African). The various 
players involved each brought their own expertise to the project: USAID contributed with 
its strong financial and human resources; EMBRAPA with its expertise in tropical 
agriculture and linguistic knowledge; IIAM with the local know-how. At the same time, 
different administrative procedures regarding expenditures created minor conflicts among 
the partners: USAID had a relatively quick, flexible decision-making process on expenses; 
EMBRAPA needed to have every expenditure verified and approved by ABC and UNDP; 
IIAM did not incur any costs other than the salaries of its own employees. The bureaucratic 
procedures of the Brazilians seemed too cumbersome for the impatient Americans, who sent 
a researcher team to Mozambique without waiting for EMBRAPA to have the cost of its 
delegation’s trip approved, which – not surprisingly – angered the Latin-Americans, who 
took it as a remnant of “Northern arrogance”. 
 
Brazilian researcher Natalia N. Fingermann conducted 59 interviews with personnel 
involved in the ProALIMENTOS program in 2015 and came to the following conclusion on 
the effectiveness of this particular TDC cooperation between Brazil, USA and Mozambique: 
 
a) Benefits 
i. Know-how exchange: researchers from entirely different working backgrounds 
and environments had the opportunity to exchange know-how and expertise on 
horticulture production 
ii. Best-practice transfer: best practices and new technologies, techniques were 
showcased to the farmers, who with little investment could increase their crop 
yield substantially 
                                                          
181 Natalia Fingermann, “The Study of Brazilian Trilateral Cooperation in Mozambique: the case of 
ProSAVANA and ProALIMENTOS”, Working Paper for the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA), 
2015, p. 7-8.  
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iii. Long-term relationships: creation of lasting work and personal relationships 
among researchers of various universities, institutes from three continents 
b)  Challenges 
i. Battlefields of knowledge: differing views on methodology and implementation 
caused minor misunderstandings among the team members 
ii. Intercultural barriers: the more actors are involved from very different cultural 
backgrounds, the more energy and resources need to be invested in overcoming 
intercultural barriers (language, perception of time, customs, traditions, social 
etiquette) 
c) Shortcomings 
i. Internal brain drain: as long as development agencies (such as USAID) offer 
better payment conditions than local institutes (IIAM), researchers will use their 
personal contacts gained through the project to find a job in an international 
institution rather than a home organization 
ii. No Southern narrative: according to the findings of Fingermann, IIAM 
participants of the program attested that Brazil’s narrative is not more 
equalitarian than the North’s narrative. Similarly to the Northern partners, Brazil 
has not included in the project’s goals a strategy to transfer knowledge of seed 
production. In other words, “EMBRAPA has just taught how IIAM could 
reproduce open-pollinated seeds, but not how they could produce their own 
seeds through the use of local material.”182 
 
We can conclude that the ProALIMENTOS project was a learning experience for both 
Northern and Southern partners in the field of trilateral cooperation. In spite of its challenges 
and shortcomings, it served as a starting base for future TDCs in the region. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that even within the Southern partnership, there are certain hierarchies 
of development and Brazil stands in the top half of it. Brazil’s research institutes are on a 
par with some of the leading centers in the developed world and a big majority of the 
Brazilian scientists have studied in the Western institutes through fellowships and other 
programs. It is thus inevitable that they will try to “educate” their African counterparts the 
same way that Northern scientists would do. In addition, given the fact that Brazil is an 
agricultural superpower with some of the world’s largest agribusiness conglomerates 
                                                          
182 Fingermann, The Study of Brazilian Trilateral, p. 14-17.  
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globally, there might be other interests behind not transferring all the know-how of seed 
growing than a faulty project plan. It is widely known that development assistance programs 
are not only guided by pure altruism, but that they also serve as door openers for the donor 
country’s corporations and export products. 
 
iii. Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) 
 
The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) is a scientific institution for research and 
development in biological sciences located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, it is considered one of 
the world's main public health research institutions. It was founded by Dr. Oswaldo Cruz, a 
noted physician and epidemiologist in 1898 and has contributed to the fight against such 
epidemics as the bubonic plague, small pox and Chagas’ fever. Aligned with Brazil’s 
horizontal international cooperation policy, FIOCRUZ has supported the health area in 
developing countries, in a South-South relationship. The Foundation has recently opened an 
office in Maputo, capital of Mozambique, Africa, which aims to coordinate, monitor and 
evaluate the cooperation programs in health developed by units of FIOCRUZ with African 
countries. 
 
The major services provided at the Africa office are: 
1. Graduate courses in different areas 
2. Training in service 
3. Distance education and polytechnic education 
4. Implementation and reformulation of the National Institutes of Health of the 
countries of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) 
a)  Transfer of technology for the production area and differentiated support for 
strengthening the health systems of countries of the CPLP183 
 
One of the major Brazilian development projects in Africa has been the building of an anti-
retroviral medicine plant in Maputo, Mozambique. The installation was supposed to be a 
flagship project of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the dawn of his presidency in 2013, 
right after having announced his radical pro-African foreign policy. Lula’s first trip to Africa 
                                                          
183 A Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (FIOCRUZ) website.  
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took him to Mozambique, a country with which Brazil did not have much commercial, nor 
political relations in the past. It was probably the least interesting country for Brazil among 
the Portuguese-speaking African countries, which can be attributed to it being 
geographically separated from the other PALOP nations (being on the East coast of Africa), 
as well as having recently come out of a 20-year long civil war that left the country in ruins, 
with no significant economic production. Mozambique, at the turn of the millennium, was 
among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with high levels of income 
inequality, unemployment, analphabetism, prevalence of HIV and tuberculosis. At the same 
time there was a weakly functioning state, marred with corruption and entirely dependent on 
foreign aid.  
 
Faced with all these challenges, − or some say exactly because of them − President Lula and 
his team decided to implement the first flagship project of Brazilian solidarity diplomacy in 
this Southeast African country. The 2003 trip to Maputo saw the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding between the two states on cooperation in the fields of health care, science 
and technology. It signaled the beginning of a 10-year long implementation phase that 
culminated in the official inauguration of the Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos S. 
A. on July 21st, 2012. FIOCRUZ was charged with the preparation of a feasibility study that 
took almost five years due to the lack of qualified workforce in Mozambique and to the 
immense red tape that surrounded the project on the side of the Mozambican government. 
The original budget of the plant was US$21 million, of which Brazil was to contribute with 
equipment, technological know-how and professional training of the staff, while the African 
country was supposed to provide the land and US$5.4 million as its contribution to the 
financing. By the time the feasibility study was completed in 2008 and works were about to 
being, the Mozambican government managed to collect only US$0.9 million, thus putting 
the whole project in jeopardy.  
 
Having anticipated the possibility of difficulties in funding on the Mozambican side, the 
Brazilian government struck a deal with Vale S.A., the largest producer of iron ore and nickel 
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in the world, that the mining giant would donate the remaining US$4.5 million to the 
Mozambican government to kick-start the project.184 
 
It is important to note that Vale S.A. had just acquired a 25-year license to mine coal in 
Northern Mozambique from the Mozambican government, where the largest coal reserves 
on the planet are supposed to be lying under the ground. The Moatize coal mine in Tete 
Province is Vale’s largest investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Starting from 2009, several 
communities were relocated to pave the way for the minds in the Moatize region. The process 
did not go smoothly, to say the least, as there were numerous complaints and grievances 
regarding the new housing arrangements, which – according to the locals – are unlivable and 
in locations with infertile land and little access to water. The indifference shown by the 
Brazilian multinational to the issue led to riots and protests that put Vale in media limelight 
around the world. We will have a deeper look at Vale’s mining activities and its 
consequences and effects on the local population in the following section. Some analysts say 
that the monetary donation from Vale to the Mozambican government was the price the 
South American conglomerate had to pay for the quick and “efficient” relocation of these 
communities.  
 
Another challenge arose during the construction of the medical plant, when it turned out that 
no professional is available in Mozambique with the required medical technical knowledge 
to install the machinery and equipment delivered from Brazil. Since the cost of a full-time 
technical manager to be transferred to Maputo was not calculated in the initial budget, Vale 
came to the rescue again and offered to have a FIOCRUZ expert placed on its payroll until 
the construction is completed. What started out initially as a purely intergovernmental 
development cooperation assumed a peculiar triangular structure as a private enterprise had 
become involved to a significant extent in the implementation of the project. 
 
The plant was inaugurated in July of 2012, in the presence of Brazilian Vice-President 
Michel Temer and the Governor of Maputo. Further challenges remain, especially on the 
regulation side, as there is no legal framework in Mozambique to regulate the sale and import 
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Moçambique: os casos dos projetos de implantação da fábrica de medicamentos antirretrovirais e o 
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of medicines and medicinal inputs, leading to the compromise of international standards and 
to a massive black market in counterfeit products. Nonetheless, the flagship project of 
Brazilian solidarity diplomacy succeeded in achieving three objectives, two of which were 
formulated at the onset and one which came about as a coincidence: 
1. Leader of South-South Cooperation: Brazil has emerged as a leading cooperation 
partner for the least developed countries that bases its principles on solidarity, equal 
partnership and non-conditionality. 
2. Brand Brazil: Brazil has succeeded in introducing its technology and know-how to 
Mozambique in the health care sector that would pave the way for stronger future 
commercial and scientific ties (riding on the waves of the medicine plant, FIOCRUZ 
established a regional office in Maputo in 2015). 
3. Positive publicity for Vale S.A.: Via the generous act of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (donation to the building of the plant), the mining conglomerate 
managed to tidy up its tarnished image in Mozambique. The company wasted no 
chance in highlighting its crucial role in the financing of the medicine factory. 
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V.  NON-INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS 
 
Among non-institutional actors we can differentiate between the civil sector and the private 
sector. The civil sector ranges from small informal advocacy groups to large international 
non-governmental organizations. The private sector consists of all the actors involved in the 
SSDC in the interest of profit, from the individual consultants to the large mining firms. 
 
A. The Civil Sector 
 
Since most of the development cooperation programs are rolled out in the fields of 
agriculture, health care and industry, it is inevitable that some of the mega-corporations in 
Brazil will come on board. Some of these mammoth holding firms, especially the ones 
involved in mining and construction, do not boast the best track records in Brazil when it 
comes to environmental conservation or respect for indigenous lands. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Vale was awarded the infamous Worst Company in the World prize in 2012 
for its role in the destruction of rainforests and natural habitats of animal species and 
indigenous tribes. 
 
In Brazil, there is a deep sense of civic justice and faith in the power of the community. 
Brazilians  are ‘street people’, meaning they live, socialize, discuss politics, sports, economy 
and everyday life. This is one of the reasons Brazilians tend to take to the streets more often 
than some other nations’ citizens. Most of the Brazilian civil organizations campaigning 
against development projects in Africa do it out of conviction that the same mistakes will be 
repeated there as at home. Unfortunately, currently there are not many permanent spaces in 
which the policies and practices related to SSDC are discussed. Government engagement 
with civil society and the private sector on such issues tends to be limited or ad hoc. The 
authors of a study done by Articulação SUL, CEBRAP and the Institute of Development 
Studies compiled the following government and civil society spaces related to SSDC. 
 
Table 6. Government and civil society spaces related to SSDC in Brazil. 
Type of Space Spaces identified 
Ad hoc spaces General foreign policy meeting held by MRE and SG-PR 
Sectoral councils or 
permanent forum 
Working group for the international agenda of the National Food 
Security Council (CONSEA), the Permanent Committee for 
International Affairs (CPAI) linked to the National Council of Rural 
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CPLP Civil Society Forum, Social and Participative Mercosul 
programme, Mercosul Economic and Social Consultative Forum, 
BRICS and IBSA Academic Forums 
Focused remit 
Spaces 
Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, CONARE (National 
Committee for Refugees), Conex (CAMEX’s private sector 
consultative council), Civil Society Forum in Haiti, GTI-AHI 
Civil society claimed 
Spaces 
GR-RI, Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples (REBRIP), 
ABONG’s working group on Brazil–Africa relations, BNDES platform 
Source: “Rising Powers in International Development”, Evidence Report No 59., Economic and Social 
Research Council’s (ESRC). 
 
The authors also categorize the government-civil society consultation mechanisms 
according to whose initiative such discussion arise from. 
 
‘Closed’ spaces are where decisions and discussions take place without broader 
consultation or involvement of other stakeholders; ‘invited’ spaces are 
government-sponsored participatory spaces, institutionalized or not, that create 
opportunities for involvement and consultation of different stakeholders; 
‘claimed/self-created’ spaces are those that emerge out of sets of common 
concerns or identifications by civil society or the private sector, or may consist 
of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits.185 
 
Several social movements have been critical of the ProSAVANA project currently taking 
place in Mozambique, funded by the governments of Brazil and Japan as part of a South-
South trilateral cooperation. We will look at the ProSAVANA project in detail further on. 
One of the most influential and vocal civil group in Brazil is the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement.  The 
MST is the largest social movement in Latin America, with a membership of over 1.5 million 
people. The organization was founded in 1984 and with land reform and is fighting for the 
rights of farm workers on the question of land ownership.186 The MST is one of the 
signatories to the Open Letter directed to the three heads of state protesting the violations of 
the rights of the locals to land in Mozambique that is going on as part of the ProSAVANA’s 
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implementation. The Open Letter will be discussed in more detail in the case study featuring 
the relevant company (Vale S.A.).  
 
A large number of organizations from civil society as well as social movements, such as the 
Platform for BNDES Transparency coordinated by the Brazilian Institute for Social and 
Economic Analyses (IBASE), are critical of the lack of transparency over financing, 
particularly that of Brazilian companies operating abroad. There are concerns raised that 
BNDES is used as a tool by the governing and economic elite to launder money by offering 
discounted loans for price-inflated projects of Brazilian conglomerates abroad, from which 
hefty kickbacks are handed out to the involved parties.187 
 
Democratizing foreign policy has been a hot topic recently in the South American giant. 
Civil society has been calling for the creation of a participatory council linked to Brazil’s 
foreign ministry. This is in the context of a wider effort to incorporate social participation 
across government in order to ensure more transparency and accountability when spending 
tax payers’ money. Bianca Suyama, researcher at the Brazilian South-South Research Center 
Articulação Sul, notes that in the light of the recent investigations into massive fraud 
schemes linking the government to the major recipients of the BNDES disbursements, it has 
never been more timely to whiten the role of the state in development assistance and export 
financing.188 
 
There are incipient initiatives of civil society participation in cooperation decision-making 
and implementation. Even though these initiatives are very focused and numerically 
restricted, they represent advances and recognize the role of civil society in development 
cooperation. Such initiatives have been led by two institutions: the presidency’s General 
Secretariat (SG-PR), which started promoting technical cooperation initiatives partnered by 
civil society organizations and governments; and, particularly, by the MRE’s General 
Coordination of International Actions to Fight Hunger (CGFOME). One such initiative was 
the National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy held in 2013 in the capital Brasília, 
entitled 2003–2013: A New Foreign Policy (the timeframe coincides with the PT’s rule in 
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Brazil). The conference was organized by the Reflection Group on International Relations 
(GR-RI), a diverse assemblage made up of self-identified leftist or progressive stakeholders 
from the government, academia and civil society. The conference, which gathered 
approximately 700 people in person and more than 12,000 people online, aimed at reflecting 
on past priorities and achievements, current challenges and future perspectives for Brazilian 
foreign policy, as well as emphasizing the need to democratize it. The group presented a 
letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding the creation of a foreign policy council. 
Citizen participation was described as a ‘creative tension’ that should be fostered and 
external relations of the country should be made public policy. Finally, the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Patriota mentioned the government’s intention of establishing, until the end 
of 2013, a consultative body, most probably a dialogue forum, between government and civil 
society on foreign policy issues.189 
 
However, this paper will not delve into more details concerning civil sector involvement in 
Brazil’s development cooperation as that can make up an entire research paper and it is not 
the main focus of this dissertation. 
 
B.  The Private Sector 
 
It is a Brazilian peculiarity that the state funds companies at home – aptly named “National 
Champions” by Luciano Coutinho, former president of BNDES –, which, having outgrown 
the domestic market, are the pioneers of Brazilian economic and commercial relations 
abroad. As noted in Chapter III.D.i., the major state-backed corporations established their 
presence in Africa as early as 1973 (Petrobras). Their operations are concentrated mainly in 
the PALOP countries, as we can see below on the map on the left. The investments by these 
handful of corporations account for the vast majority of the trade volume between Brazil and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to their highly visible presence in over a dozen countries, 
Brazilian SMEs are hesitant in venturing into the unknown markets of the rising continent 
(see map on the right below).  
 
Map 4. Left: Presence of major Brazilian corporations in Africa.  
Map 5. Right: Presence of Brazilian SME’s in Africa. 
                                                          





The “National Champions”, in addition to pursuing for-profit commercial objectives, have 
also invested in human capital and social development projects in the countries of their 
operations, as we will see later on in this section. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) 
has taken advantage of the extra years of experience and know-how these private entities 
have gathered when entering the respective countries. The ABC often teams up with the 
Brazilian companies on-site to provide development assistance where it is needed the most. 
 
This section will give the reader an overview of the private sector actors that work hand-in-
hand with the government agency in the implementation of Brazil’s development agenda. 
The focus is not on the subcontractors of the implementing bodies, but more on the 
enterprises that had set foot in Africa long before the government shifted its attention 
towards the black continent. We will first start with a deeper look at the operations of the 
parastatal Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. and mining giant Vale S.A., before we turn our attention 
to the African ventures of the “Four Sisters”, namely the Odebrecht Group, Andrade 
Gutierrez S.A., the OAS Group and the Camargo Corrêa Group. 
 
i. Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. 
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Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., more commonly known as Petrobras, is a semi-public Brazilian 
multinational corporation in the petroleum industry, created in 1953 under the government 
of Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas with the slogan “The Oil is Ours” (Portuguese: “O 
petróleo é nosso”). The company had legal monopoly in Brazil for oil and gas exploration 
until 1997. The company was badly hit by the 1973 oil crisis, when it almost went bankrupt. 
Diversification into offshore oil drilling saved the firm, which by 2016 has become one of 
the 100 largest companies in the world.190 It has activities in 28 countries, including Angola, 
Benin, Gabon, Nigeria, Namibia, Senegal, and Tanzania. As the Brazilian company with the 
longest presence in Africa (in Angola since 1973 via its subsidiary Braspetro), Petrobras 
signed an agreement on gas and oil exploration and biofuel production in both Angola and 
Mozambique in 2006. Petrobras is an expert in ultra-deep oil exploration, holding the world 
record of 1,877 meters below sea level. With this capability in mind, the conglomerate 
signed various offshore drilling agreements with the governments of Angola, Libya, Nigeria 
and Tanzania recently acquired a 50 percent stake in a 7,400 square kilometer block off the 
Benin coast to search for light crude. 
 
Petrobras is financing over a dozen corporate social responsibility initiatives in Brazil from 
culture to sports, but lacks community projects in Africa. Only in 2011 did the conglomerate 
get involved in development assistance, at the request of SENAI.  Petrobras Tanzania 
Limited carried out a training program with the government of Tanzania and local 
organizations. The Vocational Educational and Training Authority of Tanzania is to select 
50 professionals to participate in the training-of-trainers’ programs. After training, these 
professionals will maintain Petrobras Tanzania’s electrical and mechanical installations in 
the city of Mtwara, where the firm is to start exploring for deep-sea oil.191 
 
1. Operation Car Wash: the fall of an Empire 
 
In 2014, the largest corruption scandal in the history of Brazil, centered around Petrobras, 
was unravelling. The series of investigations will be covered more profoundly in a later 
chapter, but in a nutshell, prosecutors found that a small number of top Petrobras officials 
colluded with an organized cartel of 16 companies to overcharge Petrobras for construction 
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and service work in return for bribes and kickbacks, whose value reached US$2.1 billion. In 
April 2015, Petrobras’ newly appointed management team, including new CEO Aldemir 
Bendine, announced that the company had lost US$17 billion to mismanagement and graft. 
They also said that Petrobras would have to sell almost the same amount in assets and 
postpone investment plans to regain its financial footing. Moreover, Petrobras’ market value 
had been reduced by half, and the company was burdened by a US$100 billion debt. 
President Dilma Rousseff and former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva both served on the 
board of directors of Petrobras during the scandal and have both been charged with 
malfeasance. Given Petrobras’ size and the breadth of its reach in the country’s economy, 
Samuel Pessoa, a leading economist, projected that the company’s woes would reduce 
Brazil’s GDP by 0.75 percent in 2015.192 
 
By August 2016, the whirlpool created around Brazil’s giant majority-state-owned oil and 
gas company brought about the downfall of President Dilma Rousseff and laid charges 
against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil’s largest enterprise and a symbol 
of the country’s entrenched economic nationalism is where it was in 1973, at the brink of 
collapse, streamlining its operations by selling most of its African assets and trying to 
survive the lawsuits initiated by its investors and clients. 
 
ii. Vale S.A. 
 
Another Brazilian industrial giant that has been active in the field of mining and exploration 
in Africa is Vale S.A. Vale is a Brazilian multinational corporation engaged in metals and 
mining and one of the largest logistics operators in Brazil and one of the largest in the world. 
Vale is present in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, employing over 23,000 employees in 
Africa, most of them in Mozambique. The Moatize I and II coal mines and the Nacala 
Logistic Corridor (NLC) are Vale’s biggest investments on the continent, totaling over US$4 
billion since the start of negotiations back in 2004. Another US$4.5 billion investment is 
expected in the future to restore 682 km of existing railway track between Malawi and 
Mozambique, building a maritime terminal, and laying 230 km of new railway, giving a total 
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length of 912 km. These investments would enable Vale to export 22 million metric tons of 
coal per year, once completed.193 
 
On the social front, Vale runs a Foundation in the main countries of its operations that carries 
out voluntary social projects in the areas of health, education, job and income generation, 
besides culture, sports and social protection, according to local demands and in partnership 
with recognized institutions that are experienced in these themes. 
 
1. Socioeconomic development initiatives and the Vale Foundation 
 
Termed as a socioeconomic development opportunity for the community and province, Vale 
constructed more than 80 houses, a health center and police station for the local population 
that had to be resettled due to the works relating to the Nacala Logistic Corridor. In addition, 
the following development actions are currently under way:  
 Increase in the supply of water for productive activities, and irrigation of 20 hectares 
for growing crops; 
 Income generation programs run in conjunction with the Provincial Agricultural 
Agency, including chicken breeding and other initiatives; 
 Expansion of electrification to all parts of the resettled people’s communities; 
 Implementation of a transportation system in coordination with the District 
Administration of Cateme/Moatize; 
 Training in farming techniques, coordinated by the Provincial Agricultural Agency; 
 Donation of an ambulance; 
 A community radio station; 
 Installation of a model farm in Cateme. 
 
Besides the aforementioned actions, Vale is running the following voluntary social projects 
and actions through its Foundation, to promote the socioeconomic development of the 
communities in the areas where the company operates. Vale Foundation implemented over 
80 smaller scale social improvement initiatives during the feasibility phase of its mining 
activities. For a full list see Annex C. 
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2. Resettlement, poor working conditions, health issues: the dark side of Vale 
 
The admirable social projects publicized by Vale in Mozambique are in stark contrast with 
the reality on the ground. Starting from 2009, around 1300 locals had to be relocated from 
their homes in order to make way for the projected coal mine and logistical infrastructure. 
Vale displaced and resettled the communities of Chipanga, Mithete, and Malabwe in the 
Moatize province. Apart from the loss of their land, these families also suffered health 
impacts as a result of the dust produced by Vale’s mining activities, changes in social 
relations, destruction of livelihoods, and radical changes in traditional cultures due to the 
resettlement. The resettlement process was mishandled from the beginning. Vale provided 
poor quality infrastructure and insufficient housing conditions with poor access to water. 
Furthermore, the land provided was inadequate for agricultural purposes, putting the 
nutrition of the communities at risk. Promises of compensation by Vale were not kept. The 
free movement of people and goods and the access to resources was restricted in the 
resettlement area. As one relocated Mozambican woman put it, “what is a house without 
food?”194  
 
Frustrated by the lack of response to their situation, an estimated 500 residents from the Vale 
resettlement village Cateme protested on January 10, 2012, blocking the railroad linking 
Vale’s coal mine with the port in Beira. This demonstration, and a violent response by local 
police − who beat several protestors − brought international scrutiny to the problems in 
Cateme and the other resettlements. In July 2012, Vale signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the governor of Tete province to complete repairs and add foundations 
to all constructed houses, increase training opportunities, and provide ten fruit trees for each 
household in Cateme and 25 de Setembro. Nonetheless, the problem is still far from being 
solved as another wave of discontent hit the Brazilian company in 2016, when 1,400 of 
Vale’s employees went on strike to protest the lack of bonus payments Vale had promised 
earlier.195 Although several complaints and lawsuits were filed against the conglomerate, the 
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fact that none of them ended in the Vale being charged with misconduct might suggest a 
certain type of collusion between the Mozambican authorities and Vale.196 
In fact, Vale was also awarded the infamous Worst Company in the World prize in 2012 by 
a Switzerland-based sustainable development group for “its role in helping to build the Belo 
Monte dam, the largest hydroelectric power plant in the Amazon rainforest, and a host of 
alleged labor rights abuses in dozens of countries worldwide.”197 
 
3. Mozambique: the anti-retroviral medicine plant 
 
The FIOCRUZ coordinated anti-retroviral medicine plant that was supposed to be a flagship 
of Brazilian SSDC was salvaged by Vale’s donation of US$4.5 million to the Mozambican 
government. The extra funds enabled the project to be commenced on time and it turned out 
to be a good investment on the part of Vale, as it helped touch up the company’s tarnished 
image in 2012, which did not suffer major setbacks until the 2015 strike over workers’ 
allowances. 
 
4. ProSAVANA: agricultural megaproject in Mozambique 
 
The main technology transfer program is ProSAVANA, which involves Brazil’s largest aid 
disbursement in Africa of US$21.1 million, implemented in partnership with Japan. For the 
first time, the ABC assigned a coordinator abroad in Mozambique, signaling the importance 
that Brazilian development cooperation is gaining in Africa, especially with initiatives of the 
magnitude of ProSAVANA. ProSAVANA seeks to replicate the technologies used in 
developing the Cerrado region of Brazil in Mozambique, in relation to both smallholder and 
commercial agriculture. The project is being coordinated by EMBRAPA (on behalf of the 
ABC), the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Institute of 
Agricultural Research of Mozambique (IIAM). The Tripartite Cooperation for Agricultural 
Development in Mozambique’s Tropical Savannah region (ProSAVANA) involves a dozen 
institutes, universities and agencies from the three countries and has a timescale of 10 years, 
having started in 2010. The objective of the ProSAVANA project is improve to increase 
agricultural productivity in 19 counties of the Nacala Corridor, located in the north of 
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Mozambique, by integrating large-scale foreign investments with small- and medium-scale 
local farmers (see Map 6. below). 
 
Map 6. Extension of the ProSAVANA project in Northern Mozambique. 
 
 
In contrast to ProALIMENTOS, ProSAVANA is a top-down initiative, whose conception 
emerged from conversations involving the former Brazilian President Lula and the former 
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso during the G-8 Summit Meeting in L’Aquila, without the 
Mozambican government’s involvement. The precursor to the program is the PRODECER, 
the Japanese-coordinated technical development cooperation that started in 1978 and 
transformed the semiarid Cerrado area of Brazil into agricultural land. ProSAVANA set up 
two demonstration farms in two locations of the country, Lichinga and Nampula. 
Fingermann points out that intercultural differences between the Brazilian and Japanese 
partners were evident from the start, as they did not attend each other’s social events, nor 
did they exchange information test results. From the viewpoint of the Mozambicans, it 
seemed like there were two bilateral projects underway, instead of a trilateral arrangement. 
This, naturally, led to the unnecessary duplication of work and increased the budget, rather 
than reducing it, as envisioned in the original plan. The differing interpretation of working 
in a heavily donor-reliant environment also caused misunderstandings, as the ABC’s strict 
adherence to the no-cash-transfer policy met with incomprehension on the Japanese and 
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Mozambican side, who were of the conviction that without financial incentives, no foreign 
partner will be taken seriously.198 
 
Adding to the woes of the Brazilians, one of the private think-tanks involved in the 
elaboration of the Master Plan, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) Projetos, has been caught 
up in the midst of a major controversy. Since the long-term objective of ProSAVANA was 
to make it sustainable by involving the private sector for which the agricultural infrastructure 
was supposed to be built, FGV Projetos created an investment fund specially designed 
to attract investments to the Nacala Corridor. However, local and international civil society 
organizations and NGOs presented claims that the project would deprive local farmers of 
their land and benefit only Brazilian and Japanese multinationals and the Mozambican elite, 
resulting in a “No ProSAVANA” campaign. A harsh open letter was sent to the to the 
presidents of Mozambique and Brazil, and Japan’s Prime Minister, that accused them of  
 
…creating optimal conditions for multinational corporations to enter the 
country, which will inevitably rob rural families of their autonomy and disrupt 
the small-scale food production systems… …international cooperation 
converted into an instrument to facilitate obscure commercial transactions and 
promote the grabbing of community land.199 
 
It did not help the project’s image that FGV Projetos was reluctant to make public any 
information about the Nacala Fund, raising suspicions that private business interests are 
involved in the development cooperation. The campaign succeeded in bringing some 
transparency to the project, nonetheless, the details and documents of the Nacala Fund have 
not yet been made public. It is also true that the Fund has not yet commenced operations, 
although it has been five years since it was publicly launched in Maputo.200  
 
Development of the ProSAVANA project has thus been watched closely by representatives 
of the business community involved in agribusiness. Various activities were promoted in 
                                                          
198 Fingermann, The Study of Brazilian Trilateral, p. 67. 
199 “Open Letter to Urgently Stop and Debate upon the ProSavana Program”, appointed to the presidents of 
Mozambique and Brazil, and Japan’s Prime Minister by Mozambican and Brazillian organizations. 
GRAIN.org. 
200 Amanor and Chichava, South–South Cooperation, pp. 18–23. 
 156 
Brazil, Japan and Mozambique to present the program. An example is the seminar 
“Agribusiness in Mozambique: International Brazil-Japan Cooperation and Investment 
Opportunities”, held in São Paulo in April 2011, attended by prominent representation from 
agribusiness association. Following these events, more than one hundred Brazilian farmers 
visited Mozambique.201 
 
A study conducted by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and 
Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policies (CEESP) reveals that the 
ProSAVANA Program is inspired by the agro-export model dominant today in the Brazilian 
region of Cerrado, which is monoculture commodity production by mechanized, advanced 
agribusiness conglomerates. Critics fear that the influence of Brazilian firms’ investment and 
trade interest in shaping this country’s international cooperation programs override the actual 
development goals set by the ABC. From this perspective, the design of Brazil’s cooperation 
in Africa appears to be strongly compromised around a production model that is likely to 
deliver poor results in terms of local and regional development, which is still based on small-
holder, household farming using traditional techniques and tools.202 
 
The ProSAVANA project, albeit initially had little to do with Vale’s activities in the country, 
built on the path prepared by the Brazilian conglomerate in developing the logistics, namely 
the railway connections of the Nacala Corridor. The program aims at using the rail line to 
transport agricultural goods to the export market, which makes it inevitable to modernize the 
agricultural sector in Mozambique. The fertile Nacala landscape is grossly underperforming 
when it comes to agrarian output. The ABC’s development cooperation is based on the 
domestic experience of having turned the semiarid Cerrado – with Japanese help – into one 
of the most productive agricultural areas in the Americas. It is evident, thus, that Brazil will 
try to duplicate its development success story in the Nacala region, which is similar to the 
Cerrado both geologically and climate-wise. Private business interests are without doubt 
behind Brazil’s development objectives in the region, as most of the infrastructure is already 
being built by Brazilian companies (rail line, the airport of Nacala, shipping ports, etc.) and 
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the modern farming technologies and know-how to be introduced will come from the two 
donors, Brazil and Japan. The controversial Nacala Fund was also set up to channel close to 
US$1 billion into Brazilian investments in the Nacala Corridor, in a move that some analysts 
label “developing dependence”203 instead of cooperation. The entry of modern Brazilian and 
Japanese agribusiness corporations will mean total foreign control over the horizontal and 
vertical supply chains, from the toiling of the land to the harvesting, processing and shipping 
it out of the country, leaving local farmers to picking up the breadcrumbs. This is what the 
more than 100 signatories of the Open Letter to the three Heads of States protested against, 
expressing their fear that the ProSAVANA project could turn against the national interest of 
Mozambique, proving right the old proverb “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  
 
iii. Odebrecht Group 
 
Odebrecht Organization is a Brazilian conglomerate consisting of diversified businesses in 
the fields of engineering, construction, chemicals and petrochemicals. The company was 
founded in 1944 in Salvador da Bahia by Norberto Odebrecht, and is now present in South 
America, Central America, North America, the Caribbean, Africa, Europe and the Middle 
East. Its leading company is Norberto Odebrecht Construtora S.A., the biggest engineering 
and contracting company in Latin America and one of Brazil's five largest private-sector 
manufacturing companies. Odebrecht’s African presence is impressive: Angola (since 
1984), Mozambique (1999), Libya (2007), Guinea (2009), Ghana (2012), Equatorial Guinea 
(2012). Other African countries where Odebrecht had completed projects before are Zambia, 
South Africa, Djibouti, Liberia and Gabon. In 2009, Africa generated income of US$2.42 
billion for Odebrecht, about 10 per cent of the company’s total earnings.204 
 
Odebrecht has been operating in Angola since 1984, with the signing of the contract for 
construction of the Capanda Hydroelectric Power Plant, capable of generating 520 MW of 
energy. It is Angola's largest private-sector employer, giving bread to over 20,000 employees 
in the African nation. The company currently has 24 ongoing projects in the country in a 
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range of sectors including construction, agro-processing and mining, having recently been 
awarded a maintenance contract worth US$1.8 billion for three hydroelectric plants.205  
 
Odebrecht’s social contributions in Brazil go back to 1959, when it supported the publication 
of the book Homenagem à Bahia Antiga (Tribute to Old Bahia), by historian José Valladores. 
By the turn of the century, the holding company operates the Odebrecht Cultural Center, the 
Odebrecht Foundation and runs dozens of other social development projects both at home 
and abroad. One of the major achievements of the Foundation is the Program for Sustainable 
Integrated Growth and Development (PDCIS). The activities are concentrated in 11 
underdeveloped municipalities in Southern Bahia, which is home to roughly 285,000 people. 
The challenge of the PDCIS is to make the region prosperous in a socio-economically and 
environmentally sustainable way by keeping youth in rural areas and integrated with their 
families. In 2008, the Odebrecht Foundation won the 2nd Brazil ODM Award, granted to 
projects that contribute toward effective results focused on meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals.  The institution was the only corporate foundation to earn recognition 
for eight UN Development Goals in a single initiative.206 
 
1. Social responsibility projects in Africa  
 
The Kukula Ku Moxi (“Grow Together”) initiative contributes toward the sustainable 
development of family farming in the area of influence of the Capanda Agroindustrial Center 
in Angola. The region faced nutritional deficiencies when Odebrecht arrived there to start 
the construction work. The program introduced the cultivation of several different products, 
including carrots, beets, lettuce and banana, among others. In 2013, the action was expanded 
by the Client, the Capanda Agricultural Center Development Society (SODEPAC) and 
currently serves 28 Communities. The original monthly family income of US$30 increased 
drastically to US$200. The project also helps improve food security in the region. 
 
The Kwatchena Ku Munda (“Developing the Entrepreneurial Woman”) program aims at the 
sustainable development of the Community of M’páduè, located in the Province of Tete, in 
Mozambique, teaching agricultural women entrepreneurship concepts. In just 10 months, the 
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actions allowed the first 27 women trained to increase their plantations by 40% and their 
harvests by 55%. The program was designed to leverage economic inclusion and create 
mechanisms for combating poverty among women by optimizing work activities. Previously 
focused only on subsistence farming, agriculture has begun to generate income and quality 
of life through new planting and watering technologies. 
 
The Acreditar (“Believe”) initiative is an illustrative example of cooperation with the ABC 
when it comes to development assistance to Third world countries. The program qualifies 
men and women for the job market, contributing toward local development. Created in 2008, 
Acreditar had trained more than 125,000 people in Brazil and abroad by March 2016. It 
prioritizes the capacity building of professionals in those areas considered important by 
Odebrecht, favoring the contracting of local labor. The program was implemented in another 
ten countries in which Odebrecht is present. Nonetheless, there is no conditionality imposed 
on the candidate that he/she has to spend certain time working for the Odebrecht Group after 
the completion of the course. Approximately half of them were contracted by the Group's 
different businesses but many looked for work in the market with their new skills. It's not 
only a training program, but a broad social program focusing on the community's 
development and income generation. 
 
2. The Integrated Technological Training Center (CINFOTEC) 
 
Another mode of cooperation between the private and government sector in development 
cooperation is the case of the Integrated Technological Training Center (CINFOTEC) in 
Angola. This center, founded in 2000, is the result of several years of planning and technical 
coordination carried out by the ABC, more specifically by its implementing partner, SENAI. 
It was identified that in Angola, destroyed by long internal conflict, there existed a series of 
difficulties in finding a qualified workforce to support the reconstruction of the country. In 
this way, the project supported the training of qualified engineers in the areas of engine 
mechanics, civil construction, electricity, clothing and IT, contributing to the country's social 
reintegration and reconstruction efforts. Although, there was no formal cooperation in place 
with Odebrecht at the time, the Brazilian government agency counted on the by then more 
than two decades of expertise of the holding company in Angola to formulate its course 
syllabus. ABC also employed Brazilian expatriates working for Odebrecht in Angola as 
trainers and instructors in the newly formed training center. 
 160 
 
The first courses were started in January 2000 and in July of the same year the graduation 
ceremony of the first group of students trained by the Center was held, totaling 144 trainees. 
Currently the Center offers twelve courses: mechanical, electrical, computer science 
(hardware), English, masonry, electronics, crafts, sewing, plumbing, carpentry, civil 
locksmithing and refrigeration. The courses have an average duration of six months and are 
held in the morning or evening shift. Although they are paid, the price of the course is low 
to fit the local budgets. In addition, the Center offers grants and exemptions specifically 
geared toward people with special needs. The teaching material used, provided by SENAI, 
is all manufactured in the Center's reprography. The Center has 30 instructors, most of them 
with professional training courses in Brazil. Every year, about 1,200 students are cared for. 
Since the beginning of the courses in 2000, until 2008, 18,928 students passed through the 
Center. In 2005, control of the Center was transferred to the Angolan government. In 2018 
CINFOTEC plans to train more than 6,000 individuals in electricity and renewable energy, 
innovation and entrepreneurship, transportation, logistics and information and 
communication technology services, mechanics and production and electricity and 
mechatronics.207 The Acreditar initiative of Odebrecht, started in 2008, was modelled in 
large part on this bilateral development cooperation program. 
 
3. Evaluation of questionnaire 
 
In the survey conducted by the author of this dissertation, Emanuel Salgado, director for 
Public Relations and Communication at Odebrecht Infraestrutura S.A., gave the following 
information about the group’s social activities in Africa (for the full questionnaire see Annex 
D.). Odebrecht has more than a policy: its philosophies and values, known internally as TEO 
(Odebrecht Entrepreneurial Technology) are written and communicated for all, where the 
basis are the human beings and sustainability. As of 2014, there have been 70 social 
programs benefiting more than 200,000 people direct or indirectly in Africa. Some of the 
major projects are outlines below. 
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When it comes to human capacity building projects, Mr. Salgado points out the following as 
being the most important factors taken into consideration by Odebrecht (1 = not important, 
6 = very important): 
 
Complying with local regulations over 
minimum local workforce requirements 
1 Willingness to be trained 6 
Skills/expertise 2 Long-term retention of workforce 3 
Cost advantage over ex-pat workforce 4 Sustainability of skills (will employee be 
able to use his skills later in his career?) 
5 
 
It is interesting to point out that complying with local regulations figures as the least 
important factor when selecting personnel to be trained by Odebrecht, which seems odd, to 
say the least, given how much emphasis they place on the promulgation of their corporate 
philosophy.208 The representative of the Odebrecht Group points out in the survey that the 
main similarity between Brazilians and Angolans is the so-called jeito (way of life), which 
refers to various aspects of life from making decisions to social interaction and business 
etiquette. Skills/expertise is also not one of the main factors for hiring employees, the cause 
of which is that Odebrecht operates in the construction business and most of its locally hired 
workforce is unskilled and will be trained “on the job”. Cost factors, sustainability of skills 
and willingness to be trained are the most vital considerations for Odebrecht, which can be 
attributed to the large number of workers it employs and to the intensive on-the-job training 
initiatives it undertakes. Most of its workforce is unskilled and needs to be trained the basics 
of masonry and construction expertise after having hired them. Nonetheless, is it surprising 
to see that the long-term retention of workforce figures low on the priorities list; one would 
assume that after investing into training, Odebrecht would be reluctant to let go of its semi-
skilled employees. The explanation of Mr. Salgado is that low-skilled labor is easy to find 
in Angola and the skills can be acquired in a relatively short period of time (in a matter of 
weeks). 
 
It is imperative to mention that for Odebrecht the skies have not always been clear in Angola. 
The BBC news channel reported in 2014 that Odebrecht was keeping 500 of its Brazilian 
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workers in slave-like conditions in Angola. According to documents filed by prosecutors, 
“workers, hundreds of them, were subjected to degrading working conditions incompatible 
with human dignity, and had their freedom curtailed, being deprived of their right to come 
and go”. The complaint says that employees “were treated as modern slaves” and this was 
aggravated because “they were alone in a foreign country far away, unable to resist”.209 In 
September 2015, the Labor court convicted Odebrecht group and ordered the company to 
pay 50 million reais (US$13 million) in damages to the workers. 
 
The Nacala airport reconstruction in Mozambique has also been a much-talked-about 
technical development cooperation carried out by the Brazilian construction mammoth from 
Brazilian taxpayers’ money. Dubbed a white elephant by critics, it is the most modern airport 
in the African country, although it welcomes only two flights a week, both from the capital 
Maputo. The airport, able to receive the largest cargo planes, cost US$144 million and was 
opened with great fanfare in 2014. Notwithstanding, the airport remains virtually unused 
with no foreign airline intending to fly there in the near future.210 
 
To add to the woes of the Salvador-based conglomerate, investigations began the same year 
against the company that led to the uncovering of Brazil’s largest ever corruption scheme 
that implicated almost 300 senior executives and politicians, even levelling accusations 
against former President Lula da Silva for receiving illicit benefits from PetroBras and 
Odebrecht. The allegations of bribery, money-laundering and bid-rigging at several large 
Brazilian corporations that were awarded lucrative government contracts in Brazil, Peru, 
Panama, Argentina, Venezuela and Angola have shaken the public confidence in Odebrecht, 
a company whose ethics manifesto was enshrined in the company’s everyday procedures. 
The Group was accused of kickbacks, rewarding Latin-American and African politicians 
with hefty sums for awarding it overpriced infrastructure projects, in addition to using its 
political contacts to obtain concessional loans with below-average interest rates from the 
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). The investigation is still 
ongoing, but on 8 March 2016, Marcelo Odebrecht, CEO of Odebrecht, was sentenced to 19 
years and 4 months jail, for paying over US$30 million in bribes to executives of Petrobras, 
in exchange for contracts and influence. According to the verdict by the federal judge in 
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Curitiba spearheading the investigation, Odebrecht formed a “cartel” with other companies 
through which they systematically rigged bidding on Petrobras projects since 2006.211 
Analysts argue that the Brazilian company’s recent US$1.8 billion Angolan infrastructure 
project award is crucial to the Odebrecht Group’s survival as no public tenders are likely to 
be awarded to the company in Latin America in the near future. 
 
iv. Andrade Gutierrez S.A. 
 
Andrade Gutierrez is a Brazilian private multinational conglomerate headquartered in Belo 
Horizonte. The company was founded in 1948 in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. As of 2013, 
Andrade Gutierrez is the second largest construction company in Brazil with branches in 44 
countries. Andrade Gutierrez has three separate divisions: AG Engenharia (Construtora 
Andrade Gutierrez), which engages in engineering and construction; AG Concessões, which 
handles public projects, concessions and utilities; and AG Telecom, which provides 
telecommunication services. Andrade Gutierrez is currently present in ten African countries 
with construction projects, from ports to housing and sanitation projects in Angola, Algeria, 
Congo and Guinea. The company, just like Vale and Odebrecht, runs various social 
development programs, such as Digital Day, an incubator for IT-startups; and Talentos, an 
internship program for young graduates; and an environmental conversation programs that 
aim to preserve fish flow in the reservoirs by building of fish corridors alongside the dams. 
 
1. Mozambique: Moamba Major dam 
 
Andrade Gutierrez was the main contractor of the Moamba Major dam and hydroelectric 
plant, whose construction started in 2014. The works included, in addition to the dam and 
electricity plant, 19 km of railway and 10 km of highway, connecting the city of Moamba to 
the facilities. The dam was intended to solve the irrigation and drinking water supply 
problems of the region, resulting from the irregular rainfall brought about by global climate 
change. The works were financed by a loan from BNDES. 
 
In addition to the construction, Andrade Gutierrez also offered to implement a technical 
formation program in the district, to develop machine operators, electricians, welders, 
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mechanics, turners, among others. The professional training center was to be developed in 
cooperation with the ABC (and its partner organization, SENAI), much like the one that was 
installed in Luanda, Angola a decade earlier. According to Rodrigo da Costa Fonseca, ex-
president of the conglomerate’s African branch, Brazilians are keen to distinguish 
themselves from competitors, especially the Chinese. They do not want to be seen as 
grabbing everything they can and strive to hire locals and offer them skills that they can use 
in the future in other workplaces as well.212 
 
The skies started to turn cloudy for Andrade Gutierrez in the same year, as it was revealed 
that the company was deeply involved in the bribery and money-laundering campaign 
surrounding Brazil’s major corporations. The conglomerate’s leadership was accused of 
continuous attempts of bribery and bid-rigging from 2006 to 2014, which included an 
investment of US$25,000,000 into Gamecorp S.A., a company owned by Fábio Luís Lula 
da Silva, the elder son of the ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Four former executives 
of Andrade Gutierrez were convicted of the charges and sentenced to prison in August 
2017.213 
 
v. OAS Group 
 
OAS was set up in 1976, in the State of Bahia, operating in the engineering and infrastructure 
area. The co-founder, Cesar Mata Pires, was an engineer working for Odebrecht. He set up 
his own company with two friends; the first letters of their last names make up the company 
acronym OAS. Pires’ big break came when he befriended Antonio Carlos Magalhães, a 
popular politician who was Bahia governor several times, and eventually married his 
daughter Tereza. Brazilians joked that OAS stood for “Obras Arranjadas pelo Sogro” (Work 
Arranged by the Father-In-Law). The truth may not lie too far as the company grew to 
become one of the top ten construction firms in the country within eight years, and the vast 
majority of its income came from government-tendered projects up until the early 21st 
century. OAS is, today, the fourth largest privately-owned Brazilian multinational 
conglomerate, with thousands of projects delivered domestically and in more than 20 
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countries aboard.214 The OAS Group consists of ten companies and is present in seven 
African countries, namely Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Namibia 
and Mozambique. 
 
As part of the ProSAVANA agricultural cooperation agreement OAS is a member of the 
consortium that will build the new port in Nacala, Mozambique, alongside the corridor to 
lead from the same town to the coal mines of Moatize. In Ghana, the contractor will construct 
five thousand houses for US$200 million. The contractor is involved in various public works 
in the country. As OAS’s Africa head, Leonardo Calado de Brito wisely states, “there is no 
construction in Europe − there is nothing left to build there. Africa is the place to be.”215 
OAS’ business in Africa was booming, the company was riding on the waves of President 
Lula’s Africanist policies and the expansion of development cooperation and technical 
assistance to African states. The favorable loans offered by BNDES fueled the African 
construction boom of Brazilian contractors. 
 
Nonetheless, OAS’ fate started to falter in September 2013, when a ministry audit found that 
the company was keeping 150 of its employees in slave-like conditions during the expansion 
works of the Guarulhos Airport in São Paulo.216 More clouds gathered above the head of the 
South American construction giant when protests targeted the OAS headquarters in Conakry, 
Guinea. The demonstrations were triggered by the Guineans’ growing frustration with their 
government over the lack of development in their West African state, especially in the energy 
sector. OAS, a major contractor in the country, was one of the companies involved in the 
connection of an extra 100 MW of electricity at a recently installed plant in Tombo to the 
Guinean power grid.217  
 
The ongoing Operation Car Wash probe has profoundly shaken the reputation and 
operations of the company. Four top management members were condemned to 11 years of 
prison in 2015 for money laundering, corruption and criminal activity. In 2016, the convicted 
ex-president, Léo Pinheiro, entered into a plea bargain with the prosecutors, promising to 
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uncover the secret behind the inflated proposals approved by the Lula-pressured BNDES 
and the truth about the ‘donations’ given to Dilma Rousseff’s presidential campaign.218 In 
the same year, the Federal Government suspended the contracts awarded to OAS for the 
reconstruction of four airports due to ongoing investigations that OAS was part of a cartel 
that pushed up prices in ten public work tenders, insofar as the price of the winning bidder 
was inflated by US$15 million. On top of all this, Cesar Mata Pires died of a heart attack on 
August 22nd, 2017.219 
 
It is interesting to note the four values OAS is basing its company ethics on: Result 
Orientation; Professional Competence; Drive; Reliance.220 There is no mention of dignity, 
integrity, responsible behavior, sustainability nor community orientedness, as opposed to the 
mantras of the Odebrecht Entrepreneurial Technology (TEO), Andrade Gutierrez or Vale 
S.A. Not to say that the enviable code of conduct laid down by the other three 
megacorporations held back their management teams from bribery, money laundering, 
forming collusions and cartels, but the principles propagated by OAS openly advocate a 
survival-of-the-fittest corporate vision. In any case, the current domestic turmoil surrounding 
the “Four Sisters” will most likely place the African operations of OAS on hold, which will 
have a negative impact on Brazil’s exports and transfer of technical know-how to the 
continent. 
 
vi. Camargo Corrêa Group 
 
The eldest of the “Four Sisters”, Camargo Corrêa is one of the biggest Brazilian private 
conglomerates operating in Brazil and in more than 20 countries. The company was founded 
in 1939 by Sebastião Camargo and is headquartered in São Paulo. It has a diversified 
business portfolio comprising companies with outstanding performance in the cement, urban 
mobility and transportation concessions, engineering and construction, real estate 
development, textile and shipbuilding industries. The group operates in five African 
countries: Egypt, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.221 
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1. Evaluation of questionnaire 
 
In the questionnaire sent to the company (see Annex D.), an unnamed Human Resources 
(HR) representative gave the following answers to the question of Camargo Corrêa’s 
involvement in Mozambique. Camargo Corrêa is a subcontractor to Vale in the 
implementation of the Moatize coal mine and is the lead contractor in the development and 
project structuring of the Hydroelectric Mphanda Nkuwa (HMNK). The Brazilian 
conglomerate is also the owner of InterCement, one of the world’s largest cement 
manufactureres. It has leading position in Cabo Verde, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Egypt. 
 
On the social front, the Camargo Corrêa Institute, through the Ideal Volunteer program is 
now being regarded as the largest such initiative in the Brazilian corporate world. Its ‘Doing-
Good Day’ program started over ten years ago and involves community revitalization 
(playgrounds, football fields), training and teaching (sport, arts, cooking) and various other 
projects executed in hospitals and schools. In the ‘Infância Ideal Program’, which prioritizes 
actions targeted at children, the intention is to concentrate efforts on early infancy (zero to 
three years). In the Escola Ideal Program, targeted at primary and secondary education, the 
goal is to encourage literacy in the right age.222 
 
According to the answers in the questionnaire sent to the company, Camargo Corrêa seems 
to place more emphasis on compliance with local rules and regulations and the attitude of 
the laborer than costs or long-term investment in the personnel (1 = not important, 6 = very 
important): 
Complying with local regulations over 
minimum local workforce requirements 
6 Willingness to be trained 5 
Skills/expertise 4 Long-term retention of workforce 1 
Cost advantage over ex-pat workforce 2 Sustainability of skills (will employee be 
able to use his skills later in his career?) 
3 
 
The current bribery and price-fixing scandal did not leave Camargo Corrêa untouched either. 
The company was ordered to repay US$217 million to the state that it gained from collusion 
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and carteling with other bidders. The lawyers of the conglomerate entered into a plea bargain 
with the federal persecutors to alleviate the sentences of three of its top executives each 
convicted of 38 counts of money laundering in 2015. As a result of the investigations, 
Camargo Corrêa has gone to the brink of collapse and has put up for sale its shipyard, 
hydroelectric dams and even its most coveted treasure, InterCement.223 
 
vii. Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) 
 
Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) is the largest corruption and money laundering 
investigation in the history of Brazil that was launched in March 2014, after the Finance 
Ministry’s intelligence unit discovered unusual bank transactions involving the state-owned 
oil company Petrobras. They suspected that Petrobras was accepting bribes from firms, 
including the construction giant Odebrecht, in exchange for contracts. According to the 
public prosecutor’s office, by December 2017 Lava Jato had resulted in accusations against 
289 people and nearly 180 indictments for crimes including corruption, abuse of the 
international financial system, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The operation has 
found proof of misappropriation of funds at more than 20 companies, some of them the 
largest and most influential ones in the country. The amount embezzled is over US$1 billion 
and  prosecutors have requested US$11.3 billion in reimbursements. The operation got its 
name from the car wash station where the currency exchange office was located in the capital 
Brasília, which was used for the transfer of illicit money. 
 
The scandal has been disastrous particularly for the “Four Sisters”, which were all embroiled 
in the scandal. After initial investigations established that the former director of Petrobas, 
Paulo Roberto Costa, was one of the beneficiaries of a valuable gift from the owner of the 
currency exchange business, suspicion began to shift towards the parastatal. A new law 
introduced in the early 2000s in Brazil, called ‘Rewarded Collaboration’, reduced sentence 
when the defendant collaborated. Thanks to this legislation, Mr. Costa collaborated with 
federal prosecutors in a way that shed light on the complex system how political parties 
control the state-oil company Petrobas. Mr. Costa confessed that he and his colleagues had 
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been knowingly overpaying contracts, funneling funds to their own personal accounts in 
exchange for kickbacks of 3% on all contracts.224 
 
Executives from both Petrobras and Odebrecht, including the latter’s former chief executive, 
Marcelo Odebrecht, were sentenced to 19 years of jail time. In April 2017, Odebrecht was 
ordered to pay fines totaling US$2.6 billion to authorities in Brazil, Switzerland, and the 
United States after admitting to paying officials in twelve countries approximately US$788 
million in bribes; the company may also reach plea deals with other Latin American 
countries in which it operated. According to the evidence presented by the prosecution, 
Odebrecht had a secret offshore branch that was used for illegal payments to secure contracts 
in several countries in Latin America. The political color of the party ruling the country was 
of no relevance for Odebrecht as long as they won the contracts. Hugo 
Chávez’s Venezuela to Ricardo Martinelli’s Panama, contrasting each other in political 
views but both accepting Odebrecht’s money. Other high profile leaders implicated in Lava 
Jato are Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, 
and Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.  
 
Another investigation, Operação Carne Fraca (Operation Weak Flesh), was announced 
publicly in March 2017; it began as a result of Lava Jato and pursued allegations that 
employees of JBS and BRF, the world’s largest beef and poultry exporters, respectively, 
bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of spoiled products. In the following months, the 
European Union suspended its meat imports from Brazil, along with China, Egypt, Japan, 
Mexico, and the United States. (Some of the bans were lifted soon thereafter, but EU and 
U.S. restrictions remain in place.) JBS’s heads, brothers Joesley and Wesley Batista, made 
plea bargains with prosecutors and resigned from their positions in May; their testimonies 
spurred a probe into President Temer. JBS’s controlling shareholder agreed that month to 
pay a record US$3.16 billion fine after its executives admitted to bribing 1,829 politicians a 
total of nearly US$600 million. The Batistas were arrested in September on charges of lying 
to the prosecution and insider trading. 
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Several other corruption probes that have overlapped with Lava Jato have resulted in more 
than a dozen arrests, which concern alleged bribes paid by construction companies in 
exchange for contracts to build stadiums for the World Cup 2014; an investigation into 
alleged fraud at the pension funds of state-run companies; and, a probe which is looking into 
bribes allegedly paid by companies to tax officials to reduce their corporate liabilities.225 
 
Operation Car Wash has had immense significance on the political-economic structure of 
the country. It brought to justice those politicians and businessmen who were thought to be 
‘untouchables’. Up until the turn of the century there was a silent consensus among the 
population that corruption is inherent to the Brazilian national character and that the 
undertakings of the political, economic and judicial elite are not to be commented on. What 
finally popped the balloon in 2014 was the fervently independent judge, Sergio Moro, for 
whom no one was above the law. He and his team of prosecutors went first after the 
businessmen, whose testimonies were later used against politicians, even those who enjoyed 
immunity. The courage and persistence of the federal judge changed the view of Brazilians 
regarding the structurally imbedded corruption in the political and economic system. Instead 
of tolerance and acceptance of the impunity the elite had experienced they were now being 
investigated and charged. The domino effect caused by the probes reached the highest levels 
and resulted in charges laid against four former and present presidents of Brazil: Fernando 
Collor de Mello, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer. 
  
The former president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was sentenced by Judge Moro in July 2017 
to nine and half years in prison for corruption and money laundering. Lula, who said he will 
appeal his conviction, also faces charges in four other criminal cases. Lula has voiced plans 
to run in the 2018 presidential election, but if the convictions are upheld by the Supreme 
Court, Lula would be ineligible to run in the elections. The federal prosecutor’s office has 
referred to Lula as the mastermind behind the entire corruption scheme targeted by Lava 
Jato, and some officials from his administration are serving prison sentences for related 
crimes. Lula’s lobbying activities did not end at the country’s borders. According to the 
accusations, the ex-President sent his campaign manager to Angola to aid the election 
campaign of President José Eduardo dos Santos. This would not yet have been a crime on 
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its own, but the President’s marketing manager, João Santana − who since then has been 
incarcerated for accepting bribes – admitted that a US$20 million donation was made by the 
Odebrecht Group to the costs of the MPLA presidential campaign in 2012, at the request of 
the Brazilian government.226 
 
President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in August 2016, during her second term, after 
being charged with manipulating the federal budget to conceal the size of the country’s 
deficit. Prosecutors never brought charges related to the Petrobras scandal against Rousseff, 
though she was the company’s chairwoman from 2003 to 2010. A separate case, which was 
brought by the opposition, sought to annul Rousseff and Temer’s 2014 election victory over 
allegations of illegal campaign donations, but was unsuccessful. 
 
Rousseff’s one-time running mate and vice president, Michel Temer, took office in August 
2016, after Rousseff was impeached. His name did not appear on Fachin’s list, but he has 
since been charged with taking bribes. JBS chair Joesley Batista handed over to investigators 
secretly recorded audio that purports to show Temer authorizing hush money for Eduardo 
Cunha, a former speaker of Congress’s lower house. Like Rousseff and Lula, Temer has 
denied the allegations against him. 
 
The economic and political implications of Operation Car Wash have been unprecedented 
in Brazilian history. In early 2014, the country fell into its worst recession in more than a 
century. As the political crisis worsened, investment levels and consumer confidence 
suffered, leading to a 3.9 percent drop in GDP in 2015 and another 3.6 percent decrease the 
following year. Facing financial losses that stem in part from the probe, Petrobras and 
Odebrecht have laid off more than one hundred thousand employees since 2014, not 
counting the redundancies made by other Brazilian industrial conglomerates. As these 
companies were at the forefront of Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation in Africa, it 
is not surprising that the 2016 transcontinental trade volume fell to half of the 2008 data (see 
Section III.D.vii.). However, one has to take into consideration that the economic woes of 
the South American giant did not originate solely from the scandal and there were other 
factors in play that contributed to the negative macroeconomic performance. Political 
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analysts agree that Operation Car Wash not only brought about the downfall of President 
Rousseff, but also the demise of 13 years of leftist governance. 
 
Even so, once the investigations come to an end and life returns to normal, one should be 
careful about having too optimistic expectations concerning the whitening of the Brazilian 
economy. The “Four Sisters” have all recommenced their activities in 2017 after a quick 
restructuring process and payment of fines. In a country where the economy is dominated 
by a handful of mega-corporations partly owned by the state and with deep historical roots 
of intertwining between economic and political interests, it is inevitable that certain “favors” 




VI.  EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Brazil has challenged the dominant narratives of mainstream, North-guided development 
assistance technical cooperation with the less developed world. Particularly from President 
Lula da Silva’s first term in 2013 Brazil has consciously positioned itself on the stage of 
world politics as leader in Third World solidarity, horizontal exchange, mutual respect, and 
complementarity. The Brazilian administration did not spare resources and energy to build 
a global image of the country based on the following principles: 
1. New International World Order: “the time has come to bring into the arena players 
who will be able to put forward new ideas.”227 
2. Solidarity: domestic social development programs like Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) 
and other affirmative action policies have become the main export products of the 
recent Brazilian administrations; 
3. Non-conditionality: Brazil is keen on emphasizing that – contrary to the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee framework – Brazil does not impose any 
conditions on the development assistance granted to its partners; 
4. Spokesperson for the Global South: using itself as an example of a nation rising out 
of poverty, Brazil has relentlessly advocated South-South partnerships and 
coordinated actions to counterbalance the weight of the developed countries in 
forums like the WTO or the UN, calling for the creation of an “Axis of the South”228. 
 
As depicted in the analysis based on Milani’s first two variables (historical and ideological), 
it is undeniable that the historical kinship among Brazil and a large number of Sub-Saharan 
countries give the South American nation a comparative advantage over developed countries 
when it comes to dealing with the Global South. At the same time, this doctoral dissertation 
also sheds light on the fact that some of the same paradigms which characterize North-South 
cooperation have infiltrated Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) as 
well, as discussed in the sections on institutional and non-institutional dimensions. 
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Behind the glitter of the official rhetoric of the Brazilian administration and diplomacy about 
solidarity, complementarity and non-conditionality, the reality on the ground shows a 
different picture. Even though it would be untrue to say that Brazilian SSDC is guided 
exclusively by selfish, private interests, there are several cases where philanthropy and 
business seem to go hand-in-hand, as was illustrated in the above case studies. One of the 
main pillars of Brazil’s SSDC is the norm of non-association with commercial or profit 
interest (see Figure 8. in Section IV.A.), has been seriously challenged with the findings of 
Operation Car Wash. The narrative of an unselfish, egalitarian development partner built up 
by Lula over a decade has been damaged in the course of a couple of years. President Lula’s 
amicable ties to Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos facilitated many trade deals for 
the Odebrecht Group. According to ex-president and founder Marcelo Odebrecht, Lula’s 
role in providing US$1 billion in financial aid to Odebrecht’s business in Angola was not 
driven solely by altruism. The former Minister of Planning under the Lula administration, 
Paulo Bernardo approached Odebrecht, in the middle of negotiating the BNDES loan, to ask 
for US$40 million in kickbacks. Odebrecht’s owners also said that the campaign by Senator 
Gleisi Hoffmann (PT-PR) − Paulo Bernardo’s wife − to the government of Paraná in 2014 
received US$1.5 million because of the Angola agreement.229 
 
Brazil is a fertile ground for political-economic intermingling, which is rooted in its past 
when the colonial government was a mere extension of the powerful latifundistas. The 
Vargas-era policies favored the creation of partly state-owned corporations in strategic 
fields, such as energy, construction, and telecommunications. These mostly family-owned 
businesses have maintained strong ties to the ruling elite up until the present, which helped 
them attain hegemonic domination of their respective markets in Brazil by the turn of the 
century. Such is the power and presence of these conglomerates in Brazilian political life, 
that the “Four Sisters” can always count on the backing of the government, irrespective of 
which party is in power at the moment. We have seen from the examples above that the 
multi-billion dollar fraud scheme that was uncovered recently involved senators, members 
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of parliament, judges and even the President and that it has been going on for over a decade 
or longer.230   
 
On the agrarian front, Brazil has strong agricultural machinery, input, hybrid seeds, and 
biotechnology industries. The agribusiness sector accounts for about 40% of the value of 
exports and about 33% of national GDP.231 Consequently, agribusiness now exerts a 
powerful influence on Brazilian economic and foreign policy. It is no coincidence, thus, that 
the largest portion of the ABC’s development cooperation in Africa is concentrated in the 
field of agriculture (19%). The criticisms directed at the ProSAVANA project by the 
signatories of the Open Letter concerned the influence of Brazilian multinationals on the 
decision-makers when drawing up the plans: 
 
President Dilma Rousseff, how is it justified that the Brazilian Government does 
not give priority to the Food Acquisition Programme in Mozambique, which we 
rural populations support and encourage? ... ProSAVANA is a tool for creating 
optimal conditions for multinational corporations to enter the country, which 
will inevitably rob rural families of their autonomy and disrupt the small-scale 
food production systems...232 
 
As explained above, the ProSAVANA project was based on the PROCEDER initiative that 
transformed the arid and infertile Brazilian Cerrado into the largest farmland in the country, 
the effect of which was the same that the Mozambicans are fearing: small-holder agriculture 
was ‘eaten’ up by large farms and agribusiness conglomerates. Today over 20 Brazilian 
agribusiness companies now have annual sales above US$1 billion, in which 70% of national 
agricultural output originates from the Cerrado and 1% of farmers produce over 50% of 
GNP, while three million farmers (66% of the total farming population) produce only 3.3% 
of GNP.233 In a nutshell, if the ProSAVANA succeeds, Brazil will have outsourced its own 
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agrarian transformation of the Cerrado to another country. However, this time the Brazilian 
agribusiness corporations will have 30 years of advantage over their Mozambican 
counterparts when it comes to know-how and technology in large farm management. This is 
what Alden and Chichava labelled “developing dependence” and compared it to the 
traditional North-South cooperation.234 
 
The merger of the most significant economic actors into not more than half a dozen 
conglomerates in each of the strategic national industries, coupled with the relationship-
oriented Brazilian business culture pave the way for the strong lobbying activity exerted on 
political decision-makers. The judicial proceedings that began in 2014 are evidence to the 
fact that the companies interested in implementing Brazil’s foreign development projects 
used their leverage with circles close to the President to, first of all, win the bidding process, 
and second, to obtain preferential credit from BNDES for financing. On 12 July 2017, former 
Brazilian leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was convicted on corruption charges and 
sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison. The court found Lula guilty of accepting US$1.2 
million worth of bribes from engineering firm OAS S.A., the amount of money prosecutors 
said the company spent refurbishing a beach apartment for Lula in return for his help winning 
contracts with state oil company Petrobras.235 
 
In the light of the ongoing proceedings against more than 200 members of the ruling 
economic and political elite in Brazil and given the fact that most investment activity in Sub-
Saharan Africa is undertaken by the major corporations involved in the graft scheme, it 
would be logical to assume that the two sides had been exchanging information on 
development cooperation projects. This is not to say that Brazil’s development policy is 
entirely flawed and does not achieve development results with its partners. Social 
development and business activities can be mutually beneficial (as witnessed in the wide 
range of corporate social responsibility projects run by Odebrecht, Vale and Andrade 
Gutierrez), it is just a question of to what extent shall business interests determine 
development cooperation. As seen in the case of the professional training center in Angola, 
the fact that Odebrecht offered support and employment to the graduates of the center is a 
win-win situation for both institutional and non-institutional actors. On the other hand, in 
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the case of ProSAVANA, it seems that the project is more focused on pleasing Brazilian and 
Japanese corporate desires than local challenges on the ground. 
 
In discussions with Professor Dr. Lyal White, Director of the Centre for Dynamic Markets 
at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, the academician asserts that Brazil does have a 
comparative edge over other newcomers on the continent, nevertheless, the pervasive 
corruption that links business and political leaders makes Brazil’s development cooperation 
a game of the few. Professor White calls the  conservation of old practices and habits 
“paradigmatic resilience”, whereby the families of elites have difficulties breaking the long-
engrained cycle of “I give you a hand in need so that you’d give me a hand when I need it.” 
236 
 
On the other hand, the head of the trade section at the Embassy of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil in Nairobi, Kenya, Mr. Paulo Zerbinati says that Brazil has improved a lot in terms 
of corruption over the last years.237 The findings of the Transparency International 
Corruptions Perception Index 2016, though, do not confirm Mr. Zerbinati’s assertion, 
showing that the country has been stagnating at positions 79-85 of the world rankings of 
corruption over the last 5 years.238 Mr. Zerbinati adds that, moreover, aid makes commercial 
sense for all parties involved. For example, Brazil is the world’s most efficient ethanol 
producer and wants to create a global market in the green fuel. But it cannot do so if it is the 
world’s only real provider. Spreading ethanol technology to poor countries creates new 
suppliers, boosts the chances of a global market and generates business for Brazilian firms. 
Mr. Zerbinati also believes that – in contrast to public perception – Brazilians do not have a 
major advantage over other countries when it comes to doing business with Africa. The 
Counsellor attributes the argument that historical connections, climatic similarities and 
developmental parallels help Brazilians gain the trust of locals to false analysis by 
researchers in “far-away offices behind computers”. The reality, according to Mr. Zerbinati, 
is that today’s Africans are not aware of the historical link between Brazil and Africa and 
they do not discern between Brazilians or other nationals when formulating their price offer. 
The only factor that truly aides Brazilians in the PALOP countries is the knowledge of the 
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Portuguese language, everything else must be earned, says the Economic Counsellor of the 
Brazilian Embassy in Kenya.  
 
A. Survey: how the private sector feels about Brazil’s enhanced SSDC  
 
Part of this research paper includes personal interviews with company directors and a 
questionnaire sent out to six of the major enterprises operating on African soil (Annex D). 
In the replies of private firms in the mining, oil and gas, construction and agriculture sectors, 
notions of hardship, opportunity and accomplishment emerge. ‘Hardship’, as firms express 
how investment and work conditions in Africa seem to them much more difficult than ‘even 
in the poorest areas of the Northeast [of Brazil]’. Sá Pimentel defines the extra cost of doing 
business on the continent as Africa Cost (Custo África), which arises from the lack of 
physical, legal and financial infrastructure, security concerns and precarious health 
conditions, corruption and the low productivity of the labor force.239 ‘Opportunity’ was the 
other term firm executives used when referring to their work in Africa. Construction firms 
in particular view weak African infrastructure as an opportunity for investment and for 
obtaining BNDES loans for expansion abroad. Some Brazilian construction firms have been 
operating in Africa so long that they are seen as ‘local’ with much local employment.  
 
Odebrecht, for example, was keen on fostering its image as an ‘African’ construction firm 
instead of a Brazilian one. Mining companies such as the giant Vale have also seen in Africa 
a land of opportunity with large projects in Mozambique leading the way. Brazilian exporters 
of manufactured products tend to be more conservative about their assessments of 
opportunities in Africa as local competition from South African, Chinese and Indian 
manufactures thwarted many ambitious plans such as those of Brazilian cosmetics firm O 
Boticario, which closed operations in Africa after a few years, or the many small and 
medium enterprises that were not able to take advantage of the BNDES credit line. 
‘Accomplishment’ and ‘responsibility’ were also often mentioned by interviewees from the 
private sector when referring to their operations in Africa. As will be seen later in more 
detail, interviewees expressed that in Africa their social responsibility projects are even more 
important than in Brazil because of the dire social and economic conditions in which their 
African employees live. Many Brazilian companies offer services in essential sectors such 
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as health, education and agriculture in the countries they operate, often in remote areas where 
the state services do not reach. Social initiatives are put in place for employees to benefit the 
wider local community. Investment in training of the local workforce is a key feature of 
Brazilian business practices in Africa with clear links to development objectives. 
Surprisingly, Petrobras, the largest oil and gas company from Brazil (with a large percentage 
of government capital) never got involved in social programs in Africa and is now 
disinvesting in order to focus on Brazilian domestic priorities. This finding goes against the 
assumption linking state-owned companies with social programs and privately owned 
companies being associated with little investment in the area of social development. 
 
B. The “Second Scramble for Africa” 
 
The first scramble for Africa (1870-1914) left the legacy of colonialism on the continent. 
After having colonized almost the total area of the black continent within half a century, 
Europe lost nearly all of it within the next 50 years. The two World Wars and subsequent 
liberation movements wiped out most of the colonial powers by the 60s, with only the 
Portuguese standing ground until the mid-70s. From a European perspective, Africa once 
again became the “forgotten continent”. The struggling democracies and bloody conflicts of 
the newly independent continent made everyone – who could afford –leave Africa in the 70s 
and 80s, rather than go there. The end of the Cold War in Europe a decade later turned the 
world’s attention to Eastern Europe and to the remnants of the Soviet Union as they became 
the focal point of geopolitical aspirations. 
 
As professor Gábor Búr points it out in his essay “The second scramble: a második 
versenyfutás Afrikáért”, the reawakening of Western interest in Africa was triggered by the 
New York terror attacks of September 11th, 2001. The developed world began to realize that 
if Africa’s problems are not solved, it will become a hotbed for extremist organizations, who 
will use the continent to launch attacks against America and Europe. Only through concerted 
action (job creation, education, economic development) will radicalization be stopped. 
Nonetheless, the real causes for the “Second Scramble for Africa” can be found in economic 
factors and not political ones. The rapid growth of the Asian economies – particularly that 
of China – led to an increased thirst for natural resources to supply the booming construction 
and transportation sectors. From the turn of the millennium, China’s trade with Africa grew 
by an average of 30% annually. India followed suit shortly after, using its links in the Indian 
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diaspora to enter the African market, while others started to build out their relations from 
virtually zero (Japan). As more and more nations entered the race to grab a slice of the cake 
in what will soon become the world’s last breadbasket and energy supplier, a phenomenon 
similar to that of the first Scramble for Africa surfaced. However, this time it is not fought 
with armies and guns but with soft tools. However, the end result may be the same, warns 
Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, since the structural asymmetries of the 
African states can easily give rise to the foreign nation dominating the African one in 
economic and political aspects.240 
 
To be able to contextualize the extent to which Brazilian foreign policy has enhanced its 
South-South orientation, one needs to compare it with what other Middle Powers have been 
doing with respect to SSDC in the meantime. We will take a quick glance at three emerging 
nations which have prioritized Africa among their foreign policy objectives. I have decided 
to showcase one regional power from each continent to represent a diverse spectrum of 
initiatives and policies in the subject: Turkey (Europe), South Korea (Asia) and Mexico 
(Americas). The reason why the role and policies of the major players (China, India, EU, 
US) are not analyzed in this paper is due to two factors: (1) the complexity of the interaction 
of those nations would require an independent study on its own; (2) Brazil’s SSDC policy is 
not comparable neither in extent nor in scope to those of the major foreign actors in Africa, 
but is more similar to those of the Middle Powers. 
 
i. Turkey: religious-historical narrative - a tool for economic leverage 
 
The dramatic expansion of the Turkish economy in the second half of the 20th century meant 
that the domestic market cannot satisfy all the economic output of the country anymore. 
Turkey, thus, started looking for new export markets at the dawn of the new millennium, 
when the country adopted an Action Plan for Africa in 1998. Seven years later Turkey 
designated 2005 as “Year of Africa” and the country attained observer status at the African 
Union (AU). Three years later Turkey organized the first ever Africa-Turkey Summit in 
Istanbul and the Eurasian country’s status was upgraded to strategic partner at the AU. In 
2013 Turkey became member of the African Development Fund (ADF) and of the African 
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Development Bank (AfDB). A milestone in Afro-Turkish relations was November 21st, 
2014, when the 2. Africa-Turkey summit took place in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The 
2015-2018 Africa-Turkey Action Plan was adopted at the same event. 
 
Turkey’s diplomatic offensive is most visible in the number of diplomatic missions opened 
on the continent since 2010: 27 embassies were opened in half a decade to triple the number 
of outposts to 39 in Africa by 2016. The relationship was is not one-sided: 22 African 
countries opened representations in Ankara during the same period, with five others being 
in the pipeline. Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Africa has reached US$17.5 billion in 
2015. This is a three-fold increase in volume compared to the records of 2003. Trade volume 
with Sub-Saharan Africa was realized at US$6 billion level in 2015. President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan visited four West African and four East African countries in 2016 and 2017, 
respectively, accompanied by a delegation of over 150 businessmen on each journey. 
President Erdoğan, in a meeting with President John Magufuli of Tanzania in 2016, pledged 
to increase bilateral trade with Africa to US$50 billion by 2018 and to US$100 billion by 
2023.  
 
In an interview with the Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey 
in Nairobi, Kenya, Mr. Selman Kurt informed me about export promotion facilities of the 
government to assist Turkish companies in setting a foot in Africa.241 In line with the increase 
in diplomatic presence, Turkey has opened Commercial Consulates in 26 African capitals. 
In addition, Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Council established business councils with 
19 Sub-Saharan African countries. Turkish firms are reimbursed for their flight tickets, 
accommodation, space rental at fairs and exhibitions and receive consulting in setting up of 
a local branch and office in the desired African country. Most large corporations are active 
in the construction, engineering, mining and machinery fields, while small- and medium-
sized enterprises operate in the textile and food industry. The Turkish national carrier, 
Turkish Airlines (THY) flies to more African destinations than any other European airline 
(42 cities in 27 countries), and – according to Mr. Kurt – the direct linking of a country to 
Turkey results a 10% initial spike in bilateral trade. One fifth of Turkey’s total external trade 
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is done with Africa – in particular with North Africa –, where major civil construction 
projects are being executed by Turkish companies. Turkish investment in Africa in 2014 
stood at US$6.2 billion and created over 16,000 jobs, becoming the largest employer foreign 
nation with regard to foreign direct investments in the continent.242 
 
It is worth mentioning the emphasis the Turkish government places on religious-cultural and 
historical factors when it comes to official South-South rhetoric. The reminiscing of the 
times of the Ottoman ‘fraternity’ is especially poignant in dealing with North Africa and the 
Horn of Africa. Turkey, as hereditary nation state of the glorious Empire, has a moral duty 
and obligation to help her ‘brothers’ achieve economic and social development. At the same 
time, all the former vassals of the great Ottoman Empire are brothers in faith, they share a 
common religion and cultural background, which gives another reason for closer bonding 
and fraternal relations. Turkey positions itself as the Savior of North and East Africa in the 
face of Western colonization from the 16th century onwards. Many argue that it is this strong 
religious-cultural-historical affiliation – backed by an assertive diplomacy – that makes 
Turkish companies so successful in winning public procurement contracts in Africa.243 
 
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is present in 12 African 
countries and works on a multitude of projects from social development to humanitarian aid. 
In Somalia, Turkey has built the country’s largest hospital and main airport in Mogadishu, 
among many roads and other infrastructure projects. It is also in this war-torn country that 
Turkey has her biggest embassy in the world. Turkey is also actively involved in 
coordination over religious matters in Africa, from the reconstruction of mosques and 
Islamic holy sites to the elaboration of curricula in madrassas and the training of imams.  
 
ii. South Korea: a progressive partnership or agricultural imperialism? 
 
The Republic of Korea is a relative newcomer to the African stage. After an initial 
presidential visit in 1982 to Africa, the next South Korean head of state to step foot on 
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African soil was President Roh Moo-hyun in 2006 (Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria). In the same 
year, Seoul hosted the first Korea-Africa Forum, where President Roh announced the 
“Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development”, which promised an increase in ODA, sharing 
of economic development experience, provision of medical care and job training, technology 
transfer in information technology and agriculture. Seoul also co-organized the Inter-
Sessional Conference for the Korea-Africa Forum in Johannesburg in November 2007. At 
that meeting, the South Korean delegates promised to transfer economic development 
experience, especially for rural areas, to other participants. In October 2008, another Korea-
Africa Forum was held in Rabat, Morocco. The regular, bi-annual Korea-Africa Economic 
Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) was launched in 2008 in Seoul, where Korea pledged 
to promote US$760 million worth of economic cooperation projects by 2010. The 2015 
Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) attracted over 7,000 delegates. 
 
The dynamic growth of the South Korean economy, from being on the same level as some 
of the poorest African states half a century ago to becoming the eleventh largest economy in 
the world in 2016, has turned the Asian tiger into one of the planet’s largest energy importers. 
In fact, since the Republic of Korea is void of natural resources under its soil, 97% of its oil 
requirements are imported from abroad. The Far East Asian nation is looking at Africa as an 
alternative to the Middle East, the solution for her energy thirst. The limited agricultural area 
of the Korean peninsula has also generated an increasing need to quench the population’s 
hunger from outside sources. This has led to a growth in the food imports from Africa to 
Korea, as well as massive land acquisitions by Korean conglomerations on the continent. 
 
The internationally well-known Korean multinationals (chaebols), such as Samsung, 
Hyundai, Daewoo have all established their presence in Africa’s major markets for some 
time. They serve as ‘ambassadors’ of Korean technological know-how and innovation. 
Information technology projects are the flagship of Korean economic diplomacy: between 
2013 and 2017 South Korea’s largest telecommunications provider, KT Corporation rolled 
out a high-speed 4G internet service to 95 per cent of the population of Rwanda by 2017. 
With only 8.3 per cent of Rwandans online in 2013, such an increase in connectivity could 
mean a 10–13 per cent rise in the rate of GDP growth in 2018 and beyond. South Korea is a 
major development donor to the continent. The Korea International Cooperation Agency’s 
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(KOICA) is responsible for allocating more than 55 percent of South Korea’s allotted foreign 
aid budget to education (30%), health (20%), and governance (6%) projects in Africa.244 
 
A cooperation the Korean people would probably be less proud of occurred in Madagascar 
in 2008. Faced with shrinking cultivable land and increasing consumption, South Korea 
leased 1.3 million hectares of arable land for 99 years to prevent a food security crisis at 
home. In exchange, South Korea pledged infrastructural improvements on the African island 
nation and training of farmers in modern agricultural technology. Roughly half of 
Madagascar’s agricultural area, as well as rainforests were to be converted into palm and 
corn monocultures, producing food for export from a country where a third of the population 
and 50 percent of children under 5 are malnourished, using South African workers instead 
of locals. Local residents were not consulted or informed, despite being dependent on the 
land for food and income. The controversial deal played a major part in prolonged anti-
government protests that resulted in over a hundred deaths and led to the toppling of the 
government of Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. The deal was scrapped when President Andry 
Rajoelina came into power the same year. Notwithstanding, the South Korean government 
has recently signed a deal with Tanzania to develop 100,000 hectares for food production 
and processing. The idea of buying land and cultivating it in foreign countries implies that 
Korea is no longer ‘importing’ food because the land is effectively Korean. This amounts to 
“agricultural imperialism” according to Dave Durbach, South African correspondent of the 
Korea Times daily newspaper.245  
 
iii. Mexico: measured first steps and admirable social initiatives 
 
Mexico, a large Central American nation with social challenges of its own, has also entered 
the “second race for Africa”, albeit at a much slower pace than the other nations listed above. 
Diplomatic relations with African nations were formalized in the 60s and 70s, after the 
independence of the latter, but no significant exchanges other than educational ones took 
place. Mexico’s priority in foreign matters is focused on its northern neighbor, the United 
States, and on its former colonial landlord, Spain and through it, on Europe. 
                                                          
244 Kim Tae-Hyung, “South Korea’s Strategic Relationships with Sub-Saharan Africa”, The Korean Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010, pp. 111-135. 
245 Dave Durbach, “Korea’s Overseas Development Backfires”, The Korea Times, 4 December 2009.  
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The end of the previous century signaled the ‘awakening’ of the Mexican government to the 
potentials lying in the African continent. To reformulate African-Mexican relations, 
President Ernesto Zedillo’s National Development Plan (1995-2000) proposed that “in 
relation to Africa, Mexico needs to contribute with its presence to international cooperation 
with that continent and renew its traditional links, including reopening diplomatic 
missions.”246 The aim was precisely to reformulate an increasingly structured framework for 
relations between Africa and Mexico. In this spirit, Mexico reopened its Embassy in 
Ethiopia, headquarters of the African Union (AU), and signed several cooperation 
agreements on health and environment with South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. In 2006, 
Mexico declared an “Africa Week” in the month of May, during which the great wealth of 
African culture was exhibited in the country. During the following two Africa Weeks, a 
Mexico-African Countries Technical Cooperation Fair was held for the first time, as well as 
a Trade Opportunities Seminar with the participation of Mexico’s honorary consuls in 
Africa. To close the 2008 Africa Week, Mexico’s Senate and Ministry of Foreign Relations 
organized a seminar entitled “Africa and Mexico: Shared Past, Present and Future.” The 
seminar’s objective was to show the shared culture and history of Africa and Mexico and to 
analyze Africa’s political, economic and socio-cultural situation. The events featured notable 
Mexican and African personalities and attracted almost the entire African diaspora in 
Mexico. 
 
Mexico’s internationally recognized social development and poverty reduction program, 
called Prospera (Prosperity), has been studied with interest by several African nations. The 
social assistance program, originally called Progresa (Progress) and then Oportunidades 
(Opportunity), was founded in 1997. It was designed to target poverty by providing 
conditional cash transfer to families in exchange for regular school attendance, health clinic 
visits, and nutrition support. Prospera is credited with decreasing poverty and improving 
health and educational attainment in regions where it has been deployed and it served as role 
model for the highly successful Brazilian welfare program Zero Hunger. In the last ten years, 
Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania have 
                                                          
246 Louis Valentin Mballa, “A Discreet Look at Africa from Mexico”, Voices of Mexico, No. 84, January-April 
2009, p. 80. 
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approached Mexico to find out about its experience in implementing social development 
policies and the fight against poverty.247 
 
As seen above, each Middle Power has its own way of approaching Africa: Turkey 
emphasizes the religious, cultural and historical links that unite its people with those of North 
and East Africa; South Korea builds on its image as a world-class technology provider and 
neutral donor for capacity building in the fields of health care and agriculture; Mexico 
highlights the structural similarities and common social challenges and promotes its social 
assistance program as something that could also benefit Africa. Brazil, on the other hand, 
can boast with a significant African-descendant population, shared language with many 
African nations and geographic, geologic and climatic affinity, three factors that differentiate 
it from the other emerging nations described above. One common trait that unites all, 
nonetheless, is the recognition that Africa will soon become the largest breadbasket and 
energy supplier of the world, and whoever is not present, will be left without a slice from 
the cake. 
 
C. Validation of the hypotheses 
 
Having delved deep into the matter of historical relevance of kinship in modern day South-
South Cooperation, we can infer the following conclusions based on the evidence presented 
in this doctoral research paper: 
(1)  The uniqueness of Brazilian-African cooperation is inherently related to the 
long-standing historical ties between the two regions: the ethnic composition, the 
customs, traditions, culture and gastronomy of Brazil have been greatly influenced 
by the influx of millions of African slaves over the centuries. The jeito and ginga 
way of life, the positive outlook in the face of hardships and the intricate political-
economic web of the society characterize both sides of the Southern Atlantic. The 
social, economic challenges faced by the two nations are in some way similar, but 
in other are completely different. Brazil is way more industrialized than any 
African nation, including South Africa, and has gigantic multinationals that can 
compete on the global stage in the fields of agriculture, metallurgy, air transport 
                                                          
247 Ibid., p. 81. 
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among others. On the other hand, the African economies are thinly structured, 
household production dominates the agriculture and manufacturing is minimal.    
(2)  There exists an overemphasis on the relevance of these ties with respect to 
modern-day business relations between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean: the 
survey conducted – albeit we have only the replies of three respondents – confirms 
that the young generation of businessmen and decision-makers in Africa and Brazil 
do not perceive that they enjoy special privilige for sharing a common past. The 
linguistic similarities in certain countries (i.e. PALOP), and the way of thinking 
and ability to find solutions to sudden challenges can be of advantage, but the list 
ends there. The asymmetric levels of industrialization and lack of cohesive 
government structures poses a challenge to Brazilian entrepreneurs almost to the 
same extent as it does for Asians and Europeans. The conversations with the Head 
of the Trade Section at the Embassy of Brazil in Kenya, as well as the personal 
experiences of the author tend to confirm this assumption. 
(3)  Behind the façade of the Brazilian government’s rhetoric about ‘brotherhood, 
solidarity and non-conditionality’ lies a hidden economic agenda that drives 
Brazil’s South-South partnership to at least the same extent as its 
philanthropism. During the two tenures of President Lula (2003-2011), Brazil was 
in a fortunate position, it was riding on the wave of a global economic boom and 
was at the onset of the renewed interest in Africa and South-South Cooperation. It 
was easy to ‘sell’ the idea of an altruistic former colony rising up to help its 
brothers and sisters in need. Millions of dollars were poured into Africa and as 
long as everbody had a job back home, nobody seemed to care to whom and how 
the funds were disbursed. However, as the financial crisis stormed the world, 
Brazilians began to question where their tax money had gone in Africa. Operation 
Car Wash was just the top of the iceberg of a massive fraud and embezzlement 
scheme that started almost two decades ago, exactly at the same time when 
President Lula increased the credit line available for development projects in 
Africa. The result was inevitable: in a country where a handful of immensely 
powerful mega-corporations control the vast majority of construction business, one 
could expect that they would do anything to win the highly lucrative – and 
overpriced – development projects the Brazilian government has planned to 
showcase to the world in Africa. The intertwining of political and economic 
interests at the highest levels meant that it was just a question of time before a 
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government employee or politician would fall for the temptation of cutting a slice 
off the SSC cake. 
 
Based on the evidence presented in the dissertation, we can confirm that all three hypotheses 
have proved to be TRUE, and can safely say that while historical kinship can be 
advantageous for relations among people, it is not a guarantee for success in itself. At the 
same time, no matter how glitzy the rhetoric is, no cooperation is based on purely altruistic 
motivations, and it also implies to Brazil’s South-South Cooperation. 
 
D. Quo vadis Brazil: a New Atlantic Alliance248 or neo-colonialism? 
 
As a researcher of the Global Public Policy Institute says, “Brazil is still enjoying its 
honeymoon in Africa.”249 Still, with its prominence in mining, there is always a danger that 
Brazil is seen as a new colonial power. The question remains: is South-South cooperation 
that different from North-South cooperation? Is Brazil really an ‘anti-China’? 
 
Supporters of Brazil’s SSDC remind its detractors of the old proverb “there is no free lunch”, 
saying that where money is spent, somebody will benefit from it. They also point out that 
South-South cooperation is not all about aid and development assistance, it also comprises 
other aspects of the economy, such as tourism, investments and trade. 
 
Illustration 2. Brazil in Africa – a New Atlantic Alliance. 
                                                          
248 The term was coined by the journalist of The Economist in the article “Brazil in Africa: A New Atlantic 




Source: “Brazil in Africa: A New Atlantic Alliance”, The Economist, 10 November 2012. 
 
Opponents of this massive allocation of resources to a ‘futureless continent’ talk of prestige 
diplomacy and would prefer “less ideology and more strategy.”250 Celso Lafer calls the 
adoption of radically new external relations política-espetáculo, an attempt by President 
Lula to divert attention away from domestic issues by issuing a flamboyant foreign policy 
that has nothing to do with reality. There are no studies or statistics showing numerically the 
foregone trade with traditional partners that resulted from the rechanneling of resources to 
the edification of South-South commerce, but Brazil’s representative on agriculture at the 
FTAA may have been right when stating: “trade policy should be aligned with countries in 
which generating trade is possible. It is good to intensify trade with India and China, but 
they do not replace the US and EU markets.”251 Influential Brazilian business leaders accuse 
the government of clientelism and that only a few companies benefit from the intensified 
SSDC policy of the country. They argue that most Brazilians are not aware of the projects 
on which, let alone where and how much of their tax money is spent. 252 
 
                                                          
250 Professor Gábor Búr calls the post-Cold War decade “Africa’s sliding off the world map.” Source. Gábor 
Búr, A szubszaharai Afrika története, Kossuth Kiadó. Budapest, 2011, p. 186. 
251 Zsolt Mészáros, “Reaching out to the South: new dynamism in Brazil-Africa relations”, in: TradeCraft 
Review Periodical of the Scientific Board of Military Security Office. Issue 2, 2011. p. 33. 
252 “Empresarios atacam politica do governo”, O Estado de Sao Paolo, 5 October 2004, in: Chris Alden and 
Marco Antonio Vieira, The New Diplomacy of the South, p. 1086. 
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Angolan political analyst Nelson Pestana goes as far as to accuse Brazil of having “clearly 
played a colonial role in Angola, which contributed to the exhaustion of national wealth and 
Angolan resources.”253 Pestana refers to the looting of his country behind the mask of civil 
construction and public works as “…the poor roads that have ceased to exist, all this was the 
result of the plunder that the Angolan elites in power and the Brazilian elites of power did 
during that period that they called economic growth.”254 Pestana’s strong remarks rebuff the 
image Brazil wants to project to her African counterparts; that she is ‘anti-China’, a nation 
that is most concerned with know-how transfer, sustainable development and capacity 
building, that is to the benefit of all parties interested. 
 
According to experts, North-South agreements score better on implementation than South-
South agreements. This is because North-South agreements can integrate economies with 
distinct technological capabilities and other different factor proportions and therefore the 
potential gains are usually greater. Lula’s obsession with partnership-building has led to a 
spaghetti bowl of overlapping arrangements (i.e. G-20, IBSA, BRICS, BASIC) with little 
transparency and coherence. Others point out, that Brazil’s immense public investments into 
Africa are payment for the African countries’ vote when it comes to the reform of the UN 
Security Council. Africa can multiply Brazil’s power in the international organization. 
 
Whatever the arguments pro or contra Brazil’s South-South cooperation policy, one cannot 
deny its importance in the country’s external relations in the 21st century. As was elaborated 
in this paper, Brazil certainly has similarities with the African continent that can be traced 
back to historical, geographical, demographic and development factors. Nonetheless, these 
common links do not necessarily represent an advantage per se, results must be worked hard 
for. Brazilian diplomats and scholars, in general, subscribe to the view that the country’s 
engagement in technical cooperation is an instrument of foreign economic policy. The fact 
that economic interests are sometimes present in the background is not unique to Brazil’s 
international cooperation activities. Western countries do it explicitly (they call the return 
on investment condition), Asian states prefer to deal with it implicitly (by asking for 
concessions, preferential treatment for the firms of the donor nation, etc.). The intertwining 
of public and private interests in Brazil is not unique to the country’s foreign relations either; 
                                                          
253 Relly, Balanço das relações, p. 23. 
254 Ibid. 
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in Brazilian society relations of patronage have always been a determining factor in who 
gets the bigger slice of the cake. This is an issue that has to be tackled domestically by the 
Brazilian people. 
 
Lula’s strategy has not been focusing on short-term gains, but on concerted action that would 
help both sides of the Atlantic create long-lasting partnerships. In contrast to China, Brazil 
is here to stay. It has prepared the way carefully, paying attention to local conditions and 
offering assistance and employment opportunities to locals. Therefore, Brazil is unlikely to 
be perceived as the new neocolonialist peril threatening the existence of African states.255 
For Africa, Brazil’s Southern solidarity seems to be the least damaging approach from a 
foreign nation for a long time, even if it entails certain levels of soft imperialism. 
 
This dissertation intended to introduce to the reader the dimensions in which Brazilian 
South-South cooperation is acting, as well as elaborate on the various factors that have 
shaped the country’s foreign development policy over the last century and a half. The unique 
traits that link the two sides of the Atlantic are the building blocks on which the South 
American nation has recently been building its contemporary relations with Africa. Not to 
detract from the efforts and inputs of subsequent Brazilian administrations in the rekindling 
of relations with the black continent, one cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that most 
cooperation projects are implemented in the vicinity of the major investments of Brazilian 
industrial conglomerates. In the light of recent evidence supporting collusion between these 
corporations and top-level government officials, one has to question that Brazil’s SSDC 
policy is guided exclusively by solidarity and non-conditionality.  
 
Notwithstanding, compared with the European exploitative colonialism of the 19th century 
and China’s modern grab-all strategy, Brazil seems to have a third-way solution for 
engagement with the African continent. The question whether it truly delivers on its promise 
of mutual benefit for all remains to be answered in half a century when the initiatives 
implemented begin to pay off.  It will be interesting to see how the government’s new South-
South Cooperation policies will be affected after Operation Car Wash is concluded. Will the 
government make its development financer (i.e. BNDES) more transparent to the public to 
                                                          
255 In addition to bringing business opportunities to Africa, Brazil has become one of the largest donors of 
development aid to the continent, on par with Sweden and Canada, two traditional donor countries. 
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mitigate accusations of corruption? Or will it revamp its SSC strategy completely and start 




A.  Comparative Matrix for South-South Cooperation 
 
 
Source: Carlos R.S. Milani, Prof. South-South Cooperation and Foreign Policy Agendas: a comparative 
framework. Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, IESP. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. 
p.14.  
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B.  List of African projects of the Agricultural Innovation MKTPlace (EMBRAPA) 
 









Study of the Ecology and 
Nutritional Potential of 
Native Food Tree Species 
used by local communities 
in Burkina Faso and 
Brazilian Amazon: A Food 
security and conservation 














Bee Diversity And Crop 







Mekelle University  Embrapa Acre  Completed 
 
Introduction of Napier grass 
elite lines for screening for 
stunt resistance to provide 














cowpea legume production 












Fostering knowledge sharing 
for integrated natural 
resource management in 
agricultural landscapes of 








Centre (ICRAF)  
Embrapa Soils Completed 
 
Sweet sorghum varietal 







Pipal Limited  
Embrapa Maize 
& Sorghum  
Completed 
 
Developing a push-pull IPM 
strategy for smallholder 
cotton farFemale in Africa 
















Rehabilitation of degraded 
rangeland using planned 
grazing and animal impact 
in the arid and semi arid 





Frontières Suisse  
Embrapa Goats 
& Sheep  
Completed 
 
Cotton varieties and pest 




University of Dar 
es Salaam  
Embrapa Cotton  Completed 
 195 









Pesticide leaching and loss 
to groundwater in coastal 














Production And Nutrition 
Through Developing 
Drought Tolerant And High 











Participatory Evaluation and 
Promotion of Improved 
Pepper Cultivars (Capsicum 











Enhancing rice and maize 
production by small-holders 











& Sorghum  
Completed 
 
Species identification of 
root-knot nematodes (RKN) 
through improved diagnostic 
techniques aimed at durable 
resistance in vegetables 
grown in peri-urban systems 





Institute of Tropical 








assisted selection for 
cassava mosaic disease and 
screening of cassava wild 
relatives as resistance 
sources for cassava brown 













sustainable breeding of local 
chicken for improved 
productivity under local 
alternative feed management 











Swine Improvement in 
Ethiopia through Genetic 
and Socio-Economic 
Characterization and 
Development of a 











Nutritional properties and 























Research in the Dry 
Areas (ICARDA)  
Embrapa Goats 
& Sheep  
Completed 
 196 








sustainable small ruminant 
improvement programs  
 
Production and management 














domestication of indigenous 
edible and medicinal 
















Facilitating local level dairy 
innovation platforms for 







PICO - Eastern 






Sustainable Improvement of 
Swiddens for Livelihoods 












Eastern Amazon  
Completed 
 
Identification of broad 
resistance sources to 
anthracnose and rust in 
common bean and resistance 











& Beans  
Completed 
 
Utilization of Hydraulic 














Evaluation of anti-tick 
vaccine technology for 
adoption in strategic control 
of ticks and tick-borne 










Coffee genetic diversity in 































Among West Africa and 
Brazil Locally Adapted 
























markers for development of 












Utilizing Sustainable Energy 
















Narrowing the yield gap of 
food legumes through 
integrated management of 
parasitic weeds in the 






Research in the Dry 







Sustainable Rice Production 
Intensification in 
Conservation Agriculture: 
Incorporation of Legume 
and Grass as Cover Crops 
for Weed Management and 













improvement of farmer 
preferred rice varieties to the 
stalk-eyed fly (Diopsis sp): 
an emerging pest in rainfed 













Improving crop productivity 
through use of efficient, low 





Mekelle University  
Embrapa 





Comparative evaluation of 



















and Policies to Guide 
Deployment of Biotech/GM 












Exchange of banana and 
plantain (Musa spp.) 
varieties and hybrids 
between IITA and 
EMBRAPA - widening the 
genetic base for the 





Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA)  
Embrapa 
Cassava & 













cultivars and direct use by 
farmers 
 
Inoculation of efficient 
rhizobial strains as an 
approach to increase the 
pigeonpea production of 















Development of upland rice 
lines with wide blast 
resistance by marker 








Forestal (INIAF)  
Embrapa Rice 






farmers by strengthening 
capacities for organic 
production and 



















Transfer of Embrapa’s 
integrated agronomic 
package for aflatoxin-
minimization practices and 
its improvement to enhance 
smallholder aflatoxin-free 
















High quality effective 
rhizobium inoculants for 



































productivity, climate change 
resilience and environmental 
sustainability through 
adaptation of improved 















Design, fabrication and 
evaluation of affordable 
multi-feed biomass gasifier 















Revisiting the ignored 
landraces of Ethiopian 
durum wheat to adapt 
climate change: 
Participatory selection for 





















and high grain yield under 
field conditions of Tigray 
 
Developing chemical 
ecological tools for 
integrated pest management 















Transfer of Embrapa’s On-
Farm AM-fungi inoculum 
production technology to 
enhance rock phosphate use 
efficiency and crop 

















maize production through 
the promotion of Tilemsi 
rock phosphate combinated 
with phosphate-solubilizing 
and nitrogen-fixing bacteria 















Assessment of the Booroola 
Fecundity (FecB) Gene in 
Ethiopian Sheep Breed for 












Increased Smallholder Food 
Production Through 
Implementation of Water 
Conserving Aquaponics-












Initiating data recording 
system at Ethiopian dairy 
farmers level and improving 













Cashew fruit - adding value 

















Farming insects as a 
possible alternative for high 
protein feed for chicken and 














Screening of Indigenous 
Strains of Lactic Acid 
Bacteria for Development of 





















Inoculation of efficient 
endophytic microbe strains 
as an approach to control 
bacterial blight and blast 
diseases for improving 

















Enhancing crop productivity 
through incorporation of 
















Integrating food and feeds 
crops to improve livelihoods 









Institute for Natural 








productivity through rapid 
diagnostics for soybean rust 
and determining pathogenic 
diversity to enhance targeted 






Institute of Tropical 








production in Ethiopia 
through production system 
studies, breed 
characterization and 
















Local seeds value chain 
promotion: Farmers led 
breeding and distribution of 












Enriching livelihoods of 
small scale hot pepper 
farmers through partnerships 













Agroforestry systems for 

















Integrated Management of 
Invasive Fruit Fly Species in 













Source: Agricultural Innovation MKTPlace (EMBRAPA) website. 
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C.  Vale Response to Southern Africa Resource Watch - Excerpt from HRW Report 
 
Source: “What is a House without Food? Mozambique’s Coal Mining Boom and 
Resettlements.” [2013] Human Rights Watch Report. Retrieved 12 October, 2017 from 
from https://www.hrw.org/report/.../mozambiques-coal-mining-boom-and-resettlements.  
  
In 2012, Southern Africa Resource Watch published a critique of the Vale and Rio Tinto 
resettlements in Tete province. Human Rights Watch has reproduced the Vale response 
below. 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 5th, 2012 
Maputo, Mozambique 
 




Ethics and transparency are core values for Vale. Last June, the company launched its fourth 
annual Sustainability Report, which refers to 2010. For the second consecutive year, Vale 
achieved an A+ “application level,” indicating the highest level of transparency. The 
company reports its performance in economic, environmental and social dimensions in line 
with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) methodology. The A+ application level requires 
the reporting of 90 indicators, including all profile items, management data and essential 
performance and Mining & Metals Sector Supplement indicators. The document has been 
checked by an external independent entity and verified for compliance with guidelines 
produced by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), to which Vale is a 
signatory. It has also been checked by GRI itself. As a result of this continuous improvement 
with regard to transparency, Vale recently took a major step forward, as the first mining 
company to join the São Paulo Stock Exchange’s ISE Business Sustainability Index, a 
portfolio that came into effect in 2010. Vale is in compliance with all its tax requirements, 
and follows the applicable legislation for its activities in Mozambique. It is also subject to 
the commitments taken on its concession agreement. Vale is audited on a quarterly and 
annual basis by top level audit companies, in compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 
company’s financial statements are audited and disclosed in accordance with the accounting 
principles generally accepted in the USA (US GAAP) and Brazil (BR GAAP), as well as the 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Vale has won the Investor Relations 
Program Award and the Transparency in Financial Statements Award.  
 
Suppliers and Local Manpower 
 
When implementing a project, Vale concerns itself with leaving a legacy for the community 
and country that will last longer than a mine’s lifespan. More than just generating jobs, the 
company works to develop mechanisms to permit the local economy to sustain itself after 
the end of mineral extraction. All recruitment, training and development actions designed 
for the Moatize Coal Mine Project prioritize local workers and suppliers. Vale’s objective is 
to favor Mozambican companies when hiring suppliers of goods and services, and the 
company gives priority to job candidates from regions close to production areas. Vale is also 
running partnerships to help develop institutions and service providers, and is promoting 
formal and vocational education across the country through agreements with institutes and 
universities. At the moment, around 84% of employees at Moatize Coal Mine are 
Mozambicans. The company has invested in training operators, maintenance technicians and 
locomotive engineers, and has run internship programs in areas such as geology, 
infrastructure, energy, the environment, port construction, engineering and maintenance 
work, mine operations, and exploration. Mozambican employees have participated in 
trainings at Vale’s operations in Brazil. Between 2008 and 2011, Vale hired 439 companies 
registered in Mozambique, awarding contracts worth a total of approximately US$900 
million. Our aim is to increase the number of contracts with local suppliers, and to that end 
we are implementing a Linkage Program focusing on small and medium companies, building 
capacity among local entrepreneurs.  
 
About the Resettlement Process 
 
While carrying out feasibility studies for the Moatize Coal Project, Vale identified all 
families living in areas earmarked for industrial activities within the mining concession area. 
Together with a Resettlement Commission, and supported by a specialist consultancy, Vale 
spent three years engaged in extensive discussions with communities and conducting 
specific studies to produce a Resettlement Action Plan. The Resettlement Commission was 
led by the permanent secretary of Tete Provincial Government. Other members included 
representatives of provincial authorities (responsible for mineral resources, environmental 
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action coordination, public works and housing, and agriculture), the administrator of 
Moatize District, and the president of the Moatize Town Municipal Council. Dialogue with 
the community began in the program’s preliminary phase. A community participation plan 
was created, based on studies of the territory and the resident population. From 2005 to 2007, 
Vale conducted primary and secondary data surveys, qualitative and quantitative research, a 
socioeconomic diagnosis, an urban and environmental categorization study, and a survey to 
identify and register stakeholders. This research provided a detailed diagnosis of the 
project’s different areas of territorial focus. The process of producing the Resettlement 
Action Plan and Environmental Impact Study involved extensive public engagement and 
participation, consisting of three public hearings, 20 theater performances in the predominant 
local language (Nyungwe), meetings with the community and its leaders using informative 
tools such as flipcharts, 4,927 home visits for mobilization and social welfare purposes 
(involving families and leaders), and 639 social service sessions before resettlement began. 
To select the host areas, certain criteria were established by the Commission. They included 
the following: location within the Moatize Administrative Area; lack of mining concessions 
in the area; the ability to access the area; lack of significant human occupation; proximity to 
urban centers; water availability; and favorable soil for arable farming and grazing. Eleven 
potential areas were evaluated, and two of them were selected: Cateme and 25 de Setembro. 
The 25 de Setembro area has more urban characteristics and is located within a neighborhood 
in the town of Moatize. The Cateme area has a more rural nature and is located 36 km from 
the town of Moatize. Families that made a living from farming, and whose habits were more 
associated with rural life, were given preference to relocate to Cateme. Conversely, families 
with a more urban economic profile, working in activities connected with the town of 
Moatize, were given preference to move to the 25 de Setembro neighborhood in Moatize. 
For families that were not resettled, we provided the option of “assisted compensation” (106 
families chose this modality), which consisted of buying another home in line with valuation 
and inspection criteria, chosen by the family, which then moved there. Finally, 254 families 
that owned homes, farms and commercial buildings in the Resettlement Action Plan area, 
but did not live there themselves, were given simple compensation. In September 2009, after 
negotiations and agreements had been finalized, work on resettling the families began. The 
Cateme area received 716 families. In Cateme, Vale provided the following facilities for the 
community:  
 An elementary school: six blocks each containing three classrooms, and a library; 
 Eight teachers’ houses and one house for the school principal; 
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 A high school: four blocks each containing three classrooms, an administrative block, 
a library, and an information technology room; 
 A health and maternity clinic and two houses for health professionals; 
 A police station; 
 Laying out of streets; 
 Electric power in the main street and at public facilities; 
 A water supply system; 
 A cereal kit and vegetable kit delivered to each family; 
 A 0.6-hectare yard for each house, for growing vegetables or other activities; 
 1 hectare of plowed land prepared for growing crops; 
 Another 1 hectare of land will also be provided. 
 The 25 de Setembro neighborhood received 289 families. 
 In 25 de Setembro, Vale provided the following: 
 Refurbishment of Samora Machel Elementary School, remodeling and expanding 
 Six classrooms and building new restrooms; 
 Refurbishment of Heróis Moçambicanos High School, constructing three new blocks 
each containing three classrooms and new restrooms; 
 Refurbishment of the health center in the town of Moatize; 
 Construction of a new police station; 
 Electric power in all streets; 
 Water connections in all homes. 
The resettlement process was completed in August 2010. A post-settlement program was 
then initiated and a social program implemented. Vale Mozambique acknowledges that there 
are still improvements to be made to the resettled people’s community infrastructure, and is 
working hard to develop actions to support these families, together with government entities, 
to meet the demands of the resettled communities. The following improvement actions are 
under way: 
 Repairs to houses; 
 Increase in the supply of water for productive activities, and irrigation of 20 hectares 
for growing crops; 
 Income generation programs run in conjunction with the Provincial Agricultural 
Agency, including chicken breeding and other initiatives; 
 Expansion of electrification to all parts of the resettled people’s communities; 
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 Support for the Food for Work program coordinated by the National Disaster 
 Management Institute; 
 Implementation of a transportation system in coordination with the District 
Administration of Cateme/Moatize; 
 Improvement to access roads, including paving; 
 Training in farming techniques, coordinated by the Provincial Agricultural Agency; 
 Donation of an ambulance; 
 A community radio station; 
 Installation of a market in Cateme. 
Besides the aforementioned actions, Vale is running the following voluntary social projects 
and actions through its Foundation, to promote the socioeconomic development of the 
communities in the areas where the company operates: 
 Construction of a plant to manufacture antiretroviral drugs and other medications; 
 A Water Management Plan for Tete; 
 A project to support the building of low-cost housing in Tete; 
 Construction of Moatize Sports Center; 
 Rehabilitation of Tunduru Gardens; 
 A project in partnership with the University of Amsterdam and Eduardo Mondlane 
University to train students and design an energy supply system for Mozambique; 
 A preliminary plan for conserving the Boroma ruins in Tete; 
 A project to encourage reading by distributing books and training teachers; 
 Construction of an overnight clinic; 
 Cultural and sporting festivals in Moatize; 
 Cateme Model Farm. 
Since it came to Mozambique, Vale has implemented various other social initiatives in the 
country, as listed below. 
 
Social Actions Completed during the Feasibility Study Phase: 
 Remodeling and equipping of the Moatize Intermediate Institute of Geology and 
Mines; 
 Rehabilitation of Moatize Health Center; 
 Rehabilitation and expansion of Tete Provincial Hospital; 
 Donation of four ambulances to Moatize District (Mobile Emergency Aid System); 
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 Training of health professionals; 
 Construction and refurbishment of three orphanages; 
 Rehabilitation of the Moatize Intermediate Institute of Geology and Mines and 
installation of the Educational Coal Laboratory; 
 Adult literacy program; 
 Family farming and rural development support for the Mafupa Ya Ndzou Rural 
People’s Association; 
 Technical training in fashion, carpentry, vehicle maintenance, metalwork, 
construction and electrical work. 
 
Social Actions Conducted during the Mine Implementation Phase: 
 Survey of the nutritional profile of children in the resettled communities; 
 Training on nutrition for health professionals and the community; 
 Anti-parasite campaigns for members of the resettled communities; 
 Nutrition workshops; 
 Formation of and training for model mothers’ groups; 
 Talks and monitoring for pregnant women; 
 Health awareness-raising campaigns (Heart Day, Anti-Malaria Day, an HIV 
campaign, etc.); 
 Distribution of mosquito nets for all members of the resettled communities; 
 Education system human resources training seminars; 
 Essay-writing contest involving schools in Moatize; 
 Teacher-training seminar in Moatize; 
 Support for the implementation of a radio program in Cateme; 
 Training seminar on developing, producing and managing cultural projects; 
 Course for basketball and soccer coaches; 
 Athletics training course; 
 Refresher training for sports teachers and agents; 
 Vacation soccer championship; 
 Traditional games; 
 Training for young soccer referees; 7 
 Annual Cultural and Sports Festival (since 2008); 
 Support for governmental sports programs (Second Half, Fut21, and School Games); 
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 Sponsorship of the Mozambique Cooking Program; 
 Digital Inclusion Project: three information technology rooms installed and an 
information technology course conducted; 
 Support workshops for farming activities in Cateme and the donation of enhanced 
inputs; 
 Workshop on planting fruit trees and vegetables; 
 Planting of fruit trees and trees to provide shade in the resettled people’s 
communities; 
 The “Read More” project. 
 
Social Actions Under Way – Model Farm Program (Sponsored by the Vale Foundation): 
 Creation of demonstration fields; 
 Creation of multiplication fields for cassava and orange-fleshed sweet potato; 
 Purchase and distribution of short-cycle cassava stems; 
 Training for cassava and sweet potato farmers; 
 Allocation and distribution of short-cycle sorghum and corn seeds; 
 Creation of an experimentation and multiplication field for yams; 
 Project to build chicken coops; 
 Training on animal traction techniques for farmers; 
 Production and donation of fruit tree saplings for the people of Cateme (banana, 
orange, lime, papaya and cashew). Study on beekeeping; 
 Study on breeding of quails, rabbits and goats; 
 Field days at the model farm; 
 Training for producers on the manufacture and use of mineral blocks and stacks; 
 Training for producers on the manufacture and use of organic compounds and 
pesticides; 
 Installation of fodder banks; 
 Training courses at the flour mill, on the composting process, and on soil preparation; 
 Growing of vegetables (lettuce, kale, okra, zucchini, squash, pepper, cucumber and 
cabbage) and the growing of other crops on 77 hectares (peanuts, sweet potatoes, 
beans, cassava, corn and sorghum). The output is used to donate seeds for the next 
harvest and surplus production is donated to public institutions.  
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Our mission is to transform natural resources into prosperity and sustainable development, 





Source: “What is a House without Food?” Report. HRW. https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/23/what-house-
without-food/mozambiques-coal-mining-boom-and-resettlements 
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D.  Questionnaires sent to Brazilian corporations and parastatals 
 
State and Non-State Actors in Brazil’s Development Policy in Africa 












1. Please list the countries in Africa in which you are presently operating. How long 
have you been present in each of them? 
 




_49_privateLayout=false to see our operations within a cooperative platform 
named Africa Brazil Agriculture Innovation Market Place. 
Besides these projects, we have worked through the Brazilian Agency of 
Cooperation. To see projects in this category, go to 
http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/pesquisa and select Africa in the region tab and 
Agricultura in the Setor de Atividade tab. You will see a list of projects and 
which ones were carried out by Embrapa. 
 
2. How many employees do you have in each location? What is the percentage of local 
workforce employed? 
 
Most projects do not have residents in Africa. People travel with specific 
missions. We had some projects with 1-3 residents in certain periods. 
 
3. In addition to the training of the local workforce, do you implement any extra 
schemes to aim the individual development of the employees (e.g. family benefits, 
housing, microcredit, scholarships, disease prevention courses, lifestyle counseling, 
etc.)? If yes, please give an example for each country. 
 
We develop research in partnership with countries. Again, visit market place 
site to see the scope of projects. 
 
4. Have any of the above measures been used in your operations in Brazil? Do 
employees in Brazil enjoy similar types of benefits? Please specify the country-
specific schemes. 
 
Our employers have the same advantages in Brazil and abroad. 
 
5. Have you found being a Brazilian company an advantage for your operations in 
Africa? (e.g.: language, similar structure and expertise of local workforce, etc.) 
Please specify the country-specific advantages. 
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In general, there is a good will towards Brazilians, but nothing that we could say 
that lead to an advantage. Being a tropical country and sharing soil and climatic 
conditions with African countries facilitate the understanding of problems 
inherent to production systems in agriculture. Finally, Portuguese is an asset in 
Portuguese speaking countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, 
Guiné Bissau and São Tomé e Principe. 
 
 
6. What are the biggest challenges compared to working in Brazil in each of the 
countries above? 
 
In general, our agricultural production systems in Brazil are much more 
structured and dynamic that those of Africa. 
 
7. Do you have an official local community development policy in any of the above 
countries (e.g.; Corporate Social Responsibility programs; joint projects with local 
authorities, institutions; joint projects with Brazilian agencies like ABC, SENAI, 




8. How do you monitor the success of your workforce and local community 
development schemes in each of the countries above? 
 
Embrapa has a continuous process of project development evaluation. An 
analysis of projects impact was carried out in 2014. Probably the International 
Affairs Secretariat of Embrapa can supply a copy of a report on the evaluation 
of projects. Please write to sri.cct@embrapa.br. 
 
9. Please rate from 1 to 6 the importance of the below factors when hiring local 
workforce: 
 
Complying with local regulations 
over minimum local workforce 
requirements 
6 Willingness to be trained 4 
Skills/expertise 6 Long-term retention of workforce - 
Cost advantage over ex-pat 
workforce 
- Sustainability of skills (will employee 






State and Non-State Actors in Brazil’s Development Policy in Africa 












10. Please list the countries in Africa in which you are presently operating. How long 
have you been present in each of them? Nowadays we are in Angola (30 yrs), 
Mozambique (15), Libya (7, but we are closing our operations because of instability), 
Guinea (5), Ghana (2), Equatorial Guinea (2, we are just starting a new contract). 
Other african countries where we have already work before: Zambia, South Africa, 
Djibouti, Liberia and Gabon. 
 
11. How many employees do you have in each location? What is the percentage of local 
workforce employed? Angola (20.000), Mozambique (3.500), Libya (100), Guinea 
(100), Ghana (200), Equatorial Guinea (50). In all those countries the percentage is 
averaged 95%. 
 
12. In addition to the training of the local workforce, do you implement any extra 
schemes to aim the individual development of the employees (e.g. family benefits, 
housing, microcredit, scholarships, disease prevention courses, lifestyle counseling, 
etc.)? If yes, please give an example for each country. 
Yes we do implement such programs, not only aiming our employees but the whole 
community. For example our program called "Acreditar" (Believing) where 
thousands of people in each country develops professional skills (mason, carpenter, 
plumber among others). Some of them come to work with us but lots go work in the 
market with their new skills. It's not only a training program, but a broad social 
program focusing on comunity's development and income generation, as all our other 
programs. 
 
13. Have any of the above measures been used in your operations in Brazil? Do 
employees in Brazil enjoy similar types of benefits? Please specify the country-
specific schemes. 
Our major programs have a unique design, obviously with minor adaptations to every 
reality, whether in Brazil, Latin America or Africa. 
 
14. Have you found being a Brazilian company an advantage for your operations in 
Africa? (e.g.: language, similar structure and expertise of local workforce, etc.) 
Please specify the country-specific advantages. 
There are some advantages of language (Angola and Mozambique), but specially a 
cultural similarity (a "way of life", regardless of language) and a strong intent of 
brazilian government and society in this approach with Africa. 
 
15. What are the biggest challenges compared to working in Brazil in each of the 
countries above? 
The challenges are similar to those that we face in Brasil, but much more deep: 
educational quality, logistics, procurement, financing 
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16. Do you have an official local community development policy in any of the above 
countries (e.g.; Corporate Social Responsibility programs; joint projects with local 
authorities, institutions; joint projects with Brazilian agencies like ABC, SENAI, 
BNDES, etc.)? If yes, please give an example for each country. 
We have a more than a policy: our philosophies and values, known internally as TEO 
("Odebrecht Business Technology") are written and comunicated for all, where the 
basis are the human beings and sustainability. 
We have all this kinds of projects/programs and partners mentioned above. Just in 
Africa, we have about 70 social programs benefiting more than 200.000 people direct 
or indirectly. 
 
17. How do you monitor the success of your workforce and local community 
development schemes in each of the countries above? 
Through the participation of local key stakeholders. The programs counts on their 
participation, suggestions and returns. They are the best ones to tell us about this 
success (or mistakes). 
 
18. Please rate from 1 to 6 the importance of the below factors when hiring local 
workforce: is 1-most important ok? 
 
Complying with local regulations 
over minimum local workforce 
requirements 
6 Willingness to be trained 1 
Skills/expertise 5 Long-term retention of workforce 4 
Cost advantage over ex-pat 
workforce 
3 Sustainability of skills (will employee 





State and Non-State Actors in Brazil’s Development Policy in Africa 







Operational area: Construction 
Year of 
foundation: 




19. Please list the countries in Africa in which you are presently operating. How long 
have you been present in each of them? 
 
Egypt, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. About 10 years in 
each. 
 
20. How many employees do you have in each location? What is the percentage of local 
workforce employed? 
 
Egypt: 200, South Africa: 1000, Mozambique, Angola: 2000. 85% locals. 
 
21. In addition to the training of the local workforce, do you implement any extra 
schemes to aim the individual development of the employees (e.g. family benefits, 
housing, microcredit, scholarships, disease prevention courses, lifestyle counseling, 
etc.)? If yes, please give an example for each country. 
 
„Doing-Good Day” community revitalization (playgrounds, football fields), 
Infância Ideal Program, which prioritizes actions targeted at children, Escola 
Ideal Program targeted at primary and secondary education. 
 
22. Have any of the above measures been used in your operations in Brazil? Do 
employees in Brazil enjoy similar types of benefits? Please specify the country-
specific schemes. 
 
Yes, all the above are used in Brazil, no differentiation between Brazil and 
abroad. 
 
23. Have you found being a Brazilian company an advantage for your operations in 
Africa? (e.g.: language, similar structure and expertise of local workforce, etc.) 
Please specify the country-specific advantages. 
 
Language is same, local workforce is different, less structured. 
 
24. What are the biggest challenges compared to working in Brazil in each of the 
countries above? 
 
Regulatory environment of private investments. 
 
25. Do you have an official local community development policy in any of the above 
countries (e.g.; Corporate Social Responsibility programs; joint projects with local 
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authorities, institutions; joint projects with Brazilian agencies like ABC, SENAI, 
BNDES, etc.)? If yes, please give an example for each country. 
 
We do above programs with local government. 
 
26. How do you monitor the success of your workforce and local community 
development schemes in each of the countries above? 
 
Via independent audit firms and company strategic management system. 
 
27. Please rate from 1 to 6 the importance of the below factors when hiring local 
workforce (1 = not important, 6 = most important): 
 
Complying with local regulations 
over minimum local workforce 
requirements 
6 Willingness to be trained 5 
Skills/expertise 4 Long-term retention of workforce 1 
Cost advantage over ex-pat 
workforce 
2 Sustainability of skills (will employee 
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